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78-40-2. Lis pendens. 
In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property the 
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, and the defendant at the time of 
filing his answer when affirmative relief is claimed in such answer, or at any time 
afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the county in which the property or 
some part thereof is situated a notice of the pendency of the action, containing the names 
of the parties, the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that 
county affected thereby. From the time of filing such notice for record only shall a 
purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby be deemed to have 
constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against parties 
designated by their real names. 
No Change Since 1953 
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78-40-2.5. Motions related to a notice of the pendency of an action. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Claimant" means a person who files a notice. 
(b) "Guarantee" means an agreement by a claimant to pay an amount of damages: 
(i) specified by the court; 
(ii) suffered as a result of the maintenance of a notice; 
(iii) to a person with an interest in the real property that is the subject of the notice; 
and 
(iv) if the requirements of Subsection (6) are met. 
(c) "Notice" means a notice of the pendency of an action filed under Section 
78-40-2. 
(2) Any time after a notice has been recorded pursuant to Section 78-40-2, any of the 
following may make a motion to the court in which the action is pending to release the 
notice: 
(a) a party to the action; or 
(b) a person with an interest in the real property affected by the notice. 
(3) A court shall order a notice released if: 
(a) the court receives a motion to release under Subsection (2); and 
(b) the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the 
evidence the probable validity of the real property claim that is the subject of the notice. 
(4) If a court releases a notice pursuant to this section, the claimant may not record 
another notice with respect to the same property without approval of the court in which 
the action is pending. 
(5) Upon a motion by any person with an interest in the real property that is the 
subject of a notice, a court may require the claimant to give the moving party a guarantee 
as a condition of maintaining the notice: 
(a) any time after a notice has been recorded; and 
(b) regardless of whether the court has received an application to release under 
Subsection (2). 
(6) A person who receives a guarantee under Subsection (5) may recover an amount 
not to exceed the amount of the guarantee upon a showing that: 
(a) the claimant did not prevail on the real property claim; and 
(b) the person seeking the guarantee suffered damages as a result of the maintenance 
of the notice. 
(7) A court shall award costs and attorney fees to a prevailing party on any motion 
under this section unless the court finds that: 
(a) the nonprevailing party acted with substantial justification; or 
(b) other circumstances make the imposition of attorney fees and costs unjust. 
Enacted by Chapter 366, 2004 General Session 
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Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for 
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of 
several different types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to 
each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party 
relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth 
of an averment, he shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly 
meet the substance of the averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny 
only a part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and 
material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good faith to 
controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make his denials as 
specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the 
averments except such designated averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, 
when he does so intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial 
subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth 
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, 
contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of 
consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, 
res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated 
a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice 
so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is 
required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in 
the responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is 
required or permitted shall be taken as denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms 
of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or 
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When two 
or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently 
would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or 
more of the alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims or 
defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable 
grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject to the obligations set forth in 
Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial 
justice. 
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Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time 
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive 
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may 
so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his 
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall 
be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days 
after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the 
court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the pleading are 
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if 
they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as may be 
necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made 
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does 
not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the 
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be 
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. 
The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet 
such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended 
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be 
set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original 
pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable 
notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading 
setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date of 
the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the 
original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court 
deems it advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall so 
order, specifying the time therefor. 
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Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or 
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the 
adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary 
judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is 
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court 
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and 
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and 
the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may 
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file 
such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to 
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order 
the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses 
which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any 
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
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78-40-2.5. Motions related to a notice of the pendency of an action. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Claimant" means a person who files a notice. 
(b) "Guarantee" means an agreement by a claimant to pay an amount of damages: 
(i) specified by the court; 
(ii) suffered as a result of the maintenance of a notice; 
(iii) to a person with an interest in the real property that is the subject of the notice; 
and 
(iv) if the requirements of Subsection (6) are met. 
(c) "Notice" means a notice of the pendency of an action filed under Section 
78-40-2. 
(2) Any time after a notice has been recorded pursuant to Section 78-40-2, any of the 
following may make a motion to the court in which the action is pending to release the 
notice: 
(a) a party to the action; or 
(b) a person with an interest in the real property affected by the notice. 
(3) A court shall order a notice released if: 
(a) the court receives a motion to release under Subsection (2); and 
(b) the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the 
evidence the probable validity of the real property claim that is the subject of the notice. 
(4) If a court releases a notice pursuant to this section, the claimant may not record 
another notice with respect to the same property without approval of the court in which 
the action is pending. 
(5) Upon a motion by any person with an interest in the real property that is the 
subject of a notice, a court may require the claimant to give the moving party a guarantee 
as a condition of maintaining the notice: 
(a) any time after a notice has been recorded; and 
(b) regardless of whether the court has received an application to release under 
Subsection (2). 
(6) A person who receives a guarantee under Subsection (5) may recover an amount 
not to exceed the amount of the guarantee upon a showing that: 
(a) the claimant did not prevail on the real property claim; and 
(b) the person seeking the guarantee suffered damages as a result of the maintenance 
of the notice. 
(7) A court shall award costs and attorney fees to a prevailing party on any motion 
under this section unless the court finds that: 
(a) the nonprevailing party acted with substantial justification; or 
(b) other circumstances make the imposition of attorney fees and costs unjust. 
Enacted by Chapter 366, 2004 General Session 
COWLEY v. PORTER, 2005 UT App 518 
127 P.3d 1224 
Tab 7 
Tracy COWLEY, Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-appellant, v. Slone PORTER, 
Defendant, Appellant, and Cross-appellee. 
No. 20040827-CA. 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
December 8, 2005. 
Appeal from the Fourth District Court, Heber Department, Donald 
J. Eyre, Jr., J. 
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Darrel J. Bostwick, Jeffery R. Price, and Christopher C. Hill, 
Bostwick & Pricem Salt Lake City, for Appellant and 
Cross-appellee. 
E. Craig Smay, Salt Lake City, for Appellee and 
Cross-appellant. 
Before Judges GREENWOOD, McHUGH, and ORME. 
OPINION 
McHUGH, Judge: 
Tf 1 On appeal from a bench trial, Slone Porter (Porter) 
challenges the district court's ruling that he breached a 
contract with Tracy Cowley (Cowley). Porter argues, first, that 
the district court's judgment should be reversed because it is 
based on claims not asserted in Cowley's complaint, and second, 
that several of the district court's factual findings relating to 
the terms of the contract are clearly erroneous. Cowley 
cross-appeals, asserting that the district court erred in 
dismissing Veralynn Porter, Slone Porter's wife (Veralynn), as a 
defendant. Cowley also argues that he should have been awarded 
attorney fees because Porter's defense was asserted without merit 
and in bad faith. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (2002). We 
affirm in part and reverse in part. 
BACKGROUND 
f 2 The district court set forth detailed findings of facts in 
its ruling after trial. Thus, "we relate the facts granting due 
deference to the trial court's resolution of factual disputes." 
Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, ^ 2, 44 P.3d 742. 
Tf 3 Porter had been employed by 7-Eleven, Inc. (7-Eleven) for 
over fourteen years, beginning in February 1981 and ending when 
he was laid off in November 1995. At the time Porter was laid 
off, Cowley was employed as the Area Facilities Manager for 
7-Eleven and had responsibility for approving all outside 
maintenance contracts for stores in Utah, as well as the 
responsibility to oversee that maintenance work. As a matter of 
corporate policy, 7-Eleven published a Code of Business Conduct 
that prohibited employees from engaging in conflicts of interest, 
which expressly included business relationships between any 
outside companies and any current employees or former employees 
for a certain restricted time period. 
f 4 Despite the clear prohibition on such arrangements, Porter 
and Cowley, then both current 7-Eleven employees, and Bill Berg, 
a non-7-Eleven employee who was already doing 7-Eleven landscape 
work, formed Advanced Maintenance Services (AMS).[fnl] The 
company was incorporated in Utah on December 6, 1994, for the 
purpose of entering into contracts with 7-Eleven for general 
maintenance of its stores. Berg, Cowley, and Porter had equal 
ownership in AMS, although no stock certificates were ever 
issued. 
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The participation of Cowley and Porter in AMS was intentionally 
concealed from 7-Eleven, and Berg served as the contact between 
the two companies. AMS was successful in obtaining a number of 
maintenance contracts with 7-Eleven. 
If 5 AMS acquired Straight Line Striping, Inc. (SLS), a 
pavement-marking business, in 1997. In June 1997, following 
arbitration among the three owners of AMS, Berg relinquished his 
interest in the company in exchange for cash, the landscaping 
contracts with 7-Eleven, and two vehicles. Thereafter, Porter and 
Cowley each owned fifty percent of AMS. Without Berg, AMS could 
no longer conceal its noncompliance with 7-Elevenfs Code of 
Business Conduct. Consequently, Porter requested permission to 
own and operate AMS as a contractor with 7-Eleven, despite the 
fact that the time period during which transactions with former 
employees were prohibited had not yet elapsed. Jim Craig, the 
Division Facilities Manager for 7-Eleven, waived the remaining 
time period and agreed to allow AMS to contract with 7-Eleven, 
despite Porter's involvement. Although Craig was Cowley's direct 
supervisor at 7-Eleven, neither Porter nor Cowley informed Craig 
that Cowley had a fifty percent ownership interest in AMS. 
f 6 During the next few years, the contracts with 7-Eleven 
proved lucrative and AMS operated successfully. Porter received 
compensation from AMS and, although Cowley continued to work for 
7-Eleven and provided no direct services to AMS, Cowley also 
received compensation from AMS. To equalize their compensation 
under this arrangement, Cowley's payments from AMS were reduced 
to account for his 7-Eleven salary. Porter and Cowley were each 
receiving between $10,000 and $14,000 per month for their 
ownership interest in AMS. 
f 7 In 2000, Porter and Veralynn (collectively, the Porters), 
together with Cowley and his wife Kerin Cowley (Kerin) 
(collectively, the Cowleys), formed a new Utah corporation called 
Listo, Inc. (Listo). Listo was a holding company that owned title 
to two pieces of real property purchased with funds from AMS. One 
property was located in Midway, Utah, and the other in St. 
George, Utah. 
f 8 Subsequently, Johan de Besche replaced Craig as the 
Division Facilities Manager for 7-Eleven and became Cowley's 
direct supervisor. He began to scrutinize the AMS invoices. In 
February 2001, de Besche confronted Cowley about a family 
vacation to Hawaii that the Cowleys and the Porters had taken 
together because he was concerned that AMS may have paid the 
Cowleys' travel expenses. Fearing that de Besche would discover 
his connection with AMS, Cowley resigned from 7-Eleven effective 
March 31, 2001. He then began working directly for AMS and 
drawing the same salary as Porter. Although de Besche learned of 
Cowley's employment with AMS, he still was unaware that Cowley 
owned fifty percent of the company. 
If 9 Ann Atkin was hired by 7-Eleven to replace Cowley as the 
Area Facilities Manager. In connection with those duties, she 
began a detailed review of all of the AMS invoices. Atkin 
discussed her concerns about the invoices with Porter. At this 
point, the Porters became concerned that AMS might lose the 
7-Eleven contracts if Cowley remained involved with the company. 
f 10 On June 22, 2002, the Porters arranged a meeting with the 
Cowleys at the AMS offices in Midway, Utah. At that meeting, the 
Porters offered to buy Cowley's interest in AMS for $600,000, to 
be paid over five years at $10,000 per month, without interest. 
As part of this offer, the Cowleys also would receive SLS, and 
Cowley would be given his choice of either property owned by 
Listo. The Porters tape-recorded this meeting. The Cowleys were 
"stunned" by the offer and left the meeting without accepting it. 
Later that evening, Cowley called Porter and suggested that if 
Porter thought the offer was fair, then Cowley should retain AMS 
and buy Porter out for the amount offered. Porter refused this 
counter-offer and warned Cowley that AMS would lose the 7-Eleven 
contracts if Cowley's ownership in AMS became known to 7-Eleven. 
Cowley indicated that he was confident he could keep the 7-Eleven 
work. 
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U 11 After participating for over seven years in a scheme to 
deceive 7-Eleven about Cowley's ownership interest in AMS, 
Veralynn suddenly decided to inform 7-Eleven of the true nature 
of the relationship. On June 22, 2002, without first notifying 
the Cowleys, Veralynn informed Atkin, Cowley's replacement at 
7-Eleven, that Cowley had been an owner of AMS since its 
formation. Veralynn also told Atkin that Cowley had threatened a 
hostile takeover of AMS that would interfere with the work it 
performed for 7-Eleven. On June 23, 2002, at a meeting with the 
Porters, Atkin indicated that she would have to inform her 
supervisor, de Besche, and 7-Eleven's legal department about the 
situation. Atkin was unsure whether 7-Eleven would continue to 
contract with AMS. 
f 12 On the evening of June 23, 2002, the Cowleys and the 
Porters met again to discuss the future of AMS. The Porters told 
the Cowleys about Veralynn's conversation with Atkin, which 
effectively negated any possibility that the Cowleys could 
purchase AMS from Porter. The meeting was tape-recorded by the 
Porters. 
% 13 After the meeting, the Cowleys agreed that they should 
accept the buyout terms previously offered by the Porters, with 
certain changes. Because Kerin was accompanying a youth group on 
an out-of-state trip leaving early the next morning, Cowley 
arranged to meet with the Porters alone. 
f 14 On the morning of June 24, 2002, Cowley met with the 
Porters. That meeting was again tape-recorded by the Porters. 
Cowley identified additional terms that he wanted to be included 
in the buyout, and Veralynn Porter typed up a new agreement that 
incorporated Cowley's changes. Veralynn then printed two copies 
of the agreement, which was entitled "Partnership Buy-Out." 
Porter executed one copy of the agreement and placed it on the 
desk. Veralynn did not execute the agreement and Cowley did not 
request that she do so. Cowley indicated that the terms of the 
agreement were acceptable to him, but that he wanted to read it 
to Kerin before signing. Cowley attempted to contact Kerin by 
cell phone, but was unsuccessful. The Porters left, taking the 
copy of the agreement Porter had signed with them. Cowley never 
signed the second copy of the agreement. Instead, he left it on 
the desk with a note stating: "Vera — Call me. T.C." The Porters 
retained both copies of the agreement. 
Tj 15 On the afternoon of June 24, 2002, Cowley called Atkin to 
confirm that SLS could continue to do striping work for 7-Eleven. 
Atkin informed Cowley that 7-Eleven would not do business with 
any company associated with Cowley. 
T| 16 At the direction of Atkin, the Porters formed a new 
company, Quality Maintenance Systems (QMS), on June 25, 2002. QMS 
performed the work previously done by AMS. 7-Eleven agreed to 
work with QMS as long as Cowley was not involved. 
f 17 On June 27, 2002, de Besche and Atkin held separate 
meetings with the Porters and Cowley. Both the Porters and Cowley 
independently informed de Besche that Cowley had agreed to sell 
his interest in AMS to the Porters and would have no further 
involvement with the company. The notes of the meetings kept by 
Atkin indicate that the Porters showed de Besche a copy of the 
June 24,2002 agreement signed by Porter. After the meetings, de 
Besche agreed that QMS could continue to provide the same 
services to 7-Eleven that had previously been performed by AMS on 
a time-and-materials basis, so long as Cowley had no involvement 
with the new company. 
H 18 The Cowleys and the Porters then began performing the 
terms of the June 24,2002 agreement. Specifically, Cowley 
vacated the AMS offices and delivered the previous AMS employees, 
equipment, stock account, books, and premises to the Porters. 
Porter and Cowley divided equally between themselves the $50,000 
in an AMS investment account and the accounts receivable. SLS was 
transferred to the Cowleys and the logos on the premises and 
equipment of AMS were changed to those of QMS. In addition, one 
of the properties held by Listo and some vehicles were 
transferred to the Cowleys. During this time period, the Cowleys 
asked the Porters for copies of the tape-recorded meetings, which 
Veralynn agreed to provide. 
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1f 19 On July 19,2002, the Cowleys and the Porters met to 
discuss an inventory of equipment and supplies belonging to SLS 
and AMS. At this meeting, the Porters stated that because the 
contracts with 7-Eleven were on a time-and-materials basis until 
QMS could potentially enter into new contracts with 7-Eleven in 
the fall, they could not afford to pay the Cowleys $10,000 per 
month. Instead, the Porters offered to pay the Cowleys $4000 per 
month, pending QMS's rebidding of the 7-Eleven contracts. Unlike 
the previous meetings, this meeting was not tape-recorded. When 
the Cowleys again asked for copies of the tape recordings of the 
previous meetings, Veralynn stated that she had destroyed them. 
1f 20 Porter testified at trial that Cowley called him on the 
evening of July 19, 2002, and accepted his offer of $4000 per 
month over five years, or $240,000 total, as a final agreement to 
purchase Cowley's share of AMS. In contrast, the Cowleys 
testified that they agreed to accept $4000 per month as an 
accommodation to the Porters and only until QMS was able to enter 
into new contracts with 7-Eleven. At that time, the Cowleys 
understood that the original provision mandating payment of 
$10,000 per month over five years, or $600,000, would be 
restored. 
1f 21 On July 21, 2002, Porter filed Articles of Dissolution for 
AMS, indicating that no agreement of shareholders was necessary 
because AMS did not have any shareholders. 
U 22 In October 2002, the Cowleys learned that QMS had obtained 
the new 7-Eleven contracts. Although these contracts were not 
identical to those held by AMS, they were substantially the same 
and had a similar monetary value. On October 21, 2002, the 
Cowleys demanded that the Porters begin paying $10,000 per month, 
as originally agreed. The Porters agreed to consider bringing the 
payments up to $10,000 per month. Upon further consideration, the 
Porters responded that their attorney had advised them that they 
had an enforceable oral agreement to pay only $4000 per month 
over five years. The Porters paid the Cowleys $4000 per month 
from August 2002 to the time of trial. 
f 23 On May 15, 2003, the Cowleys filed the complaint in this 
action, claiming that the Articles of Dissolution had been 
improperly filed. The Cowleys asked the district court to 
judicially dissolve the company and divide the value of AMS 
between the two parties. The Porters answered by asserting, among 
other defenses, that AMS had already been properly dissolved. 
T| 24 During the proceedings, the Cowleys changed their legal 
theory and asked the trial court to enforce the June 24, 2002 
agreement executed by Porter, in which Porter agreed to pay 
Cowley $600,000, at the rate of $10,000 per month over five 
years. The Porters denied that the agreement of June 24, 2002, 
was binding and instead argued that the buyout agreement was for 
a total of $240,000, to be paid at the rate of $4000 per month 
over five years, as agreed on July 19, 2002. 
125 After denying a series of motions to dismiss and for 
summary judgment, the trial court ordered that the trial would be 
bifurcated. The first trial was to determine whether the parties 
had entered a binding contract to buy out Cowley's interest and 
the terms of any such contract. If the court concluded that there 
had been no agreement, it would then proceed to the second phase 
of trial to determine the value of AMS for purposes of judicial 
dissolution. The parties were notified that the second phase 
would not be necessary if the trial court found an enforceable 
buyout agreement. A bench trial on the existence of and terms of 
a buyout agreement between the parties was held on June 1 and 2, 
2004. 
f 26 After trial, the Cowleys again changed their position and 
asked the court to judicially dissolve AMS and set its value as 
of June 22, 2002. They selected that date because it was prior to 
Veralynn's disclosures to 7-Eleven about Cowley's ownership 
interest in AMS. On July 7,2004, the court granted the Porters' 
motion to dismiss Veralynn as a defendant and Kerin as a 
plaintiff. 
Tf 27 The trial court entered detailed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on September 10, 2004, in which it determined 
that the parties had entered into an oral buyout agreement on 
June 24,2002. The 
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court found that Porter agreed to purchase Cowley's interest in 
AMS for $600,000, to be paid at the rate of $ 10,000 per month 
over five years. Although the agreement was never reduced to a 
binding written agreement, the court concluded that it was 
enforceable despite the statute of frauds because it had been 
partially performed. In reaching that conclusion, the trial court 
found that the credibility of both the Cowleys and the Porters 
was suspect, expressly finding that both sides had made 
conflicting statements in affidavits, depositions, and trial 
testimony. In particular, the court noted in its findings of fact 
that although Veralynn told the Cowleys at their July 19, 2002 
meeting that she had already destroyed the tape recordings of 
their previous meetings, she testified at trial that she threw 
them into the Jordanelle Reservoir on July 24, 2002. The court 
also determined that both parties had participated in a scheme to 
deceive 7-Eleven as to the actual ownership of AMS over a span of 
many years. 
<[f 28 With respect to the $4000 payments made from August to 
October of 2002, the trial court found that the Cowleys agreed to 
accept reduced payments as an accommodation to the Porters. The 
trial court further found that the payments were to be raised to 
$10,000 per month as soon as 7-Eleven renewed maintenance 
contracts with QMS. These contracts were renewed in October 2002. 
The court concluded that Porter was in breach of the June 24, 
2002 oral buyout agreement as of October 2002 when, although QMS 
had entered into new contracts with 7-Eleven, Porter refused to 
increase the monthly payments to $10,000. Finally, the court 
determined that the Porters' interaction with 7-Eleven 
representatives coerced the Cowleys into selling Cowley's 
interest in AMS and constituted a breach of the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing to the company and Cowley. 
Tf 29 In accordance with its findings and conclusions, the trial 
court ordered Porter to pay Cowley $10,000 per month until the 
entire $600,000 obligation is paid in full. The court also 
ordered each party to bear its own costs and fees incurred in the 
litigation. 
If 30 On appeal, Porter alleges that the trial court erred by 
fashioning a remedy not pleaded by either party. He also 
challenges paragraphs 33, 36, and 37 of the trial court's 
findings of fact as being clearly erroneous. Cowley cross-appeals 
claiming error in the trial court's dismissal of the claims 
against Veralynn and in its decision not to award attorney fees 
to Cowley. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Tj 31 Porter's claim that the trial court erred in entering 
judgment against him on a theory not raised by the pleadings 
involves a conclusion of law that we review under a 
correction-of-error standard. See Farr v. Brinkerhoff, 
829 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). 
Tf 32 Porter also challenges several of the trial court's 
findings of fact. 
While we accord no particular deference to a trial 
court's conclusions of law, a challenge to findings 
of fact must show that the evidence, viewed in a 
light most favorable to the trial court, is legally 
insufficient to support the contested finding. The 
challenging party must marshal all the supporting 
evidence and demonstrate its insufficiency. 
Utah Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Adams, 806 P.2d 1193,1197 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1991) (citations omitted). 
f 33 Cowley argues in his cross-appeal that it was improper to 
dismiss Veralynn as a party because she was necessary to the 
proceedings. Whether it was error to grant the motion to dismiss 
is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Canyon 
Meadows Home Owners Ass'n v. Wasatch County, 2001 UT App 414, ^ 
6-7,40P.3dll48. 
% 34 Cowley also challenges the trial court's failure to award 
him his attorney fees under Utah Code section 78-27-56, which 
provides for the award of fees when a claim or defense is 
asserted without merit and in bad faith. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-27-56 (2002). "Whether the trial court properly interpreted 
the legal prerequisites for awarding attorney fees under section 
78-27-56 is a "question of law' that we 'review . . . 
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for correctness."' Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 
2005 UT 46,1[ 8, 122 P.3d 556 (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted). "In contrast, it is within the discretion of the trial 
court to determine whether an action is asserted in bad faith, 
and we therefore review such a determination under the clearly 
erroneous standard." Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, | 
21,20P.3d868. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Failure to Amend Pleadings 
Tf 35 Porter first argues that the judgment in favor of Cowley 
should be reversed because the pleadings were never amended to 
include a claim for breach of contract. Porter further contends 
that even if the trial court could properly consider the contract 
claim, it went beyond the matters at issue when it entered 
judgment against Porter according to the terms of the contract it 
determined existed. We disagree. 
If 36 Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth 
the general pleading requirements, stating that a complaint 
"shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Utah R. Civ. P. 
8(a)(1). The rule is designed to provide notice of the nature of 
the claims asserted against a defendant and an opportunity to 
meet those claims. See Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 
656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). Rule 8(f) provides that "[a]ll 
pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 8(f). "Pleadings" include both the complaint and 
the answer. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a) (emphasis omitted). "When issues 
not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as 
if they had been raised in the pleadings." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b). 
An amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence can be 
made by either party at any time, even after judgment is entered. 
See id. Yet, the failure to amend "does not affect the result 
of the trial of these issues." Id. Finally, rule 54(c)(1) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "every final 
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor 
it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded 
such relief in his pleadings." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(1); see 
also Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1, 8 (Utah 1989) 
(stating principle that a court can enter judgment reforming a 
contract where the pleadings sought declaratory judgment); Clark 
v. Second Circuit Court, 741 P.2d 956, 957-58 (Utah 1987) 
(holding that the failure to amend a petition for an 
extraordinary writ did not affect the fact that issues were tried 
by consent of the parties); Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 
Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1182 (Utah 1983) (holding that if plaintiff 
was able to adduce the necessary evidence at trial, she could 
claim punitive damages without formal amendment to the 
pleadings); Farr v. Brinkerhoff, 829 P.2d 117, 119-20 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1992) (rejecting defendants' argument that, because the 
relief had not been sought by the pleadings, the trial court 
erred by setting aside a sheriffs sale). 
f 37 The fundamental purpose of these rules is to "liberaliz[e] 
both pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are 
afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate 
contentions they have pertaining to their dispute." Cheney v. 
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963). In Cheney, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that the failure of the defendants to 
plead a subsequent agreement as an affirmative defense was not 
fatal to the trial court's consideration of that agreement. See 
id. In rejecting the plaintiffs argument to the contrary, the 
court explained: 
What [a party is] entitled to is notice of the issues 
raised and an opportunity to meet them. When this is 
accomplished, that is all that is required. Our rules 
provide for liberality to allow examination into and 
settlement of all issues bearing upon the 
controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other 
party to have a reasonable time to meet a new issue 
if he so requests. Rule 15(b) [of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure] so states. 
Cheney, 381 P.2d at 91 (footnote omitted); see also Armed 
Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, % 24, 70 P.3d 35 
(holding that the failure to plead fraud with particularity was 
not fatal where the defendant had 
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notice and an opportunity to respond); Motivated Mgmt. Intfl v. 
Finney, 604 P.2d 467,468 (Utah 1979) (holding, under rule 
54(c)(1), that the plaintiffs complaint was not defective, even 
though it sought to foreclose a lien that on appeal the plaintiff 
conceded was invalid, because the complaint also sought a 
judgment for money damages against the defendants); PLC 
Landscape Constr. v. Piccadilly Fish 'N Chips, Inc., 
28 Utah 2d 350, 502 P.2d 562, 563 (1972) (holding that the trial court 
properly allowed recovery on the basis of quantum meruit, even 
though the complaint sought relief on the basis of an express 
contract, because the defendant was not "denied a fair 
opportunity to meet the change in theory of recovery"); Buehner 
Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d 517, 519-20 (1957) 
(holding that the trial court properly considered the issue of 
partnership, although it was not formally raised by the 
pleadings, because both parties presented evidence on the issue 
at trial); Shinkoskey v. Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, f 6 n. 2, 
19 P.3d 1005 (holding that the trial court properly ordered the 
appellant to repay funds misappropriated from his children's 
custodial accounts, even though that issue was not raised in the 
pleadings, because he "had the opportunity to prepare and meet 
the issue"); Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, 
Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 275-76 (Utah Ct.App. 1996) (rejecting 
argument that the trial court impermissibly granted relief on a 
theory not pleaded where the defendant had notice and an 
opportunity to respond); Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 
757 P.2d 465, 472 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) (holding that trial court properly 
considered an overcharge claim, despite the fact that it was not 
formally raised in the pleadings, because the appellant failed to 
show it was prejudiced by consideration of the claim). 
U 38 Rule 54(c)(1) 
requires trial courts to be liberal in awarding 
appropriate relief justified by the facts developed 
at trial, as long as the failure to request a 
particular form of relief does not prejudice a party 
in the preparation or trial of the case. If there is 
no prejudice, it is necessary only that the relief 
granted be supported by the evidence and be a 
permissible form of relief for the claims litigated. 
Henderson, 757 P.2d at 472 (quotations and citations omitted). 
Porter has not been prejudiced here and his reliance on Combe v. 
Warreris Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984), is 
misplaced. In Combe, a dispute arose between the two 
shareholders of a closely held corporation. See id. at 734. The 
corporation initiated an action against the minority shareholder 
for, among other things, misappropriation of corporate assets and 
an accounting. See id. at 734-35. Although neither party sought 
dissolution of the corporation — let alone a partnership — the 
trial court entered findings and conclusions that the entity was 
actually a partnership, by their actions the parties had 
evidenced an intent to dissolve the partnership, and the assets 
of the de facto partnership should be distributed as set forth in 
the trial couifs order. See id. at 735. The trial court also 
ruled that the parties should "flip a coin" to determine which of 
them could retain the trademark, trade name, and logo of the 
business. Id. Not surprisingly, the Utah Supreme Court reversed 
the decision of the trial court holding that rule 54(c)(1) "does 
not go so far as to authorize the granting of relief on issues 
neither raised nor tried." Id. 
1f 39 This is not a case where the trial court granted relief on 
a theory that was neither pleaded nor tried. Porter had ample 
notice of the contract claim against him and was afforded the 
opportunity to meet that claim. The Cowleys' complaint sought 
judicial dissolution of AMS. In their answer, the Porters 
asserted as an affirmative defense that "[AMS] was properly 
dissolved." The Porters alleged that Porter entered into a 
binding contract to buy out Cowley for $240,000, paid in 
installments of $4000 per month over five years. In contrast, the 
Cowleys argued that a binding buyout agreement had been reached 
between Porter and Cowley, but that Porter was to buy out Cowley 
for $600,000, to be paid in installments of $10,000 per month 
over five years. From the record below, it is apparent that 
Porter was on actual notice of the conflicting theories regarding 
a binding buyout agreement. 
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f 40 The Porters' memorandum in opposition to the Cowleys' 
motion for summary judgment frames one of the disputed facts as 
follows: 
It is undisputed that [the Porters] have made 
payments of $4,000.00 per month to [the Cowleys] in 
accordance with the agreement reached on July 19, 
2002. It is disputed, as properly noted by the 
[cjourt in its prior two rulings[,] that there was 
ever an agreement between the parties concerning the 
payment of more than $4,000.00 per month, which issue 
has been set for trial in June 2004. 
That memorandum goes on to state that there are remaining "issues 
of material fact concerning whether there was a meeting of the 
minds sufficient to support an agreement, and the terms of that 
agreement, and whether the agreement reached by the parties is 
enforceable under the [s]tatute of [f]rauds." Thus, the Porters' 
own submissions to the trial court reveal that Porter was on 
notice that the existence and terms of a buyout agreement were at 
issue. 
f 41 Indeed, the first phase of the trial was for the specific 
purpose of determining whether a binding buyout agreement had 
been reached and the terms of any such agreement. The fact that 
Porter understood that Cowley was seeking to enforce a buyout 
agreement for $600,000 is expressly provided in the trial brief 
the Porters filed, which states: 
As stated by the [cjourt, presently before the court 
for trial are essentially two issues: (1) whether the 
agreement between the parties called for the payment 
from . . . Porter to . . . Cowley in the total amount 
of $240,000 or $600,000[,] paid in monthly 
installments over five years for . . . Cowley's 
portion of the capital assets of AMS; and (2) whether 
there has been sufficient part performance by the 
parties to bring the oral agreement under an 
exception to the requirements of the [s]tatute of 
[fjrauds, so that the agreement is legally 
enforceable and binding. 
The trial transcript reflects that each party put on evidence 
supporting its version of the terms of the buyout agreement. 
Because Porter had notice of Cowley's $600,000 contract claim and 
the opportunity to refute that claim at trial, he cannot claim 
prejudice from Cowley's failure to amend the pleadings. 
II. Challenge to Findings of Fact 
T| 42 Porter challenges paragraphs 33, 36, and 37 of the trial 
court's findings of fact. In doing so, he undertakes a 
significant burden. 
[W]e review the trial court's findings of fact for 
clear error, reversing only where the finding is 
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if we 
otherwise reach a firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made. To succeed in its challenge to findings of 
fact, [an appellant] may not simply reargue [his] 
position based on selective excerpts of evidence 
presented to the trial court. Instead, [the 
appellant] must first marshal all the evidence in 
support of the finding and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
finding even when viewing it in a light most 
favorable to the court below. 
ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct.App. 
1997) (quotations and citations omitted). Porter has not met this 
burden. 
f 43 In paragraph 33 of its findings of fact, the trial court 
states that "[a]fter June 27, 2002, the parties began to perform 
the terms of the written buy[]out agreement of June 24th." That 
finding then goes on to identify the specific acts performed. 
Paragraphs 36 and 37 of the trial court's findings of fact 
provide that the Cowleys agreed to accept $4000 per month as an 
accommodation to the Porters until the 7-Eleven contracts were 
reissued to QMS. In his brief on appeal, Porter admits that there 
was evidence presented from which the trial court could have made 
these findings. He argues, however, that the weight of the 
evidence was in favor of the Porters and that the Cowleys' 
testimony was not credible in light of their prior contrary 
statements. This "is nothing but an attempt to have this [c]ourt 
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on a 
contested factual issue. This we cannot do under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 52(a)." Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, ^ 28, 
80 P.3d 553 (alteration in original) (quotations 
Page 1234 
and citation omitted), cert, denied, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004). 
Furthermore, we must defer to the trial court on issues of 
credibility because it is "in the best position to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses and to gain a sense of the 
proceeding as a whole. Where contradictory testimony is offered . 
.., [t]he fact finder is free to weigh the conflicting evidence 
presented and to draw its own conclusions." Valcarce v. 
Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 314 (Utah 1998) (second alteration in 
original) (quotations and citations omitted). In this case, the 
trial court expressly noted that the inconsistent positions taken 
by both sides at various stages of the litigation raised 
questions concerning the credibility of each party. 
f 44 Porter has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's 
findings of fact are "against the clear weight of the evidence," 
or that the evidence was "legally insufficient to support the 
finding[s]." ProMax Dev. Corp., 943 P.2d at 255 (quotations and 
citations omitted). In addition, there is adequate evidence in 
the record from which the trial court could have made the 
findings. Therefore, we reject Porter's challenge to the trial 
court's findings of fact. 
III. Dismissal of Veralynn Porter 
H 45 In his cross-appeal, Cowley argues that the trial court 
improperly dismissed Veralynn as a defendant. Cowley's argument 
is based on the assertion that Veralynn, although not an owner of 
AMS, was a purchaser of Cowley's interest in the 
company. [fn2] Because the trial court found an enforceable 
buyout agreement in which Veralynn was instrumental, Cowley 
argues that judgment should have been entered against both of the 
Porters. We agree. 
f 46 The appellate courts of this State have held that findings 
of fact "must show that the court's judgment or decree follows 
logically from, and is supported by, the evidence." Parduhn v. 
Bennett, 2005 UT 22, ^  24, 112 P.3d 495 (quotations and citation 
omitted). Where the trial court's conclusions of law do not 
properly follow from the findings of fact, those conclusions can 
be overturned on appeal. See System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 
669 P.2d 421, 429 (Utah 1983) (reversing conclusion of law that 
an injunction should not issue because it was not supported by 
the findings of fact); Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 312 (Utah 
1983) (reversing conclusion of law that the plaintiffs 
possession was not open and notorious to the extent required by 
law because it did "not properly follow from the findings of 
fact"). 
^147 Here, the trial court made numerous factual findings that 
indicate that Veralynn, although not an owner of AMS originally, 
was a joint purchaser of Cowley's share in the company. For 
example, the findings of fact state: 
20 At the [June 22, 2002] meeting, the 
Porters indicated they wanted to buy o u t . . . 
Cowley's interest in AMS. . . . 
25. During the evening of June 23, the Cowleys agreed 
among themselves that they would accept the buy[] out 
terms submitted by the Porters, with certain 
changes that Mr. Cowley would submit to the Porters 
on June 24th. . . . 
31 Both Cowley and the Porters informed Mr. de 
Besche that Cowley had agreed to sell out to the 
Porters and would leave A M S . . . . 
3 3 . . . . Cowley vacated the AMS offices in Midway, 
delivering the previous AMS employees, equipment, 
stock account, books[,] and premises to the 
Porters.... 
41. On October 21, 2002, the Cowleys demanded that 
the Porters bring the payments for the buy[]out of 
AMS up to the $10,000/month level The 
Porters said they would consider starting to make 
the $10,000/month payments and get back to them. 
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43. The Porters have paid the Cowleys $4,000/month 
from August[] 2002 through the time of trial. 
(Emphasis added.) These findings, combined with the undisputed 
fact that Veralynn owned fifty percent of QMS when it made the 
$4000 per month payments to Cowley and when Cowley transferred 
the AMS assets to it as partial performance of the buyout 
agreement, indicate that Veralynn, together with Porter, 
purchased Cowley's interest in AMS. 
If 48 Paragraph 1 of the trial court's conclusions of law 
states: "There is no need to judicially dissolve AMS because the 
parties entered into an enforceable contract wherein . . . 
Porter agreed to buy[]out... Cowley's interest in 
AMS. . . . " (Emphasis added.) While it may have struck the trial 
court that the two wives should be treated identically, that 
conclusion does not logically follow from the findings of fact 
entered by the trial court. Consequently, the conclusion of law 
that only Porter is in breach is incorrect. We therefore reverse 
and remand for the amendment of the judgment to include Veralynn, 
as well as Porter. 
IV. Attorney Fees 
1f 49 Cowley also claims that the trial court erred by not 
awarding him attorney fees under Utah Code section 78-27-56. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (2002). We disagree. 
U 50 Section 78-27-56 provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n 
civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney[] fees 
to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or 
defense to the action was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith." Id. § 78-27-56(1). To award fees under 
section 78-27-56, the trial court must make two separate 
findings: "that the claim[or defense] is (1) without merit; and 
(2) not brought or asserted in good faith." In re Discipline of 
Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, If 46, 86 P.3d 712; see also Still 
Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, ffl[ 9-16, 122 P.3d 556 
(reversing award of attorney fees under section 78-27-56 where 
trial court did not make separate findings that claim was brought 
in bad faith and without merit); Paul deGroot Bldg. Servs., 
L.L.C. v. Gallacher, 2005 UT 20, f 15, 112 P.3d 490 (affirming 
trial court's denial of attorney fees under section 78-27-56). 
U 51 Despite Cowley's reliance on section 78-27-56, nowhere 
does the trial court find that Porter asserted a defense or 
brought a claim "without merit" or not "in good faith." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56(1). Indeed, the record indicates that the trial 
court rejected Cowley's request for a conclusion of law that 
stated: "The defense herein has been without merit and in bad 
faith, under [section] 78-27-56...." 
]f 52 Furthermore, although the trial court ruled in favor of 
Cowley and against Porter after the trial on the merits, that is 
not enough to justify an award of fees under section 78-27-56. 
See Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3 at f 46, 86 P.3d 712 (stating that 
section 78-27-56 "is narrowly drawn and not meant to be applied 
to all prevailing parties in all civil suits" (quotations and 
citation omitted)). Most relevant to our review of the trial 
court's refusal to award fees to Cowley is the trial court's 
specific finding that the credibility of both parties was 
difficult to ascertain because each had given inconsistent 
statements throughout the litigation. Given this finding, and 
because "it is within the discretion of the trial court to 
determine whether an action is asserted in bad faith," Warner v. 
DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102, f 21, 20 P.3d 868, we cannot say 
the trial court erred by declining to award Cowley his attorney 
fees under section 78-27-56. 
CONCLUSION 
f^ 53 Porter was on notice that Cowley claimed the agreed price 
of the buyout agreement was $600,000, to be paid at the rate of 
$10,000 per month over five years. Under rule 54(c)(1) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court could enter 
judgment against Porter for breach of that contract, despite 
Cowley's failure to demand such relief in the pleadings. In 
addition, the trial court's findings of fact Porter challenges 
are not clearly erroneous. The trial court's conclusion that only 
Porter contracted to buy 
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Cowley's interest does not logically flow from its findings of 
fact, and therefore, we reverse and remand for an amendment to 
the judgment to add Veralynn. Finally, the trial court did not 
err by declining to award Cowley his attorney fees under Utah 
Code section 78-27-56. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (2002). 
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court in part, 
reverse in part, and remand so that the judgment can be amended 
to include both Veralynn and Porter. 
If 54 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD and GREGORY K. ORME, 
Judges. 
[fill] When Porter was laid off by 7-Eleven in November 1995, he 
became primarily responsible for the daily operations of AMS. 
[fn2] Although the trial court did not issue a written decision 
setting forth the reasons for dismissing Veralynn, the transcript 
of the proceedings states: "I have not seen any evidence that 
would indicate that either of the wives .. . had an ownership 
interest in [AMS].... And[,] therefore[,][t]he [c]ourt is 
going to grant the motion to dismiss " 
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v. 
JAMES L. FARNSWORTH; DAVID 
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY 
FARNSWORTH 
Defendant 
3UNTY, UTAH 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S FIRST 
DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
CASE NO 040800079 
Judge John Anderson 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: As it relates to any conversation that either of the Plaintiffs had 
with any of the Defendants provide the following: 
a. The date of the conversation. 
b. Parties to the conversation. 
c. The method of conversation, such as to whether is was 
telephone, e-mail, in person, etc. 
e . What was said by each party. 
ANSWER: 
8/5/04 Ty Eldridge ("Ty") called Jim Farnsworth ("Jim") using the contact number from Jim's 
internet ad about the ranch for sale, 801-404-1898. Ty told Jim that Ty was interested in the ranch. 
8/7/04 Ty called Jim, discussed the ranch, Jim gave Ty directions to the ranch. 
8/8/04 Jim faxed a map of the ranch to Ty. Ty called Jim to discuss details on the map. 
8/9/04 Ty called Jim twice, spoke for about an hour, discussing the property, including water rights, 
drinking water quality, taxes, utility costs. 
8/10/04 Jessica Farnsworth ("Jessica") faxed Marina Eldridge ("Marina") information on the water 
rights. Marina called Jessica and told her the fax was illegible. Jessica said she would mail copies to 
the Eldridges. 
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8/12/04 Ty called Jim and made arrangements to view the interior of the ranch house. Ty asked Jim if 
he could meet Ty on Sunday 8/15/04. Jim said he was the elder's quorum president and had to teach 
a class. Ty asked if one of Jim's brothers could meet me. Jim said he thought they would have 
similar problems with church commitments, and that one of his brothers was a bishop. Ty asked 
about the realtor, who had a large sign posted at the entrance of the ranch. Jim said he was no longer 
under contract to the realtor, and that the realtor was not reliable. Jim said he would give Ty a key to 
the ranch house, so Ty could let himself in to inspect the house. Ty also talked to Jim about 
genealogy. Ty told Jim that him mother's maiden name was Farnsworth. Jim and Ty determined that 
they were related. One of their great grandfathers was Steven Martindale Farnsworth, who crossed 
the plains with the Mormons in the 1800s. 
8/14/04 Ty and Marina met Jim and Jessica at the Arby's in Heber. The Farnsworths gave the 
Eldridges a key to the ranch house along with originals of the faxes Jessica attempted to send o 
8/10/04. They discussed more genealogy. Jessica asked if the Eldridges were going to spend the 
night in Neola. The Eldridges stated they were just going up for the day. Jessica offered to allow the 
Eldridges to stay the night. The Eldridges decline as they had arrangements in Park City. 
8/16/04 Ty called Jim. They spoke for about 45 minutes. Ty told Jim that they wanted to make an 
offer and asked to include all of the personal property and farm equipment. Jim said that it would be 
fine, but that Jim needed to check with his brothers to see if all items were for sale. 
8/17/04 Jim called Ty and said that Ty would need to wait until Jim got back from a trip to Mexico 
before Ty could make the offer. Jim said he had not spoken to his brothers, but should have an 
answer by Saturday, 8/21/04. Jim told Ty he had turned down an offer for $325,000. 
8/22/04 Jim called Ty who was at his grandmother's birthday party. Ty made a verbal offer for the 
property and all of the personal property and equipment at $330,000. Jim countered with $340,000. 
Ty agreed at $340,000. Jim said he would get the paperwork started. Jim said he would provide a 
refrigerator because one of the brothers had taken the refrigerator from the ranch house. 
8/23/04 Jessica emailed Marina letting the Eldridges know that they were starting on the REPC. 
8/24/04 Jim called Ty and informed Ty that some of the items on the ranch would not be included. 
Because our offer was for all of the personal property, Marina got upset that the riding mower was 
being excluded. Marina called Jim and he verbally agreed to reduce the purchase price of the ranch 
by $1000. 
8/25/04 Jim faxed the REPC to the Eldridges. Marina called Jim about some minor changes. Jim 
agreed to the changes, and amended the REPC. 
8/26/04 Jim faxed the amended REPC to the Eldridges. 
9/3/04 Ty called Jim and made arrangements to meet him at the property to go over the personal 
property and equipment to confirm what would and would not be included. 
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9/4/04 The Eldridges along with Aaron Thomson met Jim, Jessica and two of their children at the 
ranch in Neola. Jim walked the property with Ty and pointed out a few items of personal property 
not included, and explained how the water system worked. Jim recommended to Ty that he obtain a 
fence repair tool. 
9/9/04 Ty called Jim and informed Jim that the Eldridges were approved for financing of $340,000 
through Washington Mutual, but that the funding was limited to the ranch house and one acre, 
because the property was a working ranch the underwriter would not waive the acreage clause. Ty 
told Jim that he would contact agricultural lenders to get the best rate for the 209 acres working farm. 
9/13/04 Ty and Jim on the telephone. Ty told Jim the agricultural lenders would require a large 
down payment. Ty said he had other property that could be used as collateral for loans. Jim told Ty 
not to do that, as it could be risky. Ty and Jim talked about some form of owner financing, including 
the Farnsworths carrying the note for the ranch; having Washington Mutual lend on the house and 
acre with the balance on a note; and a lease - purchase option. Ty told Jim that he would rather pay 
Jim interest than a bank. 
9/19/04 Jim called Ty and said that he had been thinking about the owner financing and that he really 
like the idea of the lease option. He compared the lease option to leasing a car. At this point they 
discussed the details of how the option would work. Jim told Ty that he would structure it like 
standard owner financing but without changing title to Ty name. Jim really liked the lease option 
idea because it would not require foreclosure in the event of default. Ty asked Jim about the interest 
rate he would give. Jim said he would give a rate better than a bank would charge me but more than 
a bank would give Jim for a deposit account. Jim said he felt very comfortable about the lease option 
because he knew I really wanted the ranch and that with Ty credit rating and assets we could easily 
fulfill the lease option. Jim would be making a good rate of interest on his money. Ty liked the lease 
option because it would allow him to do a 1031 exchange, possibly saving Ty tax liability. 
9/20/04 Jim called Ty and they spoke for 16 minutes. Jim said he had talked to a friend who said that 
with a lease option no portion of the lease payment could apply against principle. Ty told Jim that it 
was possible for some of the payment to apply to principle. They agreed to do more research on the 
topic and get back together. 
9/21/04 Jim called Ty and they spoke for 54 minutes. Jim and Ty had learned that a portion of the 
lease payment could apply to principle, and that they could structure payments like a loan. Jim 
offered Ty a three year lease option at 5 7/8% with 10% down. Ty was not happy with the rate, and 
stated he thought 5% would be fair. Jim said he would check with his brothers and get back to Ty. 
9/26/04 Jim called Ty and gave him two more offers for the lease option. The first required 10% 
down, $1500.00 per month with nothing going towards the principle; the second required 10% down, 
$1725.00 per month with $250 going towards the principle. Each required that Ty pay the taxes, 
water fees, utilities and insurance. Each allowed prepayment of the balance before the end of the 
third year. 
9/27/04 Jim called Ty to see which offer he preferred. Ty had calculated that both offers were for 
more than 5%. Ty countered with an offer of 10% down, payments of $1675 per month with 25% of 
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the payment going for principle, and the remaining requirements being the same as Jim's offer. Jim 
agreed that they were very close, and was pleased with the higher payment amount over Jim's second 
offer. Jim stated he needed to review this with his brothers and would get back to Ty. 
9/28/04 Jim called Ty and accepted the offer. Jim said that since he was not getting his interest rate 
that he wanted to make a side deal. Jim wanted to run 5 horses on the ranch while Ty was leasing it. 
Ty agreed, stating that they like the idea of animals on the property. Jim asked Ty if Jim could draw 
up the lease option agreement. Ty stated that he had a copy of such an agreement, and will fill it in 
and Jim could revise it if needed. 
10/5/04 Jim called Ty and asked if Ty had sent the lease option for him to review. Ty said he would 
send it ASAP. 
10/7/04 Jim called Ty. Jim said the lease option had not arrived. Ty told Jim that he had been very 
busy and had not gotten it out yet. They talked about additional terms and agreed that the personal 
property would be purchased separately. That way if there was a default, Ty could keep the 
equipment and the Farnsworths would not need to worry about the condition of the equipment. Jim 
stated that a friend who was going to help Jim review the lease option was going out of town on a 
fishing trip. Jim wanted the friend to review the lease option and told Ty to hurry and send it. 
10/9/04 Jim called Ty and left a message on Ty's phone and asked if the deal was off because he had 
not seen any information about the equipment purchase. Ty called Jim and told Jim to check the 
envelope. Jim found the agreement for the equipment in the envelope. Jim took some time to review 
the documents. Jim called back and stated that the grace period for payment was only 3 days, and 
that Jim though they should change that to 30 days. Ty agreed to the change. Jim also noted that the 
start date was not until November 1, 2004. Ty said that was just a logical date to start the lease 
option period, but that Ty wanted to complete the deal as soon as possible. Jim agreed. Jim stated 
that he thought 10% of $339,000 was $39,000. Ty corrected him and said it was actually $33,900, 
but that Ty rounded up to $34,000 on the lease option document. They agreed to make it $34,000. 
Between 10/9 -16/04 Ty made a number of calls for Jim, who did not answer his phone. Ty left 
messages for Jim to call Ty. 
10/16/04 Jim called Ty and said that he had been in the hills for a few days. Ty asked Jim for a key 
to the ranch house, as Ty's parents wanted to see the property Ty was buying. Jim said he would 
leave the key under his planter for Ty, as Jim would be at stake conference. Jim gave Ty directions 
to his house. Ty told Jim that he had not received any information from the title company yet. Jim 
asked what Ty needed, and Ty responded with information about easements and other title 
information. Jim said that Ty had not gotten anything from them because Jim had cancelled the 
closing because they were doing the lease option. Jim told Ty he had an abstract on the ranch that his 
father had acquired some years before. Jim said he would leave the abstract with the key, if he could 
find the abstract. Jim also told Ty to contact an escrow company to handle the payments for the lease 
option. Ty agreed. Jim asked if Ty had noticed the horse exercise equipment at the ranch. Jim said 
his father had promised the equipment to a lady before he died, and Jim thought it might have been 
removed from the ranch after his father had died, as Jim did not recall seeing it at his last visit. Ty 
said he had seen it and would check on it at his next visit to the ranch. Jim said he was going to sell 
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some of the horses on the ranch. Ty asked to purchase a horse, but did not have a way to care for it 
over the winter. Jim said that a horse could live year around on the ranch without human care. Ty 
was surprised by this information. Ty offered to buy one of the horses. Jim offered to sell Ty the 
white horse for $500, and that the horse was well broken for riding. Jim asked if I wanted the paper 
work for the horse, which Jim could get for an additional $1300.00. Ty responded that he did not see 
a need for the papers. Jim said he would make up a bill of sale for the horse, put it in his wallet and 
give to Ty the next time they met. 
10/17/04 Ty called Jim from the ranch and asked how to turn off the porch light. 
10/21/04 Ty left message on Jim's phone stating Ty needed the final lease option signed to get 
escrow started. 
10/22/04 Ty left message on Jim's phone that Ty needed the final lease option signed for escrow, and 
that Ty wanted to work on the old homestead. 
10/24/04 Jim called Ty. Aaron and Marina were with Ty at the ranch doing work on the old ranch 
house. Jim said he hoped that they had gone ahead and gone to the ranch and had worked on the 
ranch house and that he had been out of town that week in California. Ty told Jim that they were at 
the ranch, and that they had been repairing the house. Jim said he would contact Ty during the week 
to set up a date to close. 
10/26/04 Jim called Ty and left a message that he had called. Ty called Jim back Jim said he was 
going in to talk to his friend in St. George to finish the lease option agreement. Jim wanted to add a 
few things to the agreement, including a clause prohibiting the removal of the corrals, adding detail 
as to which bills Ty would be responsible for, and a clause allowing the Farnsworths to sell the note. 
They discussed insurance, Jim wanted to be named as a beneficiary. Ty said he had talked to his 
agent, who said that Ty could only qualify for renter's insurance. They agreed that Jim would insure 
the property, but that Ty would make the payments. They agreed to sign and settle up on the least 
option on 10/28/04. 
10/28/04 Ty called Jim at 2:50 P.M. to get directions and time to close. Jim did not answer. Ty 
called 4 more times over the next 4 hours. Jim called back at 10:23 P.M. Jim said there was a 
problem with a realtor contract that they had come across earlier that evening. Jim said the property 
had been colisted with Alan Wade. Mr. Wade used the MLS but Mr. Wilkerson, the realtor in 
Duchesne did not. Jim said the contract with Wade should have been for 6 months, but that it 
actually stated 12 months. Jim said he would just lease Ty the property until the contract expired if 
the realtor would not honor the spirit of their deal. Jim told Ty to not worry, and that Jim would get 
the problem solved. 
10/29/04 Ty called Jim at 12:26, the phone was picked up, and then immediately hung up. Ty called 
back and Jim answered, saying he was busy and would call back. At 12:56 Jim called Ty. Jim said 
they had not made any progress with the realtor. Ty offered to pay half of the realtor's commission. 
Jim said his brothers would not take any less than we had agreed upon. Ty then offered to pay the 
full fee and close this day. Jim stated he did not feel the realtor should get any commission because 
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the realtor's contract was supposed to be for 6 months. Jim said he wanted the realtor issue resolved 
before he closed the deal on the lease option. 
Ty told Jim that they had shut down their business on Saturday 10/30/04 and planned to 
spend the weekend at the ranch. Jim said to go ahead, but no do much work. Ty asked since they 
were willing to pay the entire realtor fee, why should they not feel free to do 'much work.' Jim 
stated that he felt bad about all of the promises he had made and did not want to make any more. Ty 
asked Jim if there were other problems of which Ty was not aware. Jim said there were not any other 
problems. Ty then asked Jim if Jim had problems about their deal. Jim stated that there were none 
he was aware of. Ty said if there are no other problems, we are ready to close today and pay the 
extra money to the realtors. Jim said to just wait until the problem was resolved and just go to the 
ranch and relax. 
10/30/04 The Eldridges, Aaron Thomson, and Jim, David, David's son and Gregory' s son (all 
Famsworths) were all at the ranch. David and his son removed the lawn mower, which was agreed to 
be excluded from the sale. David and Ty discussed deer hunting and trespassing. David explained 
about land owner permits. Jim came and loaded the pale horse. Ty asked about breeding the white 
horse. Jim said he would breed it for free, if Ty brought the horse to Lake Shore. Ty offered a 
check to Jim for the horse. Jim refused, and said that they could do it at the same time when they 
closed on the lease, within the next 7 to 10 days. 
While Jim was loading some personal property which was agreed to be exempt from the sale, 
he asked Marina if she wanted a box of books. Marina declined, and Jim said he would take them for 
a private library he wanted for his home. Jim told Marina that he was going to contact an attorney on 
Monday the 1st of November about the realtor commission problem. 
Ty asked Jim if he would show Ty how to turn off the water. Jim agreed, they took some 
ATV's and Jim showed Ty how to shut down the water system. While showing Ty main valve, Jim 
mentioned that the upper main pond valve would not shut off completely. He said the valve seemed 
to be getting worse and that Ty should replace it in the next year or two. Jim recommended using a 
planetary gear valve. Ty had earlier stated his intention to run some cattle on the ranch. Jim told Ty 
to start them on Ty's Mountain Green property. Ty said that was a good idea, but that the Mountain 
Green property was not fenced. 
Aaron and Ty pointed out some personal property items to Jim which had been agreed to be 
excluded which were still on the property. They helped load them. Jim thanked them. Jim asked Ty 
if he liked the view. Ty said he did. Jim then asked if it was worth $400,000. Ty said he thought it 
might be. As Jim was leaving, he commented that everyone was mad at him. Ty asked why. Jim 
said that some guy wanted to make an offer on the property, but Jim told him it was already sold. Jim 
stated he told the guy to hurry up and make an offer because the ranch sold two days ago. Ty was 
confused at this statement, but thought it was why everyone was mad at him - because he said it was 
already sold. 
11/5/04 Ty called Jim, left message to call. 
11/8/04. Jim called Ty. Ty asked Jim if he had any good news. Jim said no. Ty asked if he had any 
news. Jim said he needed to call so he could sleep better. Jim said he received an offer for $400,000 
after our contract had expired. Jim told Ty that if he had received the lease option before his friend 
went on the fishing trip that he would have had the deal complete before this new offer came in. Jim 
told Ty to just wait and see what happened. Jim said these deals fall through all of the time. Ty told 
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him that he would do what ever it took to get the ranch. Jim was surprised by this statement. Jim 
said it might be too late that he might have already signed the paperwork. Ty told Jim the ranch was 
worth the extra money. Jim told Ty he would call his brothers and see what they could do. Ty asked 
if the realtors were involved in the new offer. Jim said yes. Ty asked if he still had to pay 3% if Ty 
bought the ranch. Jim said he had not checked. Ty offered $388,000, which was the difference 
between the $400,000 and the amount of commission difference between Ty's offer and the new 
offer. Jim hung up. Jim called back and said if Ty could come up with $390,000 cash within two 
days, plus more for the personal property and equipment, that Ty could still buy the property. 
11/12/04 Jim called Ty. They discussed the situation on the property. Ty told Jim that he was very 
upset about what Jim had done to him. Ty told Jim that the paper work on the lease option was only 
a formality, and that Ty considered that they had made a deal when they agreed to the terms weeks 
before. Not only was the lease option a deal, but the right for Jim to run 5 horses, selling Ty the 
white horse, and Jim breeding the horse. Ty told Jim that he felt betrayed. Ty explained that he 
thought it was unfair for Jim to pull the rug out from underneath him, especially since they were 
cousins. Ty also said it was unfair because he could have come up with the cash had Jim actually 
wanted the cash. Ty explained that they had become emotionally attached to the property. Jim said 
he was attached to the ranch, because it had been his father's. Jim then told Ty that he met the realtor 
when he was leaving the ranch on October 30, 2004. Ty asked Jim how he felt about the situation. 
Jim said he could see Ty's side. Ty repeated the question, but Jim did not answer. Ty told him that 
he could see Jim's side, and that $61,000 was a lot of money. Ty said that a lot of people would do 
the same thing Jim had done, but that it was the wrong thing to do. Jim told Ty that if he was not 
going to come up with the $390,000 then Jim would sell the property to the other guy. Ty advised 
him against doing so. Jim apparently realized Ty had consulted with an attorney and got mad, and 
that Ty had been wasting Ty's time and that he was glad that he had not sold the ranch to Ty. 
12/10/04 Ty called Jim. Ty told Jim that when he filed the complaint he also filed a lis pendens and a 
temporary restraining order. Jim was surprised and asked what a lis pendens was. I told him that it 
let the world know that there was litigation pending concerning the ranch. We discussed the lawsuit. 
Jim denied making a sub-deal about the 5 horses. Jim promised to return Ty's weed eater. Ty asked 
if he could get Jim's word on returning the weed eater. Jim said he would give his word. Jim also 
stated that if he ever gave his word on a deal he would honor it. Ty asked who was buying the ranch. 
Jim said that Ty would not believe who it was, but said he would not disclose until the sale was 
closed. Jim then said Gerald Wilkerson was in on the deal. 
Jim called back and threatened to sue Ty if he did not lift the lis pendens. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: As it relates to your allegation in paragraph 6 of the First -
Amended Complaint, set forth in detail each and every demand that was made, including what 
was said and the date of the demand. 
Answer: See Interrogatory number 1, dates of 10/22, 10/24, 10/26, 10/28, 10/29/04. 
On 11/9/04 Ty caused a demand letter to be sent to the Defendants. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Set f o r t h all facts that support your allegations in paragraph 
14 of t h e First Amended Complaint. 
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Answer: See Interrogatory number 1 beginning with 9/13/04. On 10/8/04 the lease 
option consisting of three pages was sent via U.S. Mail to Jim. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 4 : Set forth each promise and assertion you claim that was made by 
the Defendants that was untrue and intentionally or knowingly misleading and any other facts 
that support your allegations in paragraph 7 of the First Amended Complaint. 
Answer: Plaintiffs respond that the untrue and misleading facts include the following: 
Defendants promises that they preferred the lease option over regular financing; Defendants 
promises that they would close on the lease option; that Defendants would provide a better 
financing rate than available through a bank; that Defendants would close on 10/28/04; 
Defendants implied promises that Plaintiffs no longer needed to obtain conventional 
financing; that the contracts with the realtors were expired; that there were problems with the 
realtors which prevented Defendants from closing; that Defendants would sell the white 
horse for $500; that Defendants would provide a copy of an abstract on the property; that 
Plaintiffs need not purchase the horse on 10/30/04 and that the parties could close all within 
7-10 days; that Defendants would contact an attorney to resolve the problem with the realtor; 
and that Plaintiffs could purchase the property after 11/8/04 for $390,000. 
Regarding allegations of paragraph 7, see Interrogatory number 1, for 11/8/04. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: State forth in detail each and every contact you had with any 
person or entity, other than the Defendants including title companies, real estate agents, and 
other third parties regarding the real property in Neola, which is subject of this action. Identify 
that party, the date of the contact and what was said or done in the contact. 
Answer: 
8/8/04 An unnamed Neola resident at a convenience store about water rights and shares; 
and drinking water. 
8/16/04 Plaintiff spoke to Carolyn at the water company regarding class F water rights, 
fees and other information on the telephone. She stateed that BIA or Indian water was the best. 
8/18/04 Uintah Basin Standard about area and information to subscribe to local 
newspapers on telephone. 
Prior to 8/23/04 telephone contact with Washington Mutual Bank regarding a loan on the 
property. 
About 8/23/04 telephone contact with Dava Jensen about other property we own that we 
could sell for a 1031 exchange on purchase of the ranch. 
About 9/9/04 Plaintiff called Fern at Basin Land Title, requested information on 
easements and history of the ranch title. 
9/9/04 Plaintiff called Century 21 realtor requesting information on Sundance Ranch. 
9/9/04 Plaintiff called Duchesne County recorder to order plat maps of ranch surrounding 
property. 
9/9/04 Plaintiff called Washington Mutual, they informed Plaintiff that financing was 
cleared for the amount of $340,000 but that they would only loan against the house and one acre. 
9/9; 9/10 and 9/13/04 calls and visits to Zions Bank, Wells Fargo, Western Ag Credit, 
and FSA regarding terms and rates on agricultural loans. 
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9/15/04 Jennes Eldridge email about ranch that is cool. 
9/15/04 Ty to Jennes sent pictures of Neola ranch. 
9/18/04 Jennes email to Ty, "looks cool, good luck." referring to Neola ranch. 
9/19/04 Plaintiffs talked to Joe Garfield, Aaron Thomson, Yvonne and Dave Kennison, 
that Jim offered the lease purchase option, and that Ty wanted to help out with Joe's farm for 
experience. 
9/20/04 Marina called Jen at Washington Mutual to cancel loan. 
9/20/04 Ty responded to email from his brother Jennes Eldridge about ranch in Neola, 
referring to internet link to ranch. "Looks like I will be getting it." 
10/8/04 Ty talked to Wilkinson Fabrication for metal roofing to reroof the old milk barn 
on the ranch. Aaron Thomson helped load the roofing and store it on Mountain Green property. 
Joe Garfield and Aaron help load foam insulation for the ranch house. 
10/17/04 Dave & Yvonne Kennison, Gretchen Kalie, Mekel, Lindsey Richards and 
Plaintiffs were all at ranch to show it off. 
10/18/04 Ty called Escrow Specialists concerning payments on the lease option for the 
ranch. 
10/18/04 Plaintiff spoke with Debbie Weaver in person at a title company about doing 
lease options. 
10/24/04 Plaintiffs spoke in person with Kent and Treena Bastian regarding history of 
ranch; allowing 5 horses on the ranch, about ranch equipment. Bastians stated that Jim told them 
to have their cattle off the ranch by November 1, 2004 because the ranch was sold. Plaintiffs told 
the Bastians they could leave their animals on the ranch, and they could work out the details the 
following week. Discussed the terms of the Bastian lease with Defendants. Discussed land 
prices, hunters and trespassers. 
10/22/04 Plaintiff Marina talked to Yvonne Kennison about getting a fence mender for 
the ranch as a birthday gift for Ty. Marina and Yvonne went to CAL Ranch Supply to get stuff 
for the ranch for Ty's birthday. 
On or before 10/26/04, Plaintiffs spoke with Jim Manning, AMP AC Insurance about 
insurance on the ranch and dangers of haunta virus. 
10/27/04 Jenness called Ty to wish him a happy birthday. Ty told Jenness the details on 
the lease option and that it would be closing the next day on 10/18/04. 
10/28/04 Plaintiff spoke with Larson Saw Mill, Turner Lumber and Basin Building 
Supply to get lumber and materials to repair the ranch house. 
10/28/04 Plaintiffs spoke with Debbie Weaver and Adam Phillips at American Secure 
Title regarding the things needed to protect themselves when signing the lease option agreement. 
10/28/04 Plaintiff spoke with Jolene Carter, 1st National Bank of Morgan, regarding 
notarization of the lease option agreement. 
10/28/04 Plaintiffs cancel annual snowmobile trip to McCall, Idaho and invite Jennes and 
Natasha Eldridge to spend time with Plaintiffs at the ranch. 
10/29/04 Plaintiffs spoke with Jeremy Kopp, a realtor, to check the MLS to see if the 
ranch had been listed on the MLS. 
10/30/04 Plaintiffs visited a furniture store in Roosevelt looking for a refrigerator for the 
ranch, also spoke with R.C. Willey about delivery to Neola. 
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10/30/04 Plaintiffs visited JP Saddle in Neola about ordering western saddles, bits and 
tack for the white horse. Also talked about Wilford Farnsworth's ranch. 
11/8/04 Plaintiffs spoke in person with Brian Gunn about financing for the ranch. 
11/9/04 Plaintiffs spoke in person with Alvin R. Lundgren about the problems regarding 
the ranch purchase. 
11/12/04 Plaintiffs visited Duchesne County recorder for maps of the ranch area, file the 
complaint and lis pendens. 
11/22/04 Plaintiffs telephoned American National Bank president Ted Ware about 
financing on the ranch. 
11/22/04 Plaintiffs telephone Western Agricultural Credit for long term rates on loan for 
ranch. 
12/10/04 Ty telephoned Basin Land Title. They said John would call back about the 
ranch matter. 
12/20/04 Ty called John at Basin Land Title. 
INTERROGATORY NO 6: Set forth all facts showing that the Plaintiffs followed the 
requirements of the Real Estate Purchase Contract to close the transaction on or before 
October 24, 2004. 
Response: On 8/22/04 Plaintiff made an offer on the property; Defendants countered, 
and Plaintiff accepted the counter offer. On 8/23/04 Plaintiffs applied for a loan with 
Washington Mutual. Defendants prepared the REPC, which was signed by Plaintiff on 8/23/04. 
9/9/04 Plaintiffs contacted Zions Bank, Wells Fargo, FSA and Western Ag Credit for financing. 
Then on 9/19/04 Defendant told Plaintiff that they preferred a lease option agreement. In 
reliance on Defendants assertions, Plaintiffs ceased seeking conventional financing. Plaintiffs 
contacted Defendant several times seeking to close on or near October 24, 2004 (see 
Interrogatory number 1). 
INTERROGATORY NO 7: As to any request to admit that has been denied, set forth in 
detail the facts that support the denial of that request. 
Admission Number 2. Plaintiffs tendered the purchase price in their letter of about 
November 9, 2004 to Defendants; and have repeated that offer in court on or about 
November 29, 2004. 
Admission Number 3. Plaintiffs had a line of credit sufficient to purchase the 
property through the American National Bank. Plaintiffs could have and would have 
obtained conventional financing had Defendants not opted for the lease option on the 
property. 
Admission Number 4. Plaintiffs and Defendants agreed to change the terms and 
conditions of the August 24, 2004 contract. Plaintiffs at all times wanted to acquire the 
property, either by purchase or lease option, or other terms as may have been agreeable 
between the parties. At no time did Plaintiffs desire or intend to abandon their interest in the 
property. Plaintiffs repeatedly told the Defendants that they wanted to acquire the property 
by any means necessary. 
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Admission Number 5. The parties discussed various terms of the lease option 
agreement. Defendants agreed to close on the negotiated terms of the lease option on 
10/28/04. 
Admission Number 7. Plaintiffs did not demand the return of the earnest money 
check. 
Admission Number 8. Plaintiffs received the earnest money check, but it was not sent 
to them at their request. 
Dated: 
Ty Eldridge 
Marina Eldridge 
REQUEST TO PRODUCE 
1. Copies of all telephone records including cell phone and facsimile showing any contact 
between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants, or any other party regarding the real property that is 
subject to this action. 
Plaintiffs object to this request as being vague, overbroad, and unclear. Without 
waiving those objections, see attached Bates Stamp numbers 000001 - 000052; 00010-
000130. 
2 . Copies of all e-mails, letters, or any other form of communication between the Plaintiffs, 
the Defendants, and any other party regarding the real property that is the subject of this 
action, or the issues raised in the First Amended Complaint. 
Plaintiffs object to this request as being vague, overbroad, and unclear. Without 
waiving those objections, see attached Bates Stamp numbers 000053 - 000100; 000131-
140 
3. Copies of all documents submitted to or received from lending companies regarding 
obtaining financing for the real property that is the subject of this lawsuit. 
Plaintiffs object to this request as being vague, overbroad, and unclear. Without 
waiving those objections, see attached Bates Stamp numbers 000101 - 00109 
4 . Produce any tape recordings, notes, diary entries, computer entries or any other information 
or documentation supporting any of the claims in the First Amended Complaint or regarding 
any of the conversations between the parties. 
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Plaintiffs object to this request as being vague, overbroad, and unclear. Without 
waiving those objections, see enclosed CD labeled Audio; Audio 2; and DVD labeled Ranch 
B-Day 10-17-04 10-27-04 
Dated March 23,2005 
Alvin R. Lundgren 
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ALVIN R. LUNDGREN (#5506) 
ALVIN R. LUNDGREN, L.C. 
5 1 0 5 W O L D H W Y S T E 2 0 0 
MT. GREEN, UT 84050 
TEL (801) 876-4422 
Fax (801) 876-4411 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
NOV 1 2 2004 
BY 
JOANNE McKEE, CLERK 
M U P DEPUTY 
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
TY ELDRIDGE and MARTINA 
ELDRIDGE 
Plaintiffs 
v. 
JAMES L. FARNSWORTH; DAVID 
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY 
FARNSWORTH 
COMPLAINT 
BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR SALE 
OF REAL PROPERTY 
CASE NO O^OtOOcTtf 
JUDGE ^S'^-.fCnJjUt^Y^^ 
Defendant 
Plaintiffs Ty and Martina Eldridge appear through counsel Alvin R. Lundgren and allege 
as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs are husband and wife, residents of Morgan County, Utah. 
2. Defendant James L. Farnsworth is a resident of Weber County, Utah. 
3. Defendants David Farnsworth and Gregory Farnsworth have unknown residences. 
4. The parties entered into a contract for the purchase of real property located in Duchesne 
County, Utah on August 24,2004 ("Contract"). The property is described as 280 acres 
with 120 shares of water located at approximately 4143 West 6885 North, Neola, Utah 
("Property"). 
5. The Contract by its terms (paragraph 24) requires that "time is of the essence." 
6. The time set forth in the Contract to close, October 24,2004, has passed. 
7. Demand was made but Defendant refused to close on the property. 
8. Defendant repudiated the Contract and advised Plaintiffs that he had entered into an 
agreement to sell the property to another buyer. 
9. Plaintiffs at all times were ready willing and able to consummate the Contract. 
10. Plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction against Defendants from selling the property, 
because of the unique nature of the property, and because the property cannot be replaced 
and money damages may not be an adequate remedy. 
11. Plaintiffs are entitled to their damages as proven at trial, including attorney fees and costs. 
WHEREFORE 
Plaintiffs pray this Court enter an order mandating Defendants to sell the property 
pursuant to the terms in the Contract; enjoining them from selling the Property to any other party; 
for their damages as proven at trial; for their attorney fees and costs; and such other relief as this 
Court deems reasonable and fair. 
Dated: November 12,2004 
Tab 10 
30. Plaintiffs were damaged in their reliance on Defendants through the loss of the right to 
acquire the property. 
31. Defendants profited from their misrepresentations by obtaining a significantly greater 
purchase price, all to Plaintiffs' detriment. 
32. The doctrine of fraud provides that a perpetrator of a fraud should not benefit from his 
misrepresentation, and the Defendants should be ordered to perform under the original 
agreement or the lease option. 
33. The doctrine of waiver provides that the Defendants waived their right to conventional 
financing by telling the Plaintiffs that they preferred a lease option. The Defendants 
should be ordered to complete and perform the lease option. 
34. The doctrine of estoppel provides that the Defendants cannot refuse to complete the lease 
option when Plaintiffs reasonably relied on their promises. 
35. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has been extended to those cases concerned with the 
statute of frauds, where the promise as to future conduct constitutes the intended 
abandonment of an existing right of the promissor. 
36. Here the Plaintiffs relied on the abandonment of the right of the Defendants to a 
conventionally financed sale for the lease option. The Defendants cannot refuse to 
complete the lease option because they received a second offer so long as the Plaintiffs 
are desirous and capable of completing the transaction as contemplated. 
37. Based on these principles the Plaintiffs are entitled to close on the property on the terms 
and conditions set forth in the lease option. Although the Defendants did not execute the 
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lease option, the terms are sufficiently complete to form an enforceable agreement. Any 
missing or incomplete terms can be supplemented or reformed by this court. 
38. Wherefore this Court should order the Defendants to enter into, complete and honor the 
lease option agreement or alternately allow the Plaintiffs to complete the purchase 
agreement with conventional financing. 
39. Plaintiffs are entitled to their attorney fees and costs. 
ALTERNATE RECOVERY 
40. Alternately, it is unconscionable for the Defendants to profit from their intentional deceit. 
41. Plaintiffs should be awarded damages of not less than the difference between the 
purchase price the Defendants agreed to accept from the Plaintiffs and the purchase price 
accepted with the second buyers. 
42. Defendants should be punished for their deceit by not only surrendering their ill gotten 
gains, and by a grant of punitive damages against Defendants. 
43. Plaintiffs have been required to retain counsel to protect their interest. Defendants should 
be ordered to pay Plaintiffs' attorney fees and costs. 
WHEREFORE 
Plaintiffs pray this Court enter an order 
1. Mandating Defendants to sell the property pursuant to the terms in the Contract; 
2. Enjoining them from selling the Property to any other party; 
3. For their damages as proven at trial; 
4. For their attorney fees and costs; 
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5. In the alternate that the Court grant judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the 
Defendants in such amount to be proven at trial is reasonable compensation for the 
damages, actual, consequential and incidental, sustained by Plaintiffs 
6. Together with punitive damages to prevent these Defendants and other so situated from 
engaging in such conduct and 
7. Such other relief as this Court deems reasonable and fair. 
Dated: January 20,2005 
CERTIFICATION 
I, certify that I am over age 18, not a party to the foregoing, and that a true and correct 
copy of the FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT was sent postage prepaid to the below listed 
persons on January 20, 2005 
Clark Allred 
363 East Main St Ste 201 
Vernal, Utah 84066 
dvinR, 
Alvin R. Lum 
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DUCHE: 
C;X?T 
" <'~Y, UTAH 
ALVIN R LUNDGREN (#5506) 
ALVIN R LUNDGREN, L C 
5 1 0 5 W O L D H W Y S T E 2 0 0 
MT. GREEN, UT 84050 
TEL (801) 876-4422 
Fax (801) 876-4411 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
MAS 1 3 2305 
c-KEE, CLERK 
-.DEPUTY 
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
TY ELDRIDGE and MARTINA 
ELDRIDGE 
Plaintiffs 
v. 
JAMES L. FARNSWORTH; DAVID 
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY 
FARNSWORTH 
Defendant 
ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM 
CASE NO 040800079 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
Plaintiffs Ty and Martina Eldridge appear through counsel Alvin R. Lundgren and 
ANSWER the Counterclaim as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs admit Counterclaim paragraph 1. 
2. Plaintiffs admit Counterclaim paragraph 2, and further answer that the contract placed 
duties on both parties to perform. 
3. Plaintiffs deny Counterclaim paragraph 3. 
4. Plaintiffs deny Counterclaim paragraph 4. 
5. Plaintiffs deny Counterclaim paragraph 5. 
6. Plaintiffs deny Counterclaim paragraph 6. 
7. Plaintiffs admit Counterclaim paragraph 7. 
8. Plaintiffs admit Counterclaim paragraph 8. 
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9. Plaintiffs deny that Counterclaim paragraph 9 is the statement of the Court, and state that 
the Court record speaks for itsself. 
10. Plaintiffs deny Counterclaim paragraph 10. 
11. Plaintiffs deny the inferences of Counterclaim paragraph 11 and admit only that they have 
not removed the lis pendens. 
12. Plaintiffs deny Counterclaim paragraph 12. 
13. Plaintiffs admit Counterclaim paragraph 13 to the extent that Defendants requested that 
the lis pendens be removed. 
14. Plaintiffs deny Counterclaim paragraph 14 that they have removed a request for specific 
performance. 
15. Plaintiffs deny Counterclaim paragraph 15, and state by specific allegation that Plaintiffs 
still desire to purchase the property. 
16. Plaintiffs deny Counterclaim paragraph 16. 
17. Plaintiffs admit Counterclaim paragraph 17. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
1. Defendants have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
2. The agreements between the parties, including the contract of August 2004 and 
amendments thereto create an enforceable contract and preclude the right of Defendants 
to raise their counterclaim. 
3. The Defendants are still bound to the agreements between the parties based on the 
doctrines of promissory estoppel, laches, detrimental reliance, negligent 
misrepresentation, and fraud. 
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4. Plaintiffs agreed to fully perform the terms of the August 2004 contract. 
5. Plaintiffs tendered full performance of the terms of the August 2004 contract. 
6. Defendants' own conduct excuses Plaintiffs from the strict performance of the August 
2004 contract without amendments. 
7. Defendants' own conduct prevented the Plaintiffs from strict performance of the August 
2004 contract. 
8. Defendants' anticipatory repudiation of the strict terms of the August 2004 contract, 
together with their statements inducing reliance by the Plaintiffs formed an amended 
contract which is enforcable. 
9. Defendants are not entitled to retention of the earnest money deposit because of their acts 
misleading the Plaintiffs. 
10. Defendants knew that the Plaintiffs would perform either the strict terms of the August 
2004 contract or the amended terms, however, Defendants' greed led them to conspire 
against the Plaintiffs when Defendants learned they could sell the property for more 
money. 
11. Plaintiffs renew and reassert their right to specific performance. The amended complaint 
set forth additional causes of action, and was not a dismissal of the earlier causes of 
action. 
12. Defendants appear with unclean hands and are not entitled to the relief they request. 
13. Defendants' conduct constitutes a waiver of their right to terminate the agreements 
between the Plaintiffs and Defendants. 
3 
Dated: March 14, 2005 
CERTIFICATION 
I, certify that I am over age 18, not a party to the foregoing, and that a true and correct 
copy of the PLAINTIFFS ANSWER TO THE DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM TO 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT was sent postage prepaid to the below listed 
persons on March 14,2005 
Clark Allred 
363 East Main St Ste 201 
Vernal, Utah 84066 
a 
Alvin R. Lumfefi 
Alvin R: leren 
Tab 12 
FROM : F3X NO. : ug. 26 2804 11:42HM PI 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
This hi a tooaJiy binding contract. Utah ia» roquiras rsa! asfcite U C M M K to * * I h t e tam- &*er and Setter, howswir, * *y sg*e« to alter or daiete 
its proviskHta or to U N * dHfrrwrt fwm. .1 /ou M i * * j * * : lax advice, coreufl /our attorney or tax advisor 
p EARNEST JIIONCr n e C S P T ^ __ j 
p , ^ } V j K C ^ > ^ M c L v - y ^ L - ' r H f ^ i i ^ J ' . ' ^ ^ ' ^ f t t ^ j b pugj-ase the Property 
described beicw ate aeceby fivers to me Brokerage, as Carnes: Money, tne ancunt cf 5 j ^ O Q Q — j n the rorm of 
£) vv^o v-*A. csW t^sXC which, jpon Acceptance of this offer by ail parties (as defined in Section 23), 
shS 
^ vv t  oe  fi r  t  tn  rct & ,  r ; , tr 
r;- f  
»d in arardance with state taw., ^ ff** j , 
Recced by % 1 ' A U ^ W ^ LAv^Tllt, ^ J & f W b n {Date) 
% (Signatxire af Ag*naBn>ker acknowledge* receipt or £arr.est Money) 
BTOKerage: _ _ _ ^ J S PhcittNumow 
9 * * OFFSRTOl PURCHASE \ / : Q' " \ 
1. • ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ I^OSWTTM ^ Mr^W l ^ * -UHO 
*so described « M [ H * \ ^ ^ ^ \ o ^ g S T f . S v V L ' _ ^ 
Cj-y r* ^As fc6\o^ County cfV)v*oV> * * > > « - state
 ct uiah. Z)p^-K£3 (the T^operty"). 
1.1 Included Items, Unlesi excluded bsrelr., *::s sale rndudei tf~ f oSoiVirig '-am* *{ presently attacrsd to the Prooerty: 
plumbing, hearing, atf cendi^ aning ftsure* enc equipment oeiling fans: *s.isr s-.eete.-: txna-m spctiarces; ttgnt fixtures ans 
bulbs; bathrcom futures; curtains, drapertes and ;ccs; wrec* &£ door screens: storm deers a^ d windows: w».r*Jcw si'nds; 
awntoas; instated television antenra: sated&e dishes and system pe/nvinsnily sffasd carpe-is: sificrr.sfcccarace croor opener 
and acccmpMyfciE transmitters); fencing; ere tees and shrubs. The foticwinc items shsa also be ir.rii.ded ir. this sale end 
conveyed under separate S3* of Sate with 'warranties as :c tale; _ — _ — 
AJt Excluded items. The fciic^inater^ are sxc&ded fr<V? *¥* » * : 
W ^ o W Y < \ O N W Q\MF**X~C * c U j ^ ) v ^ , 'v 
1.3 Water Rights. The fcjfcwing wsie/ rt^s are inc:L<dee: in this « & \>>o *r±~~^i+* f\ ^ J ^ ^ c ^ K A ^ 
(*C O r M ^ L F K > - » ( S O 3XX) ' _ 
1.4 Survey. (Check appUcafiia boxes)' A survey [ } WILL J«£W!LL NOT be prepared by a licensee sprayer. The 
Sur/ey WorK w3l be: [ ] Prcperty comers staked I ] Boundary Survey [ ] Bouncary & Imorovements survey [ 1 Other 
(spedfyL- - Responsibility for payment [ ] Buyer [ } Seller { ] 5uyer and Setter share equally. Buyers 
obOsaSen to purchase under this Contract [ j IS [ ] IS NOT csnc&onfcd upon Buyer's aparcvai cf the Surrey Wc*. If yes. 
the terrnsaK^e attached Survey Addendum apply. ^\A*^ 
~r\!~ j - - i - . - ***_ 'Z'ZCt ftKf^&y **Ct f)(T~ 
2. PURCHASE PRICE. The pLichaaaPrice forme Prcpeny is S ' : y = * ^ T ^ g 1 ^ " ->%> I ^ C u ^ *y 
tA Method of Payment Tne Purchase Ptice wtil be paid as follows: 
S_l\ ° ^ ^ > (a) Ezniest Money Depoait Under certain conditicn** deacxibed in Ais Contract, THIS 
^ DEPOSIT WAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE. 
$ ^ ^ t O ' a o (b) New Low* 3uyeragrsaK *o app-u fcr 3 «ew Ic .^i a* pirwcrf Ir Sec^ci 2.3. auyerwiR sppry •'cr 
one or mora of the following leans: f ] CONVENTIONAL I f >MA I ]Vy^ 
J^OTHER{specfy} C ^ v ^ u t ^ ^ A i ^ J 
If an FHA/VA loan applies, see attached FKAA/A L oan Addendum. 
If the loan is to incaide any particular terms, then cneck be-low urn give derails: 
[ I SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS J 
$ ~ ~ (c) Loan Assumption (s^e aztachefS *5.5u*npacn AcScandtm if accLcabie) 
^ ~ - . " <d) Selfer Ffnandnn 'see atsached 5e!**r ^nanrrc Adcectcum dr appiicaoie} 
> {e) Other {specify) 
$ _ Z Z Z r r r _ (f) Balance of Purchase Ffice /n Cash at SettUrnent 
S ^ ^ f ^ ^ 3 ^ PURCHASE PR1C5L Total of Srw (a) tnrough Jf) 
Pa^e t of (; pages S t^ter*$ tttfttafa^f^ ^  Date 5 / ^ / ^ euyer's initials Z 7 ^ ' Date ^/^l/o^ 
U* 7 / 
P^ nxi * :£ j - R^al Estate Purshw*C^tr^-.i - £*m Piiodng, !r.c. rn.. 3fll-i77.363fl
 M4.<ui 
FROM FPK NO. * u 9 . 2b 2004 l i :42AM F2 
"
 f ? nS)C iS S ^ c ^ * condtaonad uocn fc*ar quaUfyms for * e applicatje!ban(s) 
l a )
 S~Sced "Section 2.-&) or (c) (the W ) Thia a n d * * k ratanad to as ^ . . ^ « ^ J ^ £ :
 9 , 
(b) t ] Buyer's eb^jafimiJ purchase she P ^ ^ Section 2.^ 
does net apply. 
2 - 3
 to?PB^?J X t i ^ N o later than the Application Deadline referenced in sac** 24{a), Buyer shall apply for the 
S a r n S w S y U ^ o c c w a only wten Buyer has: (i) completed. a«Md, ana delivered to the fender nha 
i f i E d a o S ffi^p^tetion aSd documents required by the Lender and (a) paid ^ ^ ^ ^ r 
i iSuirid^/ the Lender layer agrees to diaarKy tforfc to obtain tte Lean. Buyer wd promptly provide tne Lender 
with anv additional documentation as required by fre tender. 
S r p ^ 2 5 K f Loan Application is denied, * Buyer receives ^ w i r.aft» frcm * * Lend*-** * e Lender cces 
& S £ ± t a S { r ? o S S n i a r ) , B u y e r a t a i L n o a t e r *an * ^ - ^ * ^ ^ 
^ l £ fLyar cr SaSar may, within three calendar days ater Seoefa receiptor s ^ R M ^ M 2 S E 3 
o^i-cv^n«v)8«te«^ctheroarcy. in theater* of a^anctf laton wtoer^ Section 2.3(b): (}; :f the Lear Oenia; 
K ^ i v ^ * * Earnest Money pepotuUhall 
^ e ^ ^ ^ B u y e r ? a f if the Lean Denial was received by Sfcy^ attefthst date. Buyer agrees to forfeit, and Seder 
£ S ? t o ^ ffutfVaiCRalya mmedy, the Earna* M O M * a* Hquidatad damage, A M m " i g a a 
w w ^ S ^ h b l B e ^ Canceflation 
pursuant to the pto/isions cf any Other section of mis Ccraact shtsi be gcver-ed by such ether provisions. 
2A Appraisal of Property. Buyer's ebligaScn to purchasers PiapertRft l^BNOTconcSfionadupc^toPfop^ 
ntnEkigfornotlaaathanttia AnchaaafPrtce. Iftteaffniaal censor, a g p n A * * e p ^ ^ ^ g ! 5 ^ ^ ^ 
tfS^rchase Price, Buyer may cancel th* Contact by providing wntten ncece to Sefler no later than three caWidar days 
ISrSSSrS^tfS^ the appraised value, in the event of such cancetta*cn, * e earnest Money OepcsS shaft 
STeteased to Buyer. A failure to cancal as provided in CUs Section 2.« shaft ce veered a raw of the appraisal 
condition by Buyer. 
3 SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING. Secernent shea Uke dace en the Se£ementl)eacrinta referenced in Section 24(d), or 
on a date upen which Buyer and Seller 2gree in writjna. fcSetHe^e-f' shall ocor enly when all of be rcBcwrg have been 
completed- (a) auyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each other or »tne escrow/dosing office alt documents 
r « i ^ by tte Ccnbact by the L e n ^ 
brBuyer under these documents (except for the proceeds erf any new loan) h^ we been deir»^s^ by BuTer to Sdter or to ^ 
escrowfclcsing office in the form of coflecsed or cleared funds: and (c) any monies required to be paid by Seller under tnese 
documents have been delivered by Setter to Buyer cr to the escrow/dosing offce m the form of collected cr Geared tunds. 
Seller and Buyer shall each pay cne-talf 04) of the fee charged $v th& escrcv//cicsir>g office fcr Ha services in the 
settfementfctesing process, Traeeand assessments tor :he current year, mr^: ana invest on assumed cbfigaticnsshsfi be 
prorated at Settlement as set forth in this Section Tsfent deposits (including, but net limited to, security deposits, cleaning 
deposits and prepaid rents) shall be paid or credited by SeHertD Buyer at Settlement Prorations set forth in this Sec&n shsii 
be made as of the Settlement DeatfffirKscatsnatfersncBdi'noecflcn 
Suchwiffing could include the setSement statement Ti^lransartc^warfeconsiQered closed when Settlement has been 
completed, and when aB of the fcflovwhg have been competed: (i) the proceeds of any new loan have been deSvered by the 
Lender to Seller or to the escrow/ctastng office; and (50 the appiicafcie Closing documents nave been recorded in tne offte 
of the county recorder. The ecSona described in part? (T> and (TO cf the preying sentence ^ a!l be completed wthirt four 
calendar days of Settlement 
4. POSSESSION- Seilar £h3i! defiver *ysica! pess^ ssksn to Bcye: 
[ ] Other (specify) " 
wl^in; f } J houre [ 1 ft days after Closing; 
5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At tne signing of this Contract: 
[ ] Sellers initiate [ ] Buyers Initials 
the Listing Agent, V 4 X 
The Selling Agent _ 
The Listing Broker.
 ( 
The Selling Broker, 
\k\^ 
^m 
represents [ } S^i\^ [ j Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent, 
, represents [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer [} both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent; 
^ represents f ] Seller [ J Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent; 
_ represer.:s \ ] Seller £ J Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 
as a Limited Agent 
Page 2 of S pages Seller's \niB*j&j-^J- Date S/>f/fc^ Buyer's initials / D£- Cste &f*7lcH 
Form #122 - R*al Estate Purcnaet Catnnict - Gem'Pnnong, Inc. r* - 801-^770613 t«Q!$M 
FH3M : FH>< id. : .iu«. 26 33»34 li:43vV1 P3 
6. TITLE INSURANCE. At Settlement, deter agrees to pay for a stantord-coverage cwr;ef s pcKcy of title insurance insuring 
Buyer in the amount of the Purchase Price. 
7 SELLER DISCLOSURES, No laier than ths Seter Disclosure Deadline referer,::ed in Secdcn 24(GJ. Sefier sha« provide 
to K e r S i fbflowing documents which are ccilecSveJy referred to as the, "Seller Closures': 
(a) a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and dated oy Saler; 
(b) a commitment tor the policy of ritte insurance; 
i'c{ a copy of any leases affecting the Proper?/ no; eapifins pnor lo closing: 
(d) written notice of any daims ar«d/cr conditions knowr to Seller re-iatrng to environmental problems anc building cr 
zorung code violates; .jijnd 
(e) Other (specify). 
8, BUYERS RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED OK EVALUATIONS AMD INSPECTIONS. Bjyef $ obligation to purcivase under 
.^this Contract (check applicable boxes): , - . . . . . ~ ^ - * .. • o - -* 
SFba IS I K I S NOT conditioned -^ pen Buyers approval or the center.! of a^  r*e SaJar ^ scfcsures referenced Jn Sscaer.,: 
i^sJM IS S IS NOT conditicnec uccn 8c^*Ts acc^ai of a physasri condition irspe-rscn of >he Property; 
« ^ I 1 ! S JP^ 1 3 WOTconditioned upon Buyer's eppravai of tne following te*U itftf evaiuaacrsofifcs Proper^ : (specify) 
if any of the above Hem* ere checked m the affirmative, then Sections a. 1. 8-2,8.3 and 8.4 apply; otherwise, they do not apply. 
The items chedced in the affirmative above are collectively referred to as {he "Evaluations & Inspections:' Unless cthefwise 
provided in this Contract the Evaluations & Inspections shall be rate for fay Buyer and shall be conducted sy individuals or 
entities at Buyers chrics. Seller agrees tc cooperate with the Evaluations & inspector* and witn the wask-through inspection 
under Section 11. 
3.1 Evaluations & inspections Deadline. No later tnan tne Evsiusiicns & In$cect?cns Deadline referenced in Secton 
24(c) Suyer shall* (a) complete oil Evaluations 4 inspections; and (b) determine if ire Equations & inspections are 
acceptable to Buyer. -
3.2 Right to Cancel or Object. If Buyer determines that the Evaluations & nspecirens are unacceptable, Buyer may, 
no later than the Evaluations & Inspections CeadEne, efthe-;. (a) oancai tr.is Ccntrac: oy providing wntten notice to Seller, 
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit snafI be released tc Buyer, or (b) provice Seiier with written t-ictice of objectors. 
63 Failure to Respond* If by the expjraacn of the Evaluations & inspections Deadline, Buyer dce£ MCC (a) cancel tnis: 
Contract as provided in Section 8.2; or (b) aeiiver a written ejection tc SeiJer regarding me Evaluations & IrioecScns. 5;e 
Evaluations & Inspections shall be deemed approved by Buyer. 
64 Response by Seller. If Buyer provides written objections to Setter, Buver and Seiier shall ha*e seven calendar davs 
titer Setofs receipt of Buyer's objections (tne "Response Period"} in whi£5jc agree In writing uoon the manner of resolving 
Buyer's objections. SeSer may, but shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's" objections. If Buyer and Seller have not acreed 
In wWng upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections. 3jyermarY csnes; t^ rs Contract by providing written notice ioSeiter 
no later than three calendar days after sxpfratton cf the Response Pa-iod; ^ r:$?z>jpca tns Earnest Money Deposit shall be 
released to Buyer, fftnis Contract is not canceled by Buyer uncer *his Secac* i5. A. Suyers objections shafl be deemed waived 
by Buyer, This waiver shall not affect those items warranted in Secion 10. 
9. ADDITIONAL TH?«S. "There [ ] ARE 1 ^ A R £ N 0 T ^MmdA to this Contract containing additional terrr.s. If there are, 
the terms of *he following addenda are incorporated into this Czntract by this reference: [ ] Addendum No. 
[ ] Survey Addendum [ ] Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum 
{ J Laad*6ased Paint Acfciendurn (in some transactions this add&ndum is required by taw\ 
[ J Other fspedfy) _ [ 
10. SELLER WARRANTIES A REPRESENTATIONS. 
- 10.1 Condition of Title. Seller represents that Seller nas fea Stle to me -rc-perty and wfil convey good and marketable 
* e tc Buyer at Closing by general warranty deed, unless the sals is being ?rade pursuant to a real estate contract whicn 
provides for m-e to pass at a later date. In that case, tide will be conveyeo U: scccni3nce wfth the previsions of that contract 
Buyer agrees, however, to accept tftle to the Property subjects thefoitewinc rr.acters cf recoid: essefr^rts, deed restnetions. 
CC&R's (ineaning covensrrts, ccndlticrts and restrictions)., and 1cr.ts-of«,v<iv: anc subj»c::c the contents of the Ccmnrtner^ : 
Page 3 of 6 pages Seller's toM^fef^Cj- D a t e ^ y ^ Buyer's Inltels / ^ ^ - pate t»lsr7k^ 
: FAX NO. : Au9. 26 2QQ4 ii:44n>I P4 
for TitJ* insurance as a g r ^ to by Buyfer una*' Secucn c. Buyer also agrees to take tfie Property supject to existing leases 
affectina the Property ana not expimg pricrts Closing. Bey* agrees to oe res*.cn*Ue for taxes, assessments. Homeowners 
association dueTufliBes. and other servieae provided » the Property after Closing. Except for any soan(s} spectoliy 
assumed DV Buyer under Section 2.1,'c). Seller will cause to be paid off by Closing ell mortgages. T^t deeds judgments, 
^ h a h i e ' s fiens. ta* Bans and warrants. Seder wtit cause to be paid current by dosing a!! assessments and homeowners 
association dues. 
1C.2 Condition of Prooerty. Sailer warrants that *ne Property tv.il be:-. :r.« following c^ndmc^ ON THE DATE SELLER 
DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER: , ^ 
(a) me Prcoeny shall be cruom-dean and free of debris ar.d personal oeJcn^ncs. Any Se*ier or tenant mcv»ng-related 
damage to the Property shan be repaired at Sellers expense;
 it 
fb) the hearing, cooling. elec&icaJ. plumbing and sprWder systems and fixtures, and the epp:>ance* and fireplaces will 
be in working order and tit for tnesr tntendexfpurposes; 
(c) the roof end foundation shall be free of leaks know, to Seller. 
(d) any private well or septic tank serving the Property 3hafi have ^pUc^xie permits, and shall be -r. wcrkrnc oroer and 
fitter Its intended purpose; and ... 
(e) the Property and improvements, i^duding the iandscapinc, wri ~e in :rs s?~s gen*w ccncscn as *ey ware on the 
date of Acceptance. 
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Before Settlement, Buyer may, upen reasonable notice and at a reasonable time, 
conduct a "waifc-torougrf inspection of the Property to determine only that the Property is "as n&presented," meaning that the 
items referenced in Sections 1.1,8.4 anc 10.2 ftr.e items") are respectively present, repaired/changeo es agreed and in the 
warranted condition. If "the items are net as representee. Seller wot, prior to Statement, replace, correct or repak the i»ms 
or, with ttie consent of Buyer (and Lender ft aopiicsbfe), escrow sn amount at Sedsemeni to orevkte for the same. The tenure 
reconduct a walkthrough snspeccon. or tc daim that an item is not 2s represented, shati not constitute s waiver by Buyer of 
the right tc receive, on the cate of possession, the items as represented. 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. SeSer agrees that from the date of Acceptance untit the date of Closing, none of 
the Honouring shall occur without the prior written consent of Buyer: (a) nc changes in any existing lasses shall be made; (b) 
no new teases shaft be entered into: (c) no substantial alterations cr improvements to the Property snaH be made or 
undertaken; end (d) no further financial encumbrances to :he Property shall Ze msde. 
13* AUTHORITY OP SIGNERS. Jf Buyer or Seller is a corporation. partr:arshio. teas, esisce. limited iiafcrfry company, or other 
entity, the person executing this Contract on He oehe.f warrants his cr hei &»thctty to & so aid vs btnd "Buyer and Se3er. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contrac: together with its adtenca. any attacned exhibits and Setter Disclosures. 
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prtcr negotiations. 
representations, werranfles, undertendings cr contracts between the parties. This CorSnact canr.ct -e changed excect ov 
written agreement of the parties. 
15. DfSFUTE RESOLUTION. The partes agree that any dispute, vcisog prior to cr sf.er Cbsina reefed to this Contract 
[ ] S H A L L p ^ MAY (upon mutual agreement of the parties} rtrsibes^omiffeeromediascn. If the paries agree to mediation, 
the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a mediation provider rrt-rjaity agreed upon bv ns partes. Each cam/ 
agrees tD bear its own costs of mediation, if madiason Sails, me other procedures snd remedies available under this Contract 
shall apply. Nothing in this Section 15 shall prohibit any party from seeking emergency eouiiabie rai;ef pending mediation. 
16. DEFAULT. If Suyer deieuits. Seiler may elect either to retain the eamesi Monev Deoofet as aqufdaiad damages, or to 
return it and sue Suyer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies avefisble a: iaw. If $*&*: defaults, in 
addition to return of me Earnest Money Deposit. Suyec may elect ether tc accec? (rem Seiler a sum eax& to »e Earnest 
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller 50 scectfcalJy *rizL<z# tr.\s Contract cr pursue ctner remedies 
available at law. if Buyer ejects to accept llquidatsd damages, Sefier agrees tc p&?' the -i<;uidateci d^ meoe^ s >a Buyer upon 
demand. !t ie agreed that denial of a Lost: Appfca&en made by the Buyer is not a default and is oovernec"by Secson 2.3(b i. 
Page4of 6 pages S e l l e r ' s t o i ^ r / / ^ O-te ^ Buyer's Initiate ^ ^ ^ Date &/J21//H 
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K+~*n *+'9^ . 0«*.f4t =*/«.#•» O.arrKakAjL CAntos: - (i^m Prtntinc Snc ~J» ^ 30" -277-2520 ftOf^A\ 
f^011 : PQK NO- ,: f=*u9. 26 2904 li:45AM P5 
18. NOTICES. Exceot as provided in Section 23. a;! notices requirec under this Contract must be: (a) ir writing; (b) signed 
by the party giving notice; and (c) rec&vedi by the other psny or the cthe- partys ageni no later thsr. the applicable ctete 
referenced in this Contract 
19. ABROGATION. Exceptfonhap.cv!3icnbnfSecticn« iC 1 1Q.2 15 &&".*? and express warranties made in this Contract 
the provisions of tfils Contract snail not sppiy after Ocsiny. 
20. RISK OF LOSS. Ali risk of teas to the Property, inducing or.ysicai carnage or destrucScn to the Property or its 
improvements 6ue to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking »n eminent cemain.. shall be borne 
bv Sailer until the transactors is closed 
term "dsvs" snail mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning en the day following the event whicr. trigger* the timing 
requirement $.a.f Acceptance^  racaipt of the SeJJer Disclosure*, etc.). Pencrma.'KS dsaes and 5n:es referenced herein shall 
not be binding upon title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to th;s Contrac, except as otherwise agreed 
to in writing by such non-party. 
22. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed ccpy of this Contract, any 
addenda and counteroffers, and ttia rauans.-rrssicr cf any s-gr.sc fax snail be the same as delivery of an original. This 
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers ?ney b$ exedneo b counterparts. 
23. ACCEPTANCE- "Acceptance" occurs when Seller cr Buyer, respc ncirg to an oifer or counteroffer of the ether, fa) signs 
the offer or counterofter where noted to indieare accaptaroe; and (b) communicates tc the ether psrty cr tc the ether party's 
agent mat the ofmr or counteroffer has been signed as required. 
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES. Suyer and SeSer agree that the following ceadtaes shatt apply tc this Contract 
(a) Application Deadline 
. (Date) 
(b) SetterDfedoaureDeadfine ^ ^ ^ C T ^ I ^
 } ^ ~ Q ^ \ j D a t e ) 
(c) Evaluations * Inspections Deadline ^ ^ y T . 3 H , 1 - .o -o^
 m a t e^ 
(d) Settlement Deadline VJC<T ,. 2 * M ^ X Q O ^ (Date\ 
25* OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE, ouyef offers to purchasaJtha Pi c^peiVcni^ eabS'^ etfefTnsancccriGdons If 
SeJIer does not accept this offer by: Hyg£> [ J AM *&$?fA Mountain Tinte on ^ N^n^featei . th.s offer shall lapse-
and the Brokerage shaft return the Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer. ' 
tOferDate) payers Sign3jur|y ^QlterC (Buyers Signature) ^ 
 vS5 s b ^ i / fo*f r0ste) 
Th* laser <;*' ^ T * abeve Offer Qat«6 &h*ftf i> : n&Ur*!sa to as *hs ""Oflferf ?^ »«5f ««c& Ca»** 
(Buyers' Names} (PLEASE PRINT} * (NoteAAm*} (pSSSj 
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ACCEPTANCErt^UfrrEROFFERmEJECnOM 
CHECK ONE: 
MACCEPTANCE OF OFFERTO PURCHASE: Setter Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified 
above, 
r l COUNTEROFFER: Setter presents for Buye* Acceptance the terms of Buyert Offer subjed to^heexceDtionso^ 
l J
 -t as specified in the attached ADDENDUM NO 
-t_^. , %hh _ 
Signature) * (Patd) (Tune) fSe»efs Signature} ' ( D a t e ) (Time) 
^TMSA L - fnJlm<*s*fiTH 3 *5 * -5 f rgP> . U f r S / W r U4- Set <fOH » K * 
(Sellers' Names) (PLEASE PRINT) (Nofce Address) ffhone) 
[ ] REJECTION: Setter Rejects the foregoing offer. 
(Seller'sSignature) (Date) (Time) (SeBertsSignature) (Dale) (Time)" 
I H M s inMi imMM*w»Mn«* iawsun>asa t«m»<»a>sMM 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State taw requires BroHer to furnish Buyer and SeHer with copies of this Contract bearing all signatures. (Fit in applicable 
section below.) 
A. I acknowledge receiofcof a final copy of the foregoing ftxttracl bearing ail signatures: 
/to P. €<Ud0& g » - o f ^TfOAj^ <%eL)cJ* t f ^ - y - n c / 
( B u j ^ S i g r i a t u r e ) 7 (Date) (Buyers Signature) " ( D a t e ) 
iSeiif 
VIP 
lte^ Signature) ( p M r (Setters Signature) (Bate) 
I personalty <^sed a final copy of the foreg^ ] faxed [ } mated [ jhand 
delivered on (Date), post*^ prepaid. tolhe»[ ] Setter [ ] Buyer. 
Sent/Defivered by (specify). 
6FFSCTlV*s5e>TEWeRW,ie99. fT REPLACE* AND SUPBfcSDES ALL PREVIOUSLY AmOVm VHtfinMc SUPERSEDES AIX PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF TUB FOR*. 
PageSofSpages Seltar*$ m i t i a S ^ L _ D a t e j ^ / o ^ Buyer's tafoata^ ^ r ^ 9. U he Mt 
Tab 13 
RESIDENTIAL LEASE WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE 
ereittratenolttiasumoi ? H OOP ° ° at farsfcf ia^r^fcv^!^^ 
H^oiw4nm.tt«j»wsKsiWil»dHiUwO!yo*. .J&r£fcv - — CwOol P v ' ^ n g y x e -
State cL U^cxK iegaftyfes^ ifewas . J^L*:-.?***:>» M . fe:". * V f i d . l ^ ^ L . J s & t e t ^ d i f i l l . 
g.fio cict^c, t?c <Ko^*. wvUc ^ f a ^ - t f ?!-v- t^ v/vSLa &e*A- .,Q«-1,Eihli*"\aj3 
MftiVov U T ft4053 : j and consist tf. £ M ^ ! 1 . 1**** f « A c * V * t the wfcjwing TEKNS and COKOlTlORS 
f <r A«yt. I fi^T^e^. _
 : 
2. TERM! TftctffniEtffflfs*y^o?«m»firi>.>n A r W J ^r. _ *JP£hL tf^tttoteHje tor* Genoa* ot 2j£ lawrftaaiereansr. 
3 . BENT: Fteitf shah" be *-.. / fc- < O % pet rmxtih. (£>*&* * a^2?ra. * q ^ 
oratsocho«r^p?acesasflwyl»ciesiana« iniheevent«!aisiH»»:dv*i!JWiti^^ 
- . . pms fa»u«tat *»*D % per anmsn OR treoetaouem amount 
4. UTHinES: Lessee staStwrapmis^ extaii:. &&&£. — ,; 
wttcfr£iatfDep»rt5y Lessor. 
5. USE: The pnvaises 5na» Dc jisetf as a Tts&aau and tor no at*.* p * ^ * . +itfiom *-* P*V;J w c t r car* «#«.? C - 1 esse 
6. MOUSE RULES: in Tftegwrnttt^ttepwaitesa^ 
b e t o or after tneexecolnfflrieve^ 
7. A$Stt2iaia£OTAfJDSIJ8U'^^ 
* . ItotftTEltittiCau REPAIRS OT 
ftgstt&eft and sftaBewreiider flit 
ne$iQ£rceandi*&3fte1%!iByw 
weeos. ft sneti grounds are a part of the pftmisas and are rjtzU^i^ tv tns jge rtfte L*a»«<. 
9, ENTRY AfP WSPECTIOHz lessee tftaHoensft. lessor or lessoi 'c agente to enter the pfg^^s at igsnnato? j«i*s«ft.-.w. r^ Enatrtf IWBCE tp? ft? pprpoy Q* farperfrftQ Ttr 
pnaneesorlornakmoneceasaryrtpaift . 
tfL POSSESION: tfUasor is ueaM to 0^%^ 
agreement be void or vettablt, oca Lessee snaS not be Beblt fw ;»y IHP w*3 r*ss?e«sbfl is detest lessee snay Terminate tub aotaentent is possession » not delivered vnttwi 
I V SECUftTTY; frJfi&iCur%OeposJlofSL>.—;—Li—:—, s^rk^^rvperwnnai^of!^ lessor way. 6ut*rf»finc< be obligated ». 
aaotyattorpcrtionsofsaidfJtp^ 
12. OEiPOSTT FUNDS: Ally filiiiiG^te 
t X ATTORt l l " r r f £ES:Tne» i^^ 
fnedortsedfHafliises.iiidpd^ 
14. NOTICES: Any notice **id> eHfter pany mavdr is s&imtC b i?;^ aiay fcsj *;*#! ^  a^i.r^ fee w/a« u^ta?* i^naio. K l«i&eeorio vtssorai «t»eadoresses srsown bwmof «; 
5U£n oOier efeessas nayijf oesigmisg oy C« oarticf urn. MR to ;*a%. 
15. H Q R S , ASSXsltS* SUCCESSORS: T«s %»>i sfttl op»or. sadl w2i.ee aa! »«si y >rJ ^na to ?.*rs. ^€CtfTurs. ao.i«iistratoa. saccasojs, ste assignso*. me «spec»ie 
parties hereto. 
16.71l i£rff iMisoltheess«ixofl l i»a9i9eintf A / ^ V io 7.00*1 
17. HOLOtNQ OVER: Any hoftfino oner afer ew3Uon of Jfca ^ r « o* this isai*. «iih ttts cons*? c! i^scf st^t ye cmt^isetJ as a wcfiLn-sc.^ noft^ tsrwac/ in axecrtoce wtti the 
terms nertot. as aopKcaoie. 
13. D E m U L T ; 3 lessee shall »«Uo pay i«K w n * ; (h»i, er perform a«^ i « a fjcrjof. &:iei nw * - i tv.J * r - « 5; (?*v s ivri8ar» csace cf such defsbft^vena Jr«i mamHr reftueed oy law. 
U«lessor.airi«option.fnayiermrnatea^nsmscfLivseirafesaocr.aais^iejisee.*i7w~&ete£.s-aHej^ z^teuxii: rXts&z&ssuiQtr&vtvacates(^property,wMewoetort 
af ihe payment of rent, lessor may consider any jpropeny :2ii on -5ie pretaiscs ^  t« afia^io.;^ aad aa>- <ls?oife i4 the s*rc ir. any manner aflowrd oy law. tn the event i 
raasona^iMneve^ t t ^ s t ^ aioidttia^ 
t * o«nOM-tJK5aesti*fca**»opt™^ 
aOTIwiDttpucha^^ *"< / r W ^ < * M t t 
3PL jflicufjeiuuic^rijssseeahaltato 
2U rXimriATimt OF TITLE: filtaan 0$) ***** to* <** oi Meters of fcs *$&& c?e as**** ! c i?s&ts t *j£mce tfc* titir to Jh© f-:op*iy « i s tepcrt « writing any vati^  
e^ys. II La«s0» oottm » ai^ Mstptlons to tte title. U ^ 
canrioc 01 rvno^i} wthin tht 60 days ailowad. a^ 
tosucntscsptlons. 
Z L 1VOENCE OF TITLE: Ussor Stall BfOffde sadem ut Tift as thf fo%** o! a puSc/ at W» mini! A?HJt At Us*cr !» r*ptnsa 
22. oaXOfSALE:Thsp«nimalpn^*«rtyid^^i^«ip4fjflriph .! &tag%c&nrty&J^t>tiof*4fr 
24. CL08lNO:(3os^iiaHbtwimto_JL2 Uiysfn>mwrci«rtB*Gpfc^ ^ 
25. PftOIUTIOHS:Ttt and insurince escrow M C O ^ 
date erf laosma. Unpakl fail cstm tans, foewtty dtp 
2ft, wJCPWATlONOFOfniOlfcThfcood™^ &X>v/. L - * •«*>" *2. PO"? 
Uaon axpnition. Lasacn shad ba ratMsad ftom 
27. BUEf»C!3EOF0*Hr!Olf:Tlie option sn^ 
i w l b ^ i i t f , postage prapakl. to thaUsw 
no1icoism^lM.lRtheevantth«oqtiOnkt»fd$td 3 L 5 parct^ train tfo seal <ia?dnan&^ 
2ft. #WHTTOSai~-L*ssorwir7afl«stoUssee 
this agreement 
lM WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties fttefeto have eracuted this. *oret:n«rt the 3ay and year fi»ii afcovewntfen. 
%7 P. 2 
rtl^^esg**/^. 
IESSOR 
LESSOR. 
ADDRESS " ~ ^ ~ ' - Agjgg-
Tab 14 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH 
JAN t 1 2006 
JOANNE MoKCZ.CLCnK 
BY Qtr DEPUTY 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR \* 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TY ELDRIDGE and MARINA 
ELDRIDGE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES L. FARNSWORTH, DAVID 
FARNSWORTH, and GREGORY 
FARNSWORTH, 
Defendants. 
RULING and ORDER 
CASE NO. 040800079 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. That motion was filed with the Court on 
August 26, 2005f and was accompanied by a supporting memorandum. 
The Plaintiffs filed a memo in opposition to that motion on No-
vember 01, 2005. The Plaintiffs' opposition memo also included 
Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. The Court notes 
that it has not yet received a request for a decision on Plain-
tiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. The Defendants filed 
with the Court a reply memo on their motion for summary judgment 
on November 14, 2005, which included a request for oral argument 
on the motion. The Court entertained oral argument on December 
19, 2005, and having received a notice to submit this motion for 
decision on November 18, 2005, the Court now issues its ruling 
and enters its order on the Defendants' summary judgment motion. 
This case started when the parties entered into a real es-
tate purchase contract ("the REPC") on August 24, 2004, which 
contract was to close by October 24, 2004. As part of an order 
entered on December 20, 2004, the Court has previously made 
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findings that the Plaintiffs encountered difficulty obtaining 
financing for the transaction and the parties began discussing 
alternative means to finance the transaction. See Order, pg. 2 
(filed December 21, 2004). It appears that the Plaintiffs sug-
gested a lease with an option to purchase ("the Lease Option") 
in lieu of obtaining conventional financing to purchase the 
property outright.1 The parties began negotiating the terms of 
the Lease Option sometime in the middle of September and contin-
ued to negotiate beyond the October 24, 2004 closing date speci-
fied in the REPC. Ultimately, no lease with an option to pur-
chase was ever signed by the parties and the REPC never closed 
within the timeframe established by the REPC. In November 2004, 
the Defendants sold the property which was the subject of the 
REPC to a third party. 
The Plaintiffs brought suit against the Defendants for 
breach of contract, seeking: 1) specific performance of the 
REPC; 2) an injunction barring the sale of the property; and 3) 
damages and costs. The Plaintiffs have subsequently amended 
their complaint to include the following causes of action: 1) 
waiver; 2) fraud; and 3) promissory estoppel. Based upon those 
theories, the Plaintiffs are still seeking specific performance 
of the REPC or the Lease Option.2 There are three issues the 
Court must address in order to rule upon the Defendants' summary 
judgment motion: 1) the statute of frauds as it relates to 
Plaintiffs' promissory estoppel claim; 2) the Plaintiffs' fraud 
claim; and 3) waiver issues. Each will be addressed in turn. 
1
 Conventional financing was specified in the REPC. See "Defendant's Memoran-
dum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment," Exhibit C (filed August 26, 
2005) . 
2
 In their Second Amended Complaint, a copy of which is attached to Plain-
tiffs' "Motion to Amend the Pleadings to Conform with the Evidence," filed on 
December 13, 2005, the Plaintiffs ask the Court to "order the Defendants to 
enter into, complete and honor the lease option agreement" OR "alternately 
allow the Plaintiffs, to complete the purchase agreement with conventional fi-
nancing. " 
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I. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS and PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 
Statutes of frauds are intended to bar enforcement of cer-
tain agreements that the law requires to be memorialized in 
writing- The relevant statute of frauds reads: 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one 
year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in 
lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party 
by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (2005). Both of the contracts at issue 
in this action, 1) the REPC which was entered into by the par-
ties in august 2004 and 2) the Lease Option which was never exe-
cuted between the parties, are required by the express language 
of the statute to be memorialized in writing to be enforceable. 
Because the REPC was in writing, it satisfied the statute 
of frauds and was therefore an enforceable agreement between the 
parties. However, neither of the parties to the REPC performed 
under the terms of that agreement.3 It appears that once the 
Plaintiffs encountered difficulty obtaining the conventional fi-
nancing specified in the REPC, and began negotiating the Lease 
Option instead, the REPC was abandoned by both parties. Either 
way, it is clear from the record that the date for settlement 
under the REPC passed without full performance by either party. 
While the parties are free to sue each other for defaulting un-
der the REPC, seeking specific performance (an equitable remedy) 
requires "clean hands,7' see LHIW, Inc. v. De Lorean, 753 P.2d 
961, 963 (Utah 1988), which, due to non-performance, neither of 
the parties possesses under the REPC. 
Furthermore, because the Lease Option was never reduced to 
writing and signed by the Defendants, it cannot satisfy the 
statute of frauds and therefore is unenforceable. The Plain-
3
 The Defendants apparently did not provide seller disclosures or title com-
mitments. See "Plaintiffs' Cross Motion," pg. 3 (filed November 01, 2005). 
Similarly, the Plaintiffs never tendered the purchase price. See "Defen-
dants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment," pg. 4 (filed 
August 26, 2005). 
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tiffs argue that the Lease Option should be enforced regardless 
of the statute of frauds based upon a theory of promissory es-
toppel. The Utah Supreme Court has defined promissory estoppel, 
stating: 
[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to 
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or 
a third person and which does induce such action or for-
bearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by en-
forcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may 
be limited as justice requires. 
Tolboe Constr. Co. v. Staker Paving & Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 843f 
845 (Utah 1984) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 
(1981)). Under this definition, the Plaintiffs would be enti-
tled to the relief they seek if they could establish a promise, 
reasonable reliance, and injustice. 
However, there are limits to the doctrine of promissory es-
toppel when real property is involved. These limits have been 
addressed by the Utah courts. In support of their-motion for 
summary judgment, Defendants cite F.C. Stanale v. Earnst Home 
Centers, 948 P.2d 356 (Utah App. 1997). In Stanale, the Utah 
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of "whether promissory es-
toppel precludes [a defendant] from asserting the statute of 
frauds as a defense." Stanale, 948 P.2d at 360. This issue is 
a matter of law, properly decided by this Court on summary judg-
ment. Id. The Stanale court stated, 
in situations involving the purchase or lease of real prop-
erty, [] Utah cases have narrowly circumscribed the appli-
cation of promissory estoppel to the statute of frauds. A 
defendant is estopped from asserting the statute of frauds 
as a defense only when he or she has expressly and unambi-
guously waived the right to do so. 
Stanale, 948 P.2d at 360-61 (emphasis added). Moreover, a mere 
refusal to perform an oral agreement within the statute of 
frauds, however, is not such fraud as will justify a court in 
disregarding the statute of frauds even though it results in 
hardship to the plaintiff. See id. at 362. 
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In this case, the Plaintiffs are asking this Court to re-
[uire the Defendants to perform under an oral agreement (the 
jease Option). As applied to this case, Stanqle instructs that 
:his Court cannot disregard the statute of frauds, even though 
_t appears that the Plaintiffs may suffer some hardship as a re-
sult of such judgment. If this Court were to to accept the 
Plaintiffs' estoppel argument, 
parties to a contract negotiation could not rely on the 
protections afforded by the statute of frauds, thereby 
eviscerating it. Moreover, contract negotiators would never 
know at what point mere negotiations became a binding con-
tract. Parties to contract negotiations should be entitled 
to rely on the statute of frauds absent a clear manifesta-
tion of intent to claim no reliance. A party concerned 
about the assertion of the statute of frauds could easily 
protect itself by demanding written commitments before act-
ing in reliance on the negotiations. 
Id. at 365. 
The Court finds that Stanqle controls in this case. At no 
time did the Defendants' conduct "clearly manifest an intention 
that [they] would not assert the statute of frauds." Id. Re-
gardless of the fact that no written lease was ever memorial-
ized, and the fact that both parties had apparently abandoned 
the REPC sometime in September 2004, the Plaintiffs gambled that 
the Lease Option negotiations would be successfully concluded. 
Even if this Court found that the Defendants assured the Plain-
tiffs that they would enter into the Lease Option with the 
Plaintiffs, "a mere promise to execute a written contract and a 
subsequent refusal to do so is insufficient to create an estop-
pel, although reliance is placed on such a promise and damage is 
sustained as a consequence of the refusal.'' Ld. To be clear, 
promissory estoppel bars a defendant from asserting the statute 
of frauds as a defense only where the party has clearly and une-
quivocally represented that it would not use it as a defense. 
See id. at 365-66. Accordingly, because the Defendants did not 
represent that they would not assert the statute of frauds as a 
defense, the Defendants are not estopped from doing so. This 
holds true even though the Defendants refused to enter into the 
Lease Option, which they had negotiated in lieu of the REPC. 
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Because the Defendants are not barred from asserting the statute 
of frauds as a defense, and because the Lease Option was within 
the statute of frauds, the same is void because it was not in 
writing. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (2005). 
II. FRAUD 
To establish fraud under Utah law, the plaintiff must prove 
by clear and convincing evidence each of the following elements: 
(1) that a representation was made (2) concerning a pres-
ently existing material fact (3) which was false, (4)which 
the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon 
which to base such representation, (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other 
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, 
(7) did in fact rely upon the representation, and (8) was 
thereby induced to act upon it, (9) to his injury and dam-
age. 
See Franco v. the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
2001 UT 25, 533. In addition, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
require that all averments of fraud be stated with particular-
ity. URCP Rule 9(a)(3); see also Wright and Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 1297, at 590 (1990). 
First, the Plaintiffs have made general allegations of 
fraud. Plaintiffs have claimed that the "Defendants misled the 
Plaintiffs into believing that the Defendants preferred a lease 
option," knowing that if they could delay closing on the prop-
erty under the REPC, Plaintiffs would default and the Defendants 
could then accept a more lucrative offer from another party. 
See "Second Amended Complaint," pg. 4 (permission to amend 
granted at oral argument on December 19, 2005). These allega-
tions of fraud are insufficient under Rule 9 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, as they do not possess the requisite par-
ticularity required by statute. 
The Plaintiffs also allege specific instances of fraud, but 
only regarding events which transpired after the October 24, 
2004 REPC closing deadline. These specific instances of alleged 
fraud involved a "fabricated" realtor commission, which the 
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Plaintiffs argue was fabricated by Defendants to avoid having 
the Plaintiffs demand closing on the REPC. See "Plaintiffs' 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, at pg. 12 (filed November 01, 
2005). Under Utah law, to be fraudulent, a representation must 
concern a "presently existing material fact." See Franco, 2001 
UT 25, 533. After October 24, 2004, any fraudulent representa-
tions allegedly made by the Defendants would be immaterial to 
the REPC, since its closing date had already passed and the par-
ties had not agreed, in writing, to an extension of any of the 
deadlines specified in the REPC. 
Second, "fraud, generally, cannot be predicated upon the 
failure to perform a promise or contract which is unenforceable 
under the statute of frauds, for the promissor has not, in a le-
gal sense, made a contract; and therefore, he has the right, 
both in law and equity, to refuse to perform." Stanqle, 948 
P.2d at 362. This means that any claim of fraud predicated upon 
the Lease Option, or representations made regarding the Lease 
Option, are insufficient as a matter of law, because the Lease 
Option is void under the statute of frauds. 
Additionally, the Court notes that the Plaintiffs have ar-
gued that, as part of the Lease Option negotiations, Defendant 
James Farnsworth "made suggestions to modify the Lease Option 
Agreement." See "Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judg-
ment," at pg. 8 (filed November 01, 2005). The Plaintiffs indi-
cate that these modifications were suggested on October 9, 2004. 
Id. Plaintiffs argue that 
the only logical explanation is that Jim was acting in good 
faith to bring about the terms of the Lease Option to a 
fair and final agreement. Unless Jim had a bona fide in-
tention to pursue the Lease Option, there would have been 
no reason to suggest a change in a term which would bene-
fit the Eldridges. 
Id. The Plaintiffs cannot have it both ways, arguing in one 
breath that negotiating the Lease Option was a ploy to avoid a 
demand for performance of the REPC AND that the Defendants were 
sincere in their desire to find Lease Option terms which would 
be amenable to both parties. Such arguments appear to this 
Court to be diametrically opposed; either the Defendants were 
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negotiating the Lease Option fraudulently or they were negotiat-
ing with good faith. Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds 
that the Plaintiffs fraud claims are insufficient as a matter of 
law, 
III. WAIVER 
"Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a.known right. 
To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit 
or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to 
relinquish it." Soterfs, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993). In this case, both par-
ties had rights against the other party by virtue of the REPC. 
Those rights are independent of the proposed Lease Option which 
never materialized and never provided any rights to the Plain-
tiffs or the Defendants. 
The Plaintiffs acknowledge that "the Defendants had a right 
to rely on the REPC." "Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment," pg. 15. The Plaintiffs also acknowledge that "when 
the parties agreed to proceed with the Lease Option, they waived 
their right to proceed with the REPC...they relinquished their 
right to the REPC..." Id. The Court is of the opinion that 
both parties abandoned the REPC sometime in September 2004. In 
doing so, both parties would have intentionally relinquished 
known rights under the REPC. Regardless, the fact that the par-
ties had waived rights under the REPC does not in any way make 
the Lease Option a binding agreement between these parties. The 
fact of the matter is that even if the Defendants intentionally 
relinquished all of their rights under the REPC, the Lease Op-
tion was never memorialized in writing and signed by the Defen-
dants. Therefore, the Plaintiffs' waiver argument is also in-
sufficient as a matter of law. 
ORDER 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Additionally, even though the 
Court has not received a request for a decision on the Plain-
tiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, that motion is hereby DE-
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NIED. This is a direct result of granting the Defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment and is done now in an effort to re-
solve the matter and to ensure consistent rulings in this mat-
ter. 
Dated this //>^dav of 
ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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ELDRIDGE, 1 
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FARNSWORTH; GREGORY FARNSWORTH, 
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HOLING and ORDER 
j CASE NO. 040800079 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on the following motions: 
1) Plaintiffs' "Motion to Reconsider,".filed with the Court on 
January 30, 2006; 2) Plaintiffs' "Motion to Extend the Time to 
Appeal/' filed with the Court on February 14, 2006; 3) Plain-
tiffs' "Objections to the Order Submitted by Defendants Without 
Notice or Motion Dated January 12, 2006," filed with the Court 
on January 18, 2006; and 45 Defendants' "Motion to Award Fees 
and Costs/' filed with the Court on January 18, 2006, The Court 
has reviewed these motions and the memoranda in support of, and 
in opposition to, each respective motion. The Court has also 
reviewed the Plaintiffs' objections to the Defendants' proposed 
order. Having received notice to -submit these motions for deci-
sion, and being informed in the matter, the Court will now ad-
dress each of the motions and the objections in turn. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
While the Court does have discretion in determining whether 
to reconsider an order so long as no final judgment has entered, 
see Brookslde Mobile Home Park v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 518 (cit-
ing U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.C. Gen,/ Inc», 1999 UT App 303, 555; 
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RULING and ORDER 
CASE NO. 040800079 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on the following motions: 
1) Plaintiffs' "Motion to Reconsider/' filed with the Court on 
January 30, 2006; 2) Plaintiffs' "Motion to Extend the Time to 
Appeal," filed with the Court on February 14f 2006; 3) Plain-
tiffs' "Objections to the Order Submitted by Defendants Without 
Notice or Motion Dated January 12, 2006," filed with the Court 
on January 18, 2006; and 4) Defendants' "Motion to Award Fees 
and Costs," filed with the Court on January 18, 2006, The Court 
has reviewed these motions and the memoranda in support of, and 
in opposition to, each respective motion. The Court has also 
reviewed the Plaintiffs' objections to the Defendants' proposed 
order. Having received notice to submit these motions for deci-
sion, and being informed in the matter, the Court will now ad-
dress each of the motions and the objections in turn, 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
While the Court does have discretion in determining whether 
to reconsider an order so long as no final judgment has entered, 
see Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 518 (cit-
ing U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.C. Gen., Inc., 1999 UT App 303, 555; 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b)) , the Utah Supreme Court has pointed out 
tha t such motions are not recognized by the ru les of procedure 
in c i v i l cases and has discouraged the f i l i n g of such motions. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize motions 
to reconsider. Although we have discouraged these motions, 
they have proliferated in civi l actions to the extent that 
they have become the cheatgrass of the l i t iga t ion land-
scape. We acknowledge that the extraordinary circumstance 
may arise when i t is appropriate to request a t r i a l court 
to reconsider a ruling. These occasions are rare, however, 
and we encourage attorneys to reverse the trend to make mo-
tions to reconsider routine. 
Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, 518 n.5 ( c i t a t ions omit ted) . The 
Utah Supreme Court notes tha t there are , on ra re occasion, ex-
t raord inary circumstances warranting a request for a t r i a l court 
to reconsider a ru l ing . However, the Court cannot see, and the 
P l a i n t i f f s have fa i l ed to present , any reason as to why these 
p a r t i c u l a r circumstances are extraordinary such tha t t h e i r mo-
t ion to reconsider should be granted. Therefore, t h i s Court 
wi l l not en t e r t a in the P l a i n t i f f s ' motion to reconsider as i t 
r e l a t e s to any issue already e x p l i c i t l y addressed by the Court 
in i t s January 11, 2006 ru l ing . 
In t ha t ru l ing , the Court addressed each cause of ac t ion 
iden t i f i ed in P l a i n t i f f s ' "Second Amended Complaint."1 The Court 
granted P l a i n t i f f s ' motion to f i l e the amended complaint a t ora l 
argument on December 19, 2005, and signed an order on t ha t mo-
t ion January 11, 2006. "Once a par ty has amended a pleading, 
the amended pleading supersedes the o r ig ina l pleading, and the 
o r ig ina l pleading performs no function in the ca se . " Campbell 
v. Debry, 2001 UT App 397, 517 n.4 (c i t ing 6 Federal Prac t ice & 
1
 The P la in t i f f s second amended complaint also sought "a l te rna te recovery/ ' 
arguing that i t would be "unconscionable for the Defendants to prof i t from 
the i r in tent ional dece i t . " Id. at pg. 6. The Court did not exp l i c i t l y ad-
dress th i s in i t s January 11, 2006 rul ing. However, a review of the record 
shows nothing material upon which to make a finding of in tent ional decei t on 
the part of the Defendants. The Court has already ruled tha t , as a matter of 
law, the P l a i n t i f f s ' fraud claims f a i l . By doing so, the Court intended to 
include in tha t ruling the P la in t i f f s ' claims for " in tent ional dece i t . " Fur-
ther , a review of the record indicates tha t the P la in t i f f s have fa i led to ar-
gue anything in support of the i r claim for a l te rna te recovery. 
Procedure, Wright, Miller & Kane § 1476 (1990); see also Moore!s 
Federal Practice, Civil § 15.17(3) ("An amended pleading that is 
complete in itself and does not reference or adopt any portion 
of the prior pleading supersedes the prior pleading.'')). There-
fore, any cause of action contained in the original complaint or 
the first amended complaint, but not contained in the Second 
Amended Complaint, "performs no function in the case." Camp-
bell, 2001 UT App 397, 117 n.4. 
Having addressed each of the causes of action in the second 
amended complaint explicitly, the Court will not revisit them in 
any detail. In addition to the issues explicitly ruled upon by 
the Court, there are also certain issues raised by the Plain-
tiffs in their motion to reconsider which, as a result of grant-
ing Defendants' motion for summary judgment, have been implic-
itly ruled upon by the Court. In order to bring clarity to 
those issues, the Court will briefly explicate for the benefit 
of the complaining party. 
The Plaintiffs' argue that the Court's January 11, 2006 
ruling "summarily dismissed the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment without explanation." See Plaintiffs' "Memorandum in 
Support of Their Motion to Reconsider," pg. 2 (filed January 30, 
2006). The Plaintiffs argue that they are 
entitled to an explanation of the Courtfs reasons for deny-
ing their motion, including each issue addressed by the 
Plaintiffs, not raised in the Defendants' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, including Plaintiffs' motion for specific 
performance; [sic] and Plaintiffs' motion to deny Defen-
dants' request to find the lis pendens a wrongful lien. 
Id. The Court will discuss damages, specific performance, and 
the lis pendens. 
Before discussing damages and specific performance indi-
vidually, the Court wishes to raise the following general point 
as it relates to both damages and specific performance. The 
Utah Supreme Court has ruled that 
[n] either party to an agreement can be said to be in de-
fault (and thus susceptible to a judgment for damages or a 
decree for specific performance) until the other party has 
tendered his own performance. In other words, a party must 
make a tender of his own agreed performance in order to put 
the other party in default. 
Kelley v. Leudacia Financial Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 
1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Because 
there is no indication that either of the parties tendered their 
own agreed performance under the REPC, neither the Plaintiffs or 
the Defendants are in a position to compel specific performance 
or recover damages. The Court is persuaded by the Defendants' 
argument on this point. See Defendants' "Memorandum in Opposi-
tion to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider," pg. 4 thru 11 (filed 
February 10, 2006). 
A. DAMAGES 
In the Plaintiffs' second amended complaint, they seek 
"reasonable compensation for the damages, actual, consequential, 
and incidental, sustained by Plaintiffs" and "punitive damages." 
Plaintiffs' "Second Amended Complaint," pg. 7. The Court, in 
its January 11, 2006 ruling, already ruled upon the Plaintiffs' 
estoppel, fraud and waiver claims. Therefore, because those are 
the only causes of action pled by the second amended complaint, 
there remains nothing upon which the Court could base an award 
of damages. 
In their original complaint, the Plaintiffs did plead 
breach of contract. However, as already noted, the later 
amended pleadings superseded the original complaint. Because 
the latest amended pleading did not include any action for 
breach of contract, nor did it incorporate any reference to the 
earlier complaints, that cause of action was deemed by this 
Court to have been abandoned. Further, it would be incongruous 
to grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment (which ad-
dressed all claims upon which an award of damages could be 
based) and then award damages to the Plaintiffs. Therefore, by 
granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court 
had implicitly denied the Plaintiffs an award of damages, and, 
for the sake of perfect clarity, explicitly denies Plaintiffs 
request for damages at this time. 
B. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 
As the Court noted in its January 11, 2006 ruling, the REPC 
was an enforceable agreement and satisfied the statute of 
frauds. However, sometime in the middle of September 2004, the 
parties abandoned that agreement. Neither party performed their 
obligations under the REPC. Therefore, due to non-performance, 
the parties waived their rights under that contract. 
The Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to specific 
performance on this contract, invoking either equitable specific 
performance or specific performance as outlined in the REPC. 
The Court has already addressed both of these arguments in its 
January 11, 2006 ruling, but will briefly re-visit the issue. 
First, the REPC, which created a contractual right to specific 
performance, was abandoned by the parties. Therefore, it cannot 
serve as a basis upon which this Court can grant specific per-
formance. Second, because neither of the parties performed un-
der the REPC, neither are in a position to seek equitable reme-
dies. Therefore, equitable specific performance is not an op-
tion. Finally, the Lease Option was never memorialized in writ-
ing as required by law. Therefore, it cannot be specifically 
enforced. As this Court views the situation, there is no avenue 
by which to grant specific performance in this case. 
It is appropriate at this point to clarify a point made by 
the Court in its January 11, 2006 ruling. In discussing spe-
cific performance, the Court stated, "...the parties are free to 
sue each other for defaulting under the REPC..." Ruling, pg. 
3. In making this statement, the Court was contemplating a 
separate lawsuit for breach of contract. Indeed, as already 
stated, the original complaint in this action included a claim 
for breach of contract. That claim, again as already stated, 
was not included in later amended pleadings, therefore it was 
deemed by the Court to have been abandoned. The Plaintiffs have 
indicated that u[t]his Court recognized the issue in its judg-
ment on the motions for summary judgment in stating this issue 
was preserved for trial." See Plaintiffs' Objections to Defen-
dants' Reply Memorandum, filed February 14, 2006 pg.l. The 
Plaintiffs misunderstand the Court's ruling. To be clear, the 
breach action was not included in the second amended complaint. 
Therefore, when the Court said the parties were free to sue each 
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other for breach, that contemplated a separate action for breach 
of contract- The Court did not, at any time, state that the is-
sue was preserved for trial. 
C. THE LIS PENDENS 
The lis pendens is the primary subject of the Plaintiffs' 
objections to the Defendants' proposed order which followed the 
Courts' January 11, 2006 ruling. The Plaintiffs have pointed 
out that the Court did not address the lis pendens in its Janu-
ary 11, 2006 ruling. The Court concedes this point and recog-
nizes the need to rule upon this issue in order to conclude the 
matter. 
The Defendants have argued that the lis pendens constitutes 
a wrongful lien. The Defendants argue that the lis pendens has 
been wrongful from the date on which the Court made findings and 
dissolved the TRO in this matter. The Court reminds the Defen-
dants that at the hearing on November 29, 2004, the Court was 
specifically addressing the case in light of the TRO which had 
been entered. The Court was not addressing the merits of the 
underlying causes of action at that time. 
Therefore, the Court is of the opinion that the lis pendens 
has not, at any time in this matter, been wrongful. The fact of 
the matter is that litigation has been pending during the entire 
time that the lis pendens has been in place. The lis pendens 
"charges the public with notice of outstanding claims and causes 
one who deals with property involved in pending litigation to do 
so at his peril." Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 
1244 (Utah 1979). The Court believes that the lis pendens has 
been lawfully in place, notifying the public of pending litiga-
tion. Therefore, the Court will not order the removal of the 
lis pendens. Similarly, the Court will not award the Defendants 
any damages, costs or fees as they relate to the lis pendens. 
The Court also reminds the parties that the lis pendens can 
lawfully remain in place after this Court issues final judgment 
in the matter, pending any forthcoming appeal. See Hidden Mead-
ows, 590 P.2d at 1248. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO EXTEND THE TIME TO APPEAL 
Upon review of this motion, the Court is convinced that 
this motion is unnecessary at this time, as a final judgment has 
not yet issued. Even though the Court's January 11, 2006 ruling 
was caption "Ruling and Order" and contained a paragraph titled 
"Order," neither of the parties have treated that as a final 
judgment. The Defendants' submitted a proposed order to the 
Court, which, as of yet, the Court has not signed. Submitting 
this proposed order to the Court indicates to the Court that the 
Defendants did not view the Court's ruling as a final order in 
the matter. Therefore, the Court finds that no final judgment 
has entered and therefore the Plaintiffs' time to appeal has not 
yet begun to expire. As a result, because this issue is not 
ripe for decision, the Court will dismiss the motion. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AWARD FEES AND COSTS 
As Defendants have correctly stated, attorney fees are only 
awarded if permitted by statute or contract. No statute awards 
attorney fees in a matter such as this, except for the portion 
of this matter involving the TRO and the lis pendens. The Court 
is of the opinion that the Defendants should be awarded the fees 
incurred in defending against the TRO. As for the lis pendens, 
fees are only recoverable in the event that the lis pendens was 
wrongful. The Court has ruled that the lis pendens was not 
wrongful, therefore there can be no recovery under that statute. 
Having addressed the relevant statutes, the Court now turns 
to the contract between the parties. The REPC specifically ad-
dresses attorney fees. While this was, at one time, an enforce-
able contract between these parties, that contract cannot serve 
as a basis for the award of fees in this matter. The Court has 
found that the parties abandoned the REPC and relinquished their 
rights thereunder. Indeed, it is for this reason, in large 
part, that the Court granted the Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment. It would be incongruous to say that the parties aban-
doned the REPC, but the Defendants can recover their fees under 
that same contract. 
Therefore, no attorney fees will be awarded to the Defen-
dants other than those fees incurred as a result of the TRO. 
Because the Court finds that the REPC had been abandoned by both 
parties sometime in September 2004, the provision of the REPC 
awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party in the event of 
litigation to enforce the REPC is no longer enforceable. 
Finally, the Defendants, as the prevailing party in this 
matter, will be awarded their costs of suit. 
ORDER 
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: that Plaintiffs' motion to 
reconsider is DENIED (noting that the Court finds no basis for 
an award of damages or specific performance for the Plaintiffs); 
that Plaintiffs' motion to extend time for appeal is DISMISSED 
as not ripe for decision; that the Defendants' motion for fees 
and costs is GRANTED IN PART, but only as to 1) the recovery of 
attorney fees for the portion of this case involving the TRO and 
2) an award of their costs of suit as the prevailing party; and 
that the lis pendens is not wrongful and should not be removed 
during the pendency of this litigation, including during any 
pending appeal. 
Dated this 40\ day of SHdhiJA , 2006, 
BY THE CO 
N R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TY ELDRIDGE and MARINA 
ELDRIDGE, j 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES L. FARNSWORTH; DAVID 
FARNSWORTH; GREGORY FARNSWORTH, 
Defendants. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 040800079 
JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs'"Motion to 
Conform the Complaint to the Evidence," filed with the Court on 
March 14, 2006, and accompanied by supporting memorandum and a 
proposed "Third Amended Complaint." The Defendants filed an op-
position memorandum on March 24, 2006. The Plaintiffs filed a 
response to the Defendants' opposition on April 05, 2006. On 
that same day, the Court received a notice to submit the motion 
for decision. Having reviewed the motion and related memoranda, 
the Court now rules upon the motion. 
The motion seeks for a court order amending (for a third 
time) the Plaintiffs' complaint to include a multitude of issues 
as identified by the motion, including: 1) specific performance; 
2) damages; 3) attorney fees / costs; 4) breach of contract; 5) 
fraud; 6) waiver; 7) promissory estoppel; 8) punitive damages; 
9) covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and 10) intentional 
/ negligent misrepresentation. Before addressing the merits of 
the Plaintiffs' motion, the Court points out that previous rul-
ings have already explicitly addressed each and every issue 
identified by the Plaintiffs' motion, except for the issues of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and intentional / 
negligent misrepresentation. 
The Plaintiffs, in making their motion, rely on Rules 8(f) 
and 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(f) 
states, "All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substan-
tial justice." The Court recognizes that pleadings are to be 
construed as to do substantial justice. However, in this case, 
the issue is not construing a pleading (i.e., the second amended 
complaint, as the operative pleading), but rather the issue is 
whether to allow amendment to a pleading for a third time, after 
summary judgment for the opposing party has issued, to include 
new causes of action not included in previous pleadings. For 
that reason, the Court finds that Rule 8(f) is inapposite to the 
motion before the Court. 
Unlike Rule 8(f), Rule 15(b) is arguably relevant to the 
motion before the Court. Rule 15(b) states, 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by ex-
press or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as may be nec-
essary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to 
raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at 
any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does 
not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If 
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it 
is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court 
may allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation 
of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and 
the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the ad-
mission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall 
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting 
party to meet such evidence. 
The Court finds that case law interpreting Rule 15(b) as it per-
tains to lawsuits disposed of at the summary judgment phase is 
scant. The plain reading of the rule suggests to this Court, as 
has been held in other jurisdictions, that Rule 15(b) applies 
only where the case has proceeded to actual trial. See Crawford 
v. Gould, 56 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1995); Blue Cross Blue Shield 
of Ala, v. Weitz, 913 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1990). The rule it-
self employs the words "tried" and "the trial." The language of 
the rule and the persuasive authority from other jurisdictions 
lends credence to the proposition that Rule 15(b) is only impli-
cated when the case proceeds to trial. This motion would be 
easily resolved in favor of the Defendants if the Court were to 
find Rule 15(b) not applicable to cases decided on summary judg-
ment. That said, the parties have identified Hallstrom v. Buh-
ler, 378 P.2d 355 (Utah 1963), which applies Rule 15(b) to a 
case decided on summary judgment, but that case does not explic-
itly address Rule 15(b)'s applicability to cases decided on sum-
mary judgment. For purposes of this ruling, and against reser-
vations to the contrary, the Court will assume that Rule 15(b) 
does apply in cases decided on summary judgment, thus giving the 
Plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt- Even making such an as-
sumption, the Court is not convinced that the rule requires the 
Court to allow the Plaintiffs to amend their complaint for a 
third time. 
The Court finds that the Defendants have repeatedly ob-
jected to Plaintiffs' submission of matters outside of the 
pleadings for the Court's consideration. See Defendants' "Mem. 
in Opp. to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider," at 11 (objecting 
to covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Defendants' "Reply 
Mem. in Supp. of Motion for Summary Judgment," at 7 (objecting 
to misrepresentation); Defendants' "Reply Mem. in Supp. of De-
fendants' Motion to Award Fees and Costs," at 1 (objecting to 
breach of contract). Having objected to the issues, the Court 
cannot find that the issues were tried by the express or implied 
consent of the parties, and therefore the Court is not required 
to allow amendment of the complaint. Rather, these issues, be-
ing specifically objected to, implicate the third sentence of 
Rule 15(b). See Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Fin., 974 P.2d 
288, 291 (Utah 1999). Under that part of the rule, allowing the 
Plaintiffs to amend the complaint is subject to the discretion 
of the trial court. The Court "may" allow the pleading to be 
amended if: 1) presentation of the merits of the action are 
thereby subserved and 2) if the objecting party fails to satisfy 
the Court that the admission of such evidence would be prejudi-
cial to the objecting party. 
In this case, the Court finds that neither requirement is 
met. First, allowing the Plaintiff to amend the complaint will 
not facilitate presentation on the merits, which have already 
been fully adjudicated at this late point by the entry of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Defendants. Second, the Defen-
dants have satisfied the Court that prejudice would result if 
the Court were to allow the Plaintiffs to amend the complaint 
for a third time and after summary judgment has entered. 
The Plaintiffs have offered this Court no explanation as to 
why these new claims were not included in the First Amended Com-
plaint or in the Second Amended Complaint. Twice the Plaintiffs 
have amended their complaint (once by right and once by permis-
sion of the Court) and, having issued final judgment on the 
amended complaint, the Plaintiffs now seek to shift to new theo-
ries hoping that one such theory will lead the Court to find in 
their favor. In the opinion of this Court, that is not the pur-
pose of any of the rules relied upon by the Plaintiffs in their 
motion to conform. The parties have prepared the case, includ-
ing conducting discovery and arguing motions, based upon the 
first and second amended complaints. At this late time in the 
case, it would be clearly prejudicial to the Defendants to allow 
the Plaintiffs once again to amend their complaint. The Defen-
dants have not prepared their case with these new causes of ac-
tion in mind, but have diligently objected to the introduction 
of issues outside of the pleadings. To allow the Plaintiffs to 
continually refine their strategy, both after summary judgment 
motions were filed and after judgment was entered on such mo-
tions, would work an injustice on the Defendants. Therefore, 
the Court will deny the Plaintiffs' motion to conform. 
Finally, having addressed the only two new causes of action 
contained in the proposed third amended complaint, the Court 
wishes to once again briefly address the issue of breach of con-
tract. In the January 11, 2006 ruling, this Court, in discuss-
ing specific performance, stated that "While the parties are 
free to sue each other for defaulting under the REPC, seeking 
specific performance (an equitable remedy) requires 'clean 
hands,' which, due to non-performance, neither of the parties 
possesses under the REPC." January 11, 2006 Ruling, at pg. 3. 
The Plaintiffs understood this to mean that the issue of breach 
A of ^ 
of contract was reserved for trial. To clarify the Court's po-
sition on this issue, the Court, in the March 29, 2006 ruling, 
stated that "In making [the statement above], the Court was con-
templating a separate lawsuit for breach of contract" because 
the Court believed that the Plaintiffs, by not including the 
original breach of contract claim in either of the amended com-
plaints, had abandoned that particular cause of action. Upon 
further reflection, this Court is of the opinion that a separate 
lawsuit on breach of contract would be unavailing to either 
party for, in large part, the very reason that this Court 
granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court 
has found that the parties abandoned the' REPC sometime in Sep-
tember 2004 and that both parties waived the rights that were 
enforceable by virtue of that agreement. Therefore, the Court 
was wrong when it stated that the parties were free to sue each 
other for defaulting under the REPC. That agreement, abandoned 
by both parties, became unenforceable and neither party can pur-
sue an action for breach of that contract. 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the Plaintiffs' "Mo-
tion to Conform the Complaint to the Evidence" is DENIED. 
Dated this /K~ day of " % ^ , 2006, 
JOHN R. ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' "Motion for 
Stay of Execution of the Court's Orders and for Approval of the 
Plaintiff's Supersedeas Bond," filed May 10, 2006, and accompa-
nied by supporting memorandum. The Defendants filed their memo-
randum in opposition to the motion on May 23, 2006. The Plain-
tiffs filed their reply memorandum June 01, 2006, and that reply 
was accompanied by a notice to submit the motion for decision. 
Having reviewed the motion and related memoranda, the Court now 
rules upon the motion. 
The Plaintiffs' motion requests that: 1) the Court stay 
execution on its January 11, 2006 and March 29, 2006 orders and 
2) approve the $500, tendered by the Plaintiffs to the Court 
with the motion, as sufficient supersedeas bond in this matter. 
Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in part, 
When an appeal is taken, the appellant by giving a superse-
deas bond may obtain a stay, unless such stay is otherwise 
prohibited by law or these rules. 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 62(d). Because the Plaintiffs have filed 
an appeal, and because there is no indication that staying the 
execution of the Court's orders is prohibited by law or the 
rules, the Court will grant the motion to stay. Having made 
that determination, the Court must now address the issue of the 
supersedeas bond, which the Court will require for the stay to 
issue. 
Rule 62(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs 
the form of a supersedeas bond, stating in part, 
A supersedeas bond given under Subsection (d) may be either 
a commercial bond having a surety authorized to transact 
insurance business under Title 31A, or a personal bond hav-
ing one or more sureties who are residents of Utah having a 
collective net worth of at least twice the amount of the 
bond, exclusive of property exempt from execution." 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 62(i)(l). Rule 62(i) continues by stating, 
"Upon motion and good cause shown, the court may permit a de-
posit of money in court or other security to be given in lieu of 
giving a supersedeas bond under Subsection (d)." Utah R. Civ. 
P. Rule 62 (i) (2). In this case, the Plaintiffs indicate that 
they have tendered a $500 cash bond and allege that this amount 
is sufficient for the supersedeas bond.1 After reviewing the 
rule, it appears that the Plaintiffs are mingling Rule 62 (i) (1) 
and Rule 62 (i) (2). The plain language of the rule indicates 
that the appellant may either file a supersedeas bond (commer-
cial or personal) OR request that the Court waive the bond re-
quirement and accept a cash deposit in lieu of the bond. Here, 
the Plaintiffs have deposited $500 with the Court and are asking 
the Court to find that this is sufficient as the supersedeas 
bond contemplated by Rule 62(d). The Court will find that the 
$500 deposit is insufficient for purposes of the bond require-
ment of Rule 62(d) and will require the Plaintiffs to post a 
bond consistent with Rule 62 (i) (1). The $500 deposit is not ap-
proved and will be released back to the Plaintiffs upon request. 
1
 Plaintiffs contend that the $500 cash bond is sufficient to cover the super-
sedeas bond and to serve as guarantee for the lis pendens. The lis pendens 
is not a matter under consideration for purposes of this motion. Therefore, 
the Court will not address whether the $500 is sufficient guarantee for the 
lis pendens at this time. 
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The question remaining is what amount is sufficient for the 
supersedeas bond in this matter. Rule 62(j), which governs the 
determination of the amount of a supersedeas bond, states in 
part: 
Except as provided in subsection (j)(2), a court shall set 
the supersedeas bond in an amount that adequately protects 
the judgment creditor against loss or damage occasioned by 
the appeal and assures payment in the event judgment is af-
firmed. In setting the amount, the court may consider any 
relevant factor.... 
Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 62(j)(l). The Utah Supreme Court, quoting 
American Jurisprudence, Second, has stated, 
The purpose of a supersedeas bond is to protect non-
appealing parties by maintaining the status quo during the 
appeal and insuring that those who have obtained the judg-
ment under review will not be prejudiced by a stay of the 
judgment pending final determination of the appeal. 
Diversified Holdings, L.C. v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, 139 (quoting 5 
Am. Jur. 2d APPELLATE REVIEW, § 441 (1995)). 
In this case, the Defendants are in the position of "judg-
ment creditor" for purposes of Rule 62. It is the duty of this 
Court to require of the Plaintiffs, as the appealing party, a 
bond in an amount "that adequately protects the [Defendants] 
against loss or damage occasioned by the appeal" and to maintain 
the status quo while the Court's judgment is stayed pending ap-
peal. The Court notes that the longer this matter is drawn out, 
the more likely it is that events will transpire making the now-
contemplated sale of the underlying property to Gibson an impos-
sibility. In the event that such events do transpire, the De-
fendants would suffer losses associated with losing Gibson as a 
buyer. In light of this possibility, the Defendants have re-
quested that the Court set the bond at $450,000.00, to cover the 
entire agreed-upon purchase price and interest on that amount. 
The Court is not convinced that the Defendants would be unable 
to find a new buyer for the underlying property. In other 
words, even if the current agreement with Gibson falls apart, 
the Defendants' ultimate damages will not be the loss of the en-
tire sale price. That said, should the now-contemplated sale 
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fail due to circumstances occasioned by the appeal, the Defen-
dants will certainly suffer some prejudice as a result of the 
stay. Therefore, the Court will set the bond at $100,000.00, 
which amount will cover any foreseeable losses to the Defendants 
as a result of the stay issued by this Court, including changes 
in market conditions, costs of retaining the property pending 
the appeal, and other related losses as may be established by 
the Defendants. 
ORDER 
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' "Motion for 
Stay of the Execution of the Court's Orders and for Approval of 
the Plaintiffs' Supersedeas Bond" is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED 
IN PART: 
1) the motion is GRANTED as to the Plaintiffs' motion for a 
stay of the Court's orders in this matter, contingent on 
the Plaintiffs securing, .and submitting for court approval, 
a supersedeas bond in the amount of $100,000.00, in accor-
dance with Rule 62 (i) (1) and Rule 62 (i) (4) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; and 
2) the motion is DENIED as to the request for an approval 
of the $500 as the supersedeas bond; the $500 shall be re-
turned to the Plaintiffs upon Plaintiffs' request. 
Dated this <£/ day of \J^1A^C^ t 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
ANDERSON, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
A m ? A 
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This matter is before the Court on Defendants' "Motion to 
Release Lis Pendens," filed April 25, 2006, and accompanied by 
supporting memorandum. The Plaintiffs filed an objection to the 
motion on May 04, 2006. The Defendants' reply memorandum in 
support was filed May 12, 2006. On July 18, 2006, the Court re-
ceived a notice to submit the motion for decision. The Court 
has reviewed the motion, the related memoranda, and the prior 
rulings in this case, and, having received a request for deci-
sion, now rules upon the motion. For the reasons that follow, 
the Court will grant the motion in part. 
The Defendants argue that the lis pendens should be re-
leased pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2.5(3), which reads: 
(3) A court shall order a notice released if: (a) the court 
receives a motion to release under Subsection (2); and (b) 
the court finds that the claimant has not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the 
real property claim that is the subject of the notice. 
The Court first notes that while it has addressed the lis pen-
dens in other rulings related to this case, this is the first 
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time a motion for release has been filed. The Court has ruled 
that the lis pendens did not constitute a wrongful lien and has 
cited to Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 
1979) to support the proposition that the lis pendens could stay 
in place pending the Plaintiffs' appeal. See "Ruling and Or-
der," p. 6 (filed March 29, 2006). In the March 29 ruling, the 
Court stated that "the Court will not order removal of the lis 
pendens." id. The Court further ordered that "the lis pendens 
is not wrongful and should not be removed during the pendency of 
this litigation, including during any pending appeal.7' Id. at 
8. In taking that position on the issue of the lis pendens, the 
Court was considering it in the context of finding the lis pen-
dens to not be wrongful. In other words, the Court's refusal to 
order the release of the lis pendens was due to the Court's 
finding that the lis pendens was not wrongful and could there-
fore lawfully remain in place. 
The Defendants' motion to release presents the Court with a 
new issue to consider. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-40-2.5(3), it would appear that the Court has no choice but 
to release the lis pendens at this time. The statute requires 
(1) a motion to be filed and (2) a finding by the Court that the 
"claimant" (as defined by the statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 
78-40-2.5(1)(a)) has not established the probable validity of 
the underlying real property claim. Both of these criteria are 
met at this time. The Defendants have filed a motion, satisfy-
ing the first requirement. Furthermore, the Court has granted 
the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, indicating that the 
Plaintiffs' have failed to establish probability of validity of 
the underlying property claim by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, satisfying the second requirement. 
The Plaintiffs argue that, should the Court decide to leave 
the lis pendens in place, the Court may require a "guarantee" 
(as defined by the statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 
78-40-2.5(1)(b)) as a condition of maintaining the notice. As 
the Court reads the statute, and as previously stated, the Court 
does not have a choice as to whether to leave the lis pendens in 
place once the requirements of § 78-40-2.5(3) are met. The 
Court does not construe the statute to allow the Court to ignore 
the mandatory "shall" language of § 78-40-2.5(3) by requiring a 
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ORDER 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
the Defendant's motion is GRANTED IN PART: 1) the notice of lis 
pendens is ordered to be released forthwith and 2) the Defen-
dants request for costs and fees on the motion is DENIED. 
Dated this iV- day of ftuflfjref 
BY THE COURT: 
2006, 
JOHN R. AND: M;T iSotgljjp JUDGE 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
TY ELDRIDGE and MARINA ) DEPOSITION OF: 
ELDRIDGE, ) 
) JAMES FARNSWORTH 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
) Case No. 04080079 
JAMES L. FARNSWORTH, DAVID ) Judge 
FARNSWORTH, GREGORY ) 
FARNSWORTH, ) 
Defendants. ) 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 17th day of 
June, 2005, that the deposition of JAMES FARNSWORTH, 
produced as a witness herein at the instance of the 
plaintiffs herein, in the above-entitled action now 
pending in the above-named court, was taken before 
DEBRA A. DIBBLE, a Registered Professional Reporter in 
and for the State of Utah, commencing at the hour of 
10:00 a.m. of said day, at the DUCHESNE COUNTY 
COURTHOUSE, 21554 West 9000 South, Duchesne, Utah. 
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
Alvin R. Lundgren 
Attorneys at Law 
5015 W. Old Highway 
suite 200 
Mountain Green, Utah 84050 
(801) 876-4422 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
Clark B. Allred 
ALLRED £ McCLELLAN 
Attorneys at Law 
363 East Main Street i 
Suite 201 
Vernal UT 84078 
(435) 789-7800 
ALSO PRESENT: 
Ty and Marina Eldridge 
Karen Lundgren 
Justin Allred 
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I N D E X 
JAMES FARNSWORTH: Page 
Direct Examination by MR. LUNDGREN: 4 
E X H I B I T S 
Number Description Page 
1 Western Land Realty, Inc., listing 12 
Agreement. 
2 Co-listing agreement with Alan F. 13 
Wade. 
*1 n i j-,4- twT-i — — . •• -4-A-j riot map. ID 
4 8/10/04 fax from Jessica 6 James 17 
Farnsworth to Ty & Marina Eldridge. 
5 8/27/04 real estate purchase contract. 28 
6 10/5/04 Residential Lease with Option 50 
To Purchase. 
7 10,000 offer on personal equipment. 52 
8 Telephone records. 82 
9 Buyer Due Diligence checklist with 90 
Addendum Nos. 1-9 
10 10/2/904 REPC. 118 
11 Addendum No. 1. 199 
Page 
REPORTERS CERTIFICATE: 125 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. LUNDGREN: This is the time and place 
appointed pursuant to notice, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for the deposition of James Farnsworth. 
Mr. James Farnsworth is present, and his 
attorney Clark Allred. The plaintiffs are also 
present, with their attorney Alvin Lundgren. 
MR. CLARK: Before we start, a couple of 
things. 
I notice we have the tape recorder, the VCR, 
and a reporter. I have an objection to being here, 
except I think the official record of this deposition 
should be with the reporter's taking. The other two, I 
have no objection to just for personal use, but I 
would, if anybody intends them to be available for 
court use. Where we have a reporter here, so. 
I don't know what the intent is. 
MR. LUNDGREN: Well, your objection is duly 
noted. 
MR. CLARK: Is the intent any other than 
that? 
MR. LUNDGREN: Well, it may or may not be 
used in court. We reserve the right to raise it as a 
possible evidence in court. And if we do raise it, 
you're certainly entitled to object, and we'll let the 
Page 3 
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1 judge make a decision. 
2 MR. CLARK: Well, okay. There's a basis on 
3 how you do video depositions, and we have not followed 
4 that procedure at all. 
5 MR. LUNDGREN: Well -
6 MR. CLARK: And where we have an official 
7 reporter, I don't think it's appropriate, and it 
8 violates your rule to have more than one record. 
9 MR. LUNDGREN: You're so entitled to object. 
10 MR. CLARK: Also, there are individuals here 
11 we haven't identified on the record. 
12 My son is with me, and - just because I 
13 have to take him on to Salt Lake. 
14 I don't know who the blonde lady is. 
15 MR. LUNDGREN: My legal assistant, Karen, is 
16 with me. 
17 MR. CLARK: Okay. 
18 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Mr. Farnsworth, have you 
19 ever had your deposition taken before? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. The first thing we're going to do is have 
22 you sworn in by the recorder. 
23 JAMES FARNSWORTH 
24 having first been duly sworn, was examined and testified 
25 as follows: 
Page 6 
1 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. LUNDGREN: 
3 Q. I'm sure your attorney has talked to you a 
4 little bit about the purpose behind a deposition, and 
5 what happens here. 
6 Just as a reminder, this is your sworn 
7 statement. You are under oath under penalty of perjury 
8 to tell the truth here. 
9 This is somewhat an informal proceeding, and 
10 that any time you need to take a break, or if you need 
11 any sort of time to consult with your attorney, you are 
12 entitled to do so. 
13 Do you understand that? 
14 A. (Witness nods.) 
15 Q. You also are required to answer your 
16 questions with yes or no. The recorder cannot put down 
17 a nod, or an uh-huh, or something of that nature. 
18 A. Okay. Yes. 
19 Q. And not to be picky, but I'd rather have you 
20 say yes or no than yeah, because sometimes yeah can be 
21 misinterpreted. And it just makes her job easier, and 
22 it makes my job easier, and your attorney's job as 
23 well. 
24 Are you now taking any sort of medications, 
25 or ~ of any kind that would affect your ability to | 
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1 answer questions today? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. Are you ill, or sick, or under any sort of 
4 disability, either mentally, emotionally, or 
5 physically, that would affect your ability to attend 
6 this deposition? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. I want to start out and just get a little 
9 bit of information about you, Mr. Farnsworth, because I 
10 don't know you. I'd like to find out a little bit 
11 about you. 
12 Where were you raised? 
13 A. I was raised in the Mormon colonies in 
14 Mexico. 
15 Q. I'll bet that was an exciting and 
16 interesting experience. 
17 What is your educational background? 
18 A. I've been to college for two years. 
19 Q. Whichr college did yotrgo to? 
20 A. I went to Eastern Arizona Junior College, 
21 and Utah Valley College — state college, I guess now. 
22 Q. And what is the last year you attended 
23 school? 
24 A. I don't remember. 
25 Q. Well, give me a rough estimate? 
P a g e 8 | 
1 A. '88, '89. 
2 Q. When were you born? 
3 A. 1960. 
4 Q. And what date? 
5 A. July the 6th. 
6 Q. And you were born in Mexico? 
7 A. No. Tucson, Arizona. 
8 Q. What is your current employment? 
9 A. Maxway Trucking. 
10 Q. And what do you do for Maxway? 
11 A. Driver. 
12 Q. How long have you been employed there? 
13 A. Since 1983. 
14 Q. Where do you currently live? 
15 A. Where do I currently live? 
16 Q. Yes, sir. 
17 A. Lake Shore, Utah. 
18 Q. How long have you lived in Lake Shore? 
19 A. Since 2000. 
20 Q. Where did you live prior to that? 
21 A. Orem. 
22 Q. How long did you live in Orem? 
23 A. Seven or eight years, I guess. 
24 Q. Okay. 
25 Do you own your current home? 1 
Multi-rage 
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1 A. Well, it's financed through the bank. 
2 Q. You're purchasing it? 
3 A. Mm-hmm. (Witness nods.) 
4 Q. And did you own the home in Orem, or are you 
5 purchasing it? 
6 A. No. We're financing it through the -
7 purchasing it. 
8 Q. Other than these two residences, do you own 
9 any other real estate? 
10 A. No. 
__. Q;-other than these two, have you owned any 
12 other, or been purchasing any other real estate in the 
13 past? 
14 A. No. 
15 Well, I guess you'd have to say that I owned 
16 the ranch here, that we're in this whole deal over, for 
17 a while, I guess. But other than that, no. 
18 Q. Have you ever been arrested for any crime? 
I 1 g\ A V a n _ 
-|i9~ A. ies^ 
20 Q. What crime? 
21 A. Not paying a speeding ticket. 
22 Q. Other than a traffic kite, anything else? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. Are you related to the plaintiff, Ty 
J25 Eldridge? 
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1 A. I don't know. 
2 Q. Tell me how you come about to have an 
3 interest in the property which is the subject of this 
4 lawsuit. 
5 A. It was my father's ranch. 
6 Q. And how did you come to have an interest in 
7 it? 
8 A. I don't quite understand your question. I 
9 mean --
10 Q. Your father's ranch, you have a legal 
11 interest in it now. What happened that you obtained 
12 the legal interest in it from your father? 
13 A. Oh. He died. 
14 Q. And what year did he dye? 
15 A. What are we? I guess 2003, or 2002. 
16 Probably 2002, because I guess we're going on three 
17 years here in the fall. 
18 Q. Okay. 
19 Did your father leave it to you? 
20 A. To me and my two brothers. 
21 Q. What are your brothers' names? 
22 A. David and Greg. 
23 Q. Are these younger brothers or older 
24 brothers? 
25 A. Older. 1 
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Q. How old are you now? 
A. 44. 
Q. How old is David? 
A.. 52. And Greg should be about 50. 
Q. When your father left it to you, did he 
leave it to you in a will, or a trust, or how did it 
pass - how did title pass? 
A. He just left us as co-executors of his 
estate. All three of us. 
Q. Did he have a trust? 
A T N O 
Q. So he left a will? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did the property go through probate? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who - you said you all three are 
co-executors of the estate? 
A. (Witness nods.) 
QTTO eruiwi-- any oneijryuu nrcnarge^oi uic 
group? 
A. No. 
Q. You share the responsibility equally? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you make the decision to sell the 
property? 
Page 12 
A. I don't recall exactly. Soon after he 
passed away. 
Q. Once you made the decision to sell the 
property, how did you make that known to the general 
public? 
A. We listed it on the internet. 
Q. Is that all you did? 
A. After a while of being listed on the 
internet, then we signed up — or listed it with a real 
estate agent. 
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 1 
was marked for identification.) 
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Let me show you what has 
been marked as Exhibit 1. 
Can you identify that document for me? 
A. As far as I know it looks like a ~ the real 
estate listing there, with Gerald Wilkinson. 
Q. Does your signature appear on this page? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And which one is it at the bottom? 
A. The top one of the three. 
Q. Do you recognize the other two signatures? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And whose are they? 
A. They're my two brothers. 
T k A T ' V ^ _ _ 1 / ^ 
Multi-Page 
I Page 13 
1 Q. And is the second one David's? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And is the bottom one -
4 A. Greg's? Yes, as far as I can tell. 
5 Q. There's some handwriting at the bottom. Can 
6 you read that for me? 
7 A. Where it says addendum? 
8 Q. I believe that's what it says. 
9 A. Yeah. It says, If the owners find a buyer 
[10 for this property
 L that total commission paid to the 
II listing agents will be three percent of the sale price. 
12 Q. And this is a correct copy of the original 
13 document you signed? 
14 A. As far as I know. 
15 Q. Did you list it with any other agent? 
16 A. After - I don't remember the exact dates, 
17 but after this went for a while we did, I guess, what's 
18 called a co-listing with another agent named Allen 
19 Wade. 
20 Q. Let me show you what's going to be marked 
21 Exhibit 2. 
22 (Whereupon, Exhibit No. 2 
23 was marked for identification.) 
24 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Can you identify 
|25 Exhibit 2? 
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1 A. My brother had this one in his possession, 
2 but I think I've seen it once. It looks like it's -
3 it would be the co-listing agreement. 
4 Q. Is this the co-listing to which you were 
5 referring? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Let me direct your attention to page two of 
8 this document. There are two pages in it only. 
9 A. Mm-hmm. 
10 Q. And there's some signatures at the bottom. 
11 Can you identify those signatures for me? 
12 A. The one that's mine and my brothers I can. 
13 Q. There are three lines with - which appear 
14 to have signatures on them. Which signature is yours? 
15 A. Mine is the one that says J. Farnsworth. It 
16 would be the second signature from the - well, this 
17 one right here. 
18 Q. All right. 
19 A. Second from the top, I guess. 
20 Q. And the signature that just appears above 
21 your name, do you recognize that? 
22 A. That's my brother David, yeah. 
23 Q. In addition to this you had an ad that has 
24 appeared on the internet? 
|25 A. Yes. - 1 
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1 Q. When did you first have contact with 
2 Mr. Eldridge? 
3 A. I don't remember the exact date. Sometime, 
4 I think, in the first part of August. Middle of August 
5 maybe. I don't-
6 Q. And I'm going to represent to you that that 
7 was about August 5th. 
8 Do you remember what the first contact 
9 consisted of? What he said to you? 
110 A. Not - well, I'm - not exactly. I couldn't 
11 quote it. I'm sure it was something to his interest to 
12 purchase the ranch. 
13 Q. And do you recall what your response was to 
14 him? 
15 A. Not exactly. 
16 Q. Did you describe the ranch to him? 
17 A. You know, I don't remember the conversation 
18 exactly. I'm sure I did, if he was interested in it. 
19 I probably told him what I'd told other people that had 
20 called on the phone about it. 
21 That it wasn't a ~ just as we'd start out, 
22 that it wasn't a money-making ranch. And then probably 
23 just a little bit about the ~ you know, the layout of 
24 it, I guess. How big it was probably. Maybe. I — 
25 but I don't remember the conversation that well. 
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1 Q. Do you recall whether or not you gave him 
2 directions to the ranch? 
3 A. I don't - not in the first conversation — 
4 At some point in time I gave him directions. 
5 I don't know now if it was that first contact or not. 
6 Q. And I'll represent to you that there was a 
7 second call about the 7th of August. It could have 
8 been that call? Would that sound right to you? 
9 A. It could have been, yeah. 
10 Q. Let me show you Exhibit 3. 
11 (Whereupon, Exhibit No. 3 
12 was marked for identification.) 
13 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Can you recognize this 
14 exhibit, sir? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And what is that? 
17 A. It's a - I don't know exactly what you call 
18 it, but an aerial plat, or something like that. Of the 
19 acres that involves the ranch. 
20 Q. Did you send a copy of that to Mr. Eldridge? 
21 A. I don't remember if we sent it, or hand gave 
22 it to him, or what. But it came from me to him. 
23 Q. There's a date at the top of this, which 
24 appears to be a facsimile transmission. It says 
25 August 8th, '04. J 
mum-rage 
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Could that be about the approximate time 
that document was sent to Mr. Eldridge? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let me show you what has been marked as 
Exhibit 4. 
(Whereupon, Exhibit No. 4 
was marked for identification.) 
Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Do you recognize that 
document? 
A. No, but I know what it is. I mean. 
Q. What is it? 
A. It looks like a fax cover sheet. 
Q. Do you recognize the signature at the bottom 
of that page? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And whose signature is that? 
A. My wife's. 
Q. And there's an address at the upper 
left-hand cornei^o£ thi^ covei^sheet-
Is that your home address? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you know whether or not your wife may 
have sent real property tax notices, irrigation and 
water share information, and utility information to 
Mr. Farnsworth? 
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A. To Mr. Eldridge? 
Q. To Mr. Eldridge? Thank you. 
A. I think so. 
Q. There's a date on this document of 
8-10-2004. Would that have been about the time this 
document was sent? 
A. I don't dispute it. 
Q. You don't have any reason to believe that 
it's not accurate? 
A. Yeah. No. 
In fact, do you know what? There's some 
writing on the top of here. This 
www.westernlandrealty.com. That's not mine or my 
wife's writing. I think that's probably put on there 
at some other time. 
Q. All right. Thank you. 
After this information was faxed to 
Mr. Eldridge, do you recall whether or not he got back 
in touch with you again? 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. Did he request permission to go up at the 
ranch and look at it? 
A. At some point in time he did, yeah. 
Q. But whether or not he called you on or about 
August 12th, requesting that you meet him at the ranch 1 
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on Sunday, August 5th? 
A. I don't recall ever meeting him on Sunday at 
the ranch. 
Q. No, that wasn't my question. Let me - and 
if you don't understand exactly what I'm asking, make 
sure I keep it clear for you. Because I'm not trying 
to confuse you. 
A. All right. 
Q. Do you recall whether or not about August 
12th, that Mr. Eldridge would have called you and asked 
you to meet him up at the rancJTon Sunday, August l~5~th? 
A. I don't recall it the way you're telling me. 
Q. Do you recall that you may have responded to 
him that you could not meet up there on a Sunday, 
because you were elders quorum president? 
A. Yeah. That - I recall something like that. 
I think I gave him a key and he ~ so he could go 
himself. 
r\ K -C IA 
yr~Are"you,~inriaet7_an eiders quorum 
president? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall whether or not he asked 
whether or not your brothers could meet up there on a 
Sunday? 
A. I don't recall. 
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Q. Do you recall whether or not you told him 
that your brother could not, because he was a bishop? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Do you have a brother that was a bishop at 
that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which one? 
A. David. 
Q. On or about August 12th, do you recall 
talking to Mr. Eldridge about the fact that there was a 
real estate sign on the property? 
A. I don't recall the exact conversation. 
Q. Has there been a real estate sign on the 
property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall whether or not you made any 
comments to Mr. Eldridge whether or not a realtor was 
presently involved? 
A. No, I don't recall. 
Q. You indicated that you offered Mr. Eldridge 
a key. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that correct? 
Did you make arrangements to meet and give 
him the key? 
ni7Pmv/rAY i?i?prii?TTMn ciri>VTr'i?c nvrr' / a im ^«_ i i « f i ParrA 17 _ PQ(TP 9H 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Did you talk with Mr. Eldridge at this time 
3 about whether or not you might have been related to 
4 him? 
5 A. At some point in time we did. I don't know 
6 if that was the time or not. 
7 Q. What was the substance of that conversation, 
8 as you recall it? 
9 A. I don't recall it that well, other than 
110 he -
111 Your client knows better than I would, 
12 because he's the one that approached the subject. 
13 It seems like maybe he said something about 
14 us having a common ancestor. And that's about all I 
15 remember about it. 
16 Q. Do you remember when you met Mr. Eldridge to 
17 give him a key to the ranch? 
18 A. To the best of my recollection, it was in 
19 Heber. 
20 Q. Do you remember what day that was? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Was it a weekday, or a weekend? 
23 A. I couldn't say for sure. I think it was 
24 Sunday, but I'm not positive. 
25 Q. Do you remember at that meeting whether or 
I Page 22 
1 not you give Mr. Eldridge copies of the originals of 
2 the tax and water information at that time? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. Do you recall at that time whether or not 
5 you offered to allow the Eldridges to stay overnight at 
6 the ranch? 
7 A. We may have. I didn't object to them 
8 staying there if they wanted, so. 
9 Q. Do you recall the next conversation you had 
10 with Mr. Eldridge? 
II A. No. 
12 Q. Did there come a time, shortly thereafter, 
13 where Mr. Eldridge called you and offered to make a 
14 ranch on the property? 
15 Excuse me. Let me rephrase that. I think I 
16 stumbled there. 
17 Did a time, shortly after, occur where 
18 Mr. Eldridge called you stating that he wanted to make 
19 an offer on the property? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Do you remember how long after that it was? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Couple days? Couple weeks? 
24 A. Seems more like a couple of weeks. 
25 Q. But you don't recall the date? 
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1 A. I don't recall. 
2 Q. Do you recall that you went to Mexico in 
3 August? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. And what part of Mexico - what part of 
6 August did you go to Mexico? 
7 A. I don't remember the dates. 
8 Q. Do you recall telling Mr. Eldridge that he 
9 had to wait until you got back from Mexico to make an 
10 offer? 
f 11 A. No, I don't recall that. 1 
12 Q. Do you recall telling Mr. Eldridge that 
13 you've not yet talked to your brothers about him making 
14 an offer? 
15 A. I don't recall that. 
16 Q. Do you recall whether or not you told 
17 Mr. Eldridge that you were going - that you had 
18 already turned down an offer for 325,000? 
19" A. Yes. 
20 Q. Who made that $325,000 offer, do you recall? 
21 A. No. 
22 Q. Do you have copies of that offer? 
23 A. It was just over the phone. 
24 Q. Do you recall that on or about August 22nd, 
25 that you called Ty and talked to him about the price on 
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1 the property? 
2 A. I haven't kept records of my phone 
3 conversations, so when you ask me to put an exact date 
4 to something, it's hard for me to answer in the 
5 affirmative. 
6 Q. Well, let me rephrase the question, because, 
7 again, I'm not trying to trick you up here. I'm just 
8 trying to find out what you know. 
9 On or about the 22nd of August, sometime 
10 after your return from Mexico, do you recall talking to 
11 Mr. Eldridge? 
12 A. I don't recall the time. But yes, I recall 
13 talking to him about it, sure. 
14 Q. And was that right after you returned from 
15 Mexico? 
16 A. I believe so. 
17 Q. Okay. 
18 And did you call him? 
19 A. I don't remember. 
20 Q. Did you talk about the price with 
21 Mr. Eldridge? 
22 A. At some point in time, we did. 
23 Q. Did you talk with him about the equipment on 
24 the property? 
25 A. At some point in time, yes. 
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1 Q. Did you talk to him about a refrigerator? 
2 A. At some point in time, we did. 
3 Q. What was the conversation about the 
4 refrigerator? 
5 A. To the best of my recollection, if -
6 Was the refrigerator gone, then, Ty, or 
7 what? 
8 MR. CLARK: You just need to answer the 
9 questions. 
10 THE WITNESS: Then the refrigerator I 
i n Mip5^e~w&~lms^ to nave anotnefone 
12 re - in its place. 
13 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) And did you offer to do 
14 that? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And did you offer to make available other 
17 personal property? 
18 Do you understand what I mean when I say 
19 "personal property?" 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Did you offer to make other personal 
22 property available to Ty and Marina, that was on the 
23 ranch? 
24 A. Some of it. 
25 Q. Do you remember the price to which you 
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1 agreed to in this first conversation? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And how much was that? 
4 A. 340,000. 
5 Q. Did you offer to prepare a real estate 
6 purchase contract? 
7 A. I don't recall. ; 
8 Q. Did you ever prepare a real estate purchase 
9 contract? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. Do you know who prepared the first real 
12 estate purchase contract? 
13 A. No. 
14 Well, it was — I suppose it was either 
15 Mr. Eldridge or his wife. 
16 Q. Do you recall talking to Mr. Eldridge 
17 shortly after that, and again, you were discussing some 
18 of the personal property on the ranch, and a 
19 conversation may have included comments by Marina that 
20 the riding mower was not included? 
21 A. Ask me that again? 
22 Q. Shortly after this date, where you were 
[23 discussing the $340,000 price with Mr. Eldridge, do you 
24 recall having a conversation with Ty, talking about 
25 some of the items that would not be on the property, 
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1 including that the riding lawnmower would not be there? 
2 A. We had a conversation that was talked about 
3 some of the things that you just mentioned, yes. 
4 Q. And was the riding mower part of that 
5 agreement? 
6 A. Of the original agreement? 
7 Q. Yes. 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Was an adjustment made for the riding 
10 lawnmower? 
TTl A. Yes. 
12 Q. What kind of an adjustment? 
13 A. We decided to take a thousand dollars off 
14 the asking price. 
15 Q. So the actual asking price would have been 
16 $339,000? 
17 A. After we took the — yes. 
18 Q. And you, or one of your family members, 
419—wotrid~remove-the riding lawnmower fronr the ranch?" 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. Along with some other property? 
22 A. No. That never - no. 
23 Q. Explain to me how that would work. 
24 A. We were just talking - we were just 
25 negotiating terms. We didn't ever talk about who was 
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1 going to remove this, or that, or the other. 
2 Q. All right. 
3 But the riding lawnmower was not going to be 
4 included in the price of the ranch. 
5 A. The riding -
6 The riding lawnmower was not to be included 
7 in the price of the ranch? Is that what you — 
8 Q. Yeah. They were not going to buy the riding 
9 lawnmower with the ranch, were they? 
10 A. That's right. 
11 Q. And there were a few other items they were 
12 not going to purchase. Correct? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Let me show you what has been marked as 
15 Exhibit 5. 
16 (Whereupon, Exhibit No. 5 
17 was marked for identification.) 
18 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Have you seen this 
19 document before, Mr. Farnsworth? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. And what is that? 
22 A. Real estate purchase contract. 
23 Q. Do you recognize the handwriting on this 
24 first page? 
25 A. Some of it. 
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1 Q. Is any of that yours? 
2 A. Yeah. 
3 Q. Which of the handwritten items on that first 
4 page are in your handwriting? 
5 A. I had to add this Marina J. Eldridge, this 
6 part that says Basin Land and Title, and down here 
7 where it says conventional. And then wherever it's 
8 initialed by me. 
9 Q. Do you know who prepared the rest of it? 
10 A. I don't know for sure. I'm assuming it's Ty 
11 or his wife. 
12 I mean, they recognize their own 
13 handwriting. I mean, have them look at it. 
14 Q. Let me direct your attention to the last 
15 page of this document, Exhibit 5. 
16 Is that your signature? 
17 A. My signature is on here twice. 
18 Q. Okay. 
\l9 Is it possible that the person that prepared 
20 this document, other than where your handwriting is, 
21 was a friend of yours? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Were you, on August 24th of 2004, authorized 
24 by your brothers to accept this offer? 
|25 A. No. I don't recall the exact date. 
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1 Q. Well, look at the last page of this 
2 document, Mr. Farnsworth. And there's a date next to 
3 your signatures. What is that date? 
4 A. August the 24th. 
5 Q. On August 24th of 2004, were you authorized 
6 to accept this purchase offer on behalf of yourself and 
7 your brothers? 
8 A. I believe so. 
9 Q. And how did you obtain that authorization? 
10 A. By showing them a copy of it and consulting 
II with them. 
12 Q. Have your brothers ever objected to this 
13 offer? Or your acceptance of this offer? 
14 A. They — I don't — they may have had some 
15 objections, but not in the overall. 
16 Q. Do you recall when they gave you specific 
17 authority to sign this offer? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. You don't recall whether you talked to them 
20 on the 24th and showed them a copy of this, and they 
21 gave you verbal authorization at that time, or -
22 A. Like I said, I don't remember the exact 
23 date. 
24 Q. Do you remember signing this document? 
125 A. Yes. [ 
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1 Q. Do you remember what time of day you signed 
2 it? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. Do you remember how long before you actually 
5 signed this document that you discussed it with your 
6 brothers? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. What was included in this contract? What 
9 were the Eldridges buying? What was your understanding 
10 with them, what they were purchasing? 
| i l A. The 280 acres, and the farm equipment, and 
12 items of personal property that would be left behind by 
13 us, that would be decided by us as brothers which they 
14 were going to be. 
15 Q. Give me some idea of what you thought those 
16 items would be that would be left behind? 
17 A. Bedding, some beds, dishes. That's probably 
18 about it. 
19 Enough for them to be able to live in the 
20 house there, without - that's about it. 
21 Q. Was furniture included in that? 
22 A. Furniture, yeah. 
23 Q. Was any farm equipment included in that? 
24 A. I just said farm equipment. 
25 Q. What kind of farm equipment existed on the 
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1 farm at that time? 
2 A. There was a swather, and a bailer, and a 
3 stack wagon. There might have been another piece or 
4 two, but that was basically it. 
5 Q. Any tractors? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. Any motorized equipment? 
8 A. No. Well, the swather is motorized. 
9 Q. Any irrigation equipment? 
10 A. The irrigation equipment is supposed to stay 
11 with the ranch. 
12 Q. Give me some idea of how much irrigation 
13 equipment was there. 
14 A. Two motorized wheel lines. 
15 Q. What length were they? 
16 A. I don't know. 
17 Q. Approximately? 
18 A. I don't know. They went down the length of 
19 the field. However long that is. 
20 Q. Well, I'm not familiar with your property. 
21 See if you can give me some estimate. 
22 You know, there - was it about 100-foot 
23 length? Was it about 200-foot length? Was it a 
24 500-foot length? I don't know. 
25 A. Oh, that's maybe - what is it? 150 yards, | 
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1 my best guess. 
2 Q. Okay. Each of them about the same length? 
3 A. One was a little longer than the other one. 
4 Q. Other than what you've mentioned, any other 
5 equipment or personal property that would have 
6 remained? 
7 A. Not that I recall. 
8 Q. Did you talk about leaving any ATVs, three 
9 wheel errs, four wheelers? 
10 A. There was two ATVS that we would leave, 
jtr (^Anymotorcycles? 
12 A. There was a couple old motorcycles that we'd 
13 leave too. 
14 Q. Okay. 
15 Now that we're talking about this, does this 
16 refresh your memory? Is there anything else that you 
17 were planning on leaving? 
18 A. Not that I recall. I'm not saying we were 
19 going to — we didn t^ go^  through: and da a& inventory on- -
20 every nut and bolt that was on the place, and what we 
21 were going to take and what we weren't. 
22 Q. I understand. I'm just talking about 
23 significant equipment. 
24 I -
25 Understand, I wasn't there. You were there. 
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1 I'm trying to understand what you knew, and what your 
2 understanding was. 
3 A. Well, I gave a statement of what we talked 
4 about with him already about it. 
5 Q. Okay. 
6 Now, I noticed that none of what you've been 
7 talking about is listed in the real estate purchase 
8 contract, or perhaps you can point to me where the 
9 personal property is discussed on the real estate 
10 purchase contract. 
11 A. Well, I -
12 I'm not understanding your question. You 
13 want it listed what we were going to remove? Or what 
14 we were going to leave? 
15 Q. Well, a list of what was — personal 
16 property that was included in the sale. Is there a 
17 list of the personal property that was going to be 
18 included in the sale that's on this real estate 
19 purchase contract? 
20 A. No. I don't think so. 
21 Q. Was this property included in the sales 
22 price of $339,000? 
23 A. Maybe this will help you clear things up. 
24 It's basically what I said before. We were 
25 going to leave the farm equipment, and then there's 
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1 280 acres, and the stuff in the house, that we were 
2 going to remove at our discretion. 
3 So there was never any exact ~ he was 
4 asking me this over the phone. I'm in Provo when I'm 
5 telling this. I can't recall every single thing at the 
6 time. That's why the thing between him and I was, we'd 
7 take whatever — out of the house - all of the items 
8 that are out of the house that was personal property, 
9 and it was going to be our discretion as to what it was 
10 going to be. 
IT QTBut you had discussed with him that you were 
12 going to leave these three-wheelers and the irrigation 
13 equipment, and the farm equipment, and some of the 
14 household stuff. Is that correct? 
15 A. Uh-huh. 
16 Q. Was that your intention, to leave that with 
17 him? 
18 A. He requested that. 
119 Q_ And did you— 
20 A. Well, we never talked about any of the 
21 irrigation equipment, if I remember right, but he 
22 requested that the four-wheelers be left there. 
23 Q. And did you agree to that? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. And was that all to be included in the 
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1 $339,000? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And even though that property is not 
4 mentioned on this agreement, was it your intention to 
5 honor that agreement with Mr. Eldridge? 
6 A. Yes. To the way I stated it, yes. 
7 Q. And did you expect that Mr. Eldridge could 
8 rely upon your promise that you would deliver that? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 MR. LUNDGREN: Did you get a copy of that 
11 Exhibit 5? 
12 MR. CLARK: Yes. 
13 MR. LUNDGREN: Let's take a break for a 
14 short second, please. 
15 (Whereupon, a break was taken.) 
16 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Let me bring your 
17 attention back to Exhibit 5, Mr. Farnsworth. 
18 Let me direct your attention to the third 
19 page of this real estate purchase agreement. 
20 Paragraph seven talks about seller 
21 disclosures. 
|22 A. Mm-hmm. 
23 Q. Did you ever provide any seller disclosures 
24 to Mr. Eldridge? 
25 A. No. 
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1 Q. Did you ever provide a title commitment to 
2 Mr. Eldridge? 
3 A. Not that I know of. 
4 Q. Did you ever provide any information to 
5 Mr. Eldridge about any lessees that were using the 
6 property? That is people to whom you had given 
7 permission to use the property? 
8 A. I think I told him — I'm sure - I would 
9 have had to have told him about the guy we had leasing 
Up it from us at the time. 
11 Q. And who was that guy? 
12 A. Kent Bastian. 
13 Q. And when did you tell them about Kent 
14 Bastian? 
15 A. I don't remember. 
16 Q. What did you tell them about Kent Bastian's 
17 agreement? 
18 A. Just that he ran some cows on there and cut 
19 the hay. 
20 Q. Now, I understand that you think you may 
21 have told him that. Any idea of when, or where you 
22 told him that? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. Any idea of who else would have been around 
25 during that conversation? That could have heard that? 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. Is there a written agreement with 
3 Mr. Bastian? 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. It's an oral agreement? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. How long has Mr. Bastian been running cattle 
8 on the farm? 
9 A. He — that was his second season of doing 
10 it. 
II Q. What was the terms of that agreement? 
12 A. $2,500 for it. 
13 Q. Mr. Bastian paid you $2,500 for each year 
14 that he run the cattle on the property? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And he was allowed to cut and keep the hay? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And that was an oral agreement? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Did you ever change that oral agreement with j 
21 Mr. Bastian? 
22 A. It was just when the agreement with him, 
123 that when we -- that the place was for sale. And when 
'24 we sold it, that then he would have to remove his cows. 
25 Q. Did you abide by the terms of that 
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1 agreement? 
2 A. Y e s . 
3 Q. D i d y o u expect M r . Bast ian to abide by the 
4 terms o f that agreement? 
5 A. Y e s . 
6 Q. D i d he? 
7 A. Y e s . 
8 Q. D o you recall, o n or about the 1st o f 
9 September, whether or not Mr . Eldridge called you to 
10 inspect the personal property at the ranch? 
11 A. Except for the date. I 'm not reaTsure o n 1 
12 the date, but he did — w e had a conversat ion about the 
13 personal property o n the ranch. 
14 Q. And did y o u meet Mr . Eldridge at the ranch 
15 to s h o w h im the personal property at the ranch? 
116 A. Y e s . 
17 Q. D o y o u recall whether or not that may have 
18 been around Labor Day? 
19 A: N o . - --'••--
20 Q. D o y o u recall the date at all? 
21 A. N o . 
22 Q. D o you recall w h o w a s there at the ranch 
23 bes ides y o u and T y Eldridge? 
24 A. N o . 
25 Q. D o you recall whether or not M r s . Eldridge 
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1 was present? 
2 A. No. She may have been, but I — just 
3 because I don't recall doesn't mean she wasn't there. 
4 Q. Do you recall whether or not there was 
5 anyone else there? 
6 A. I don't. 
7 Q. Do you recall what happened when you met him 
8 at the ranch? 
9 A. If it's the time I'm thinking about, then we 
10 just walked around and basically pointed out a couple 
11 of items, to remove some of the confusion that we had 
12 about the personal property. 
13 Q. And did you come to agreement on what would 
14 be removed? 
15 A. Yes. 
116 Q. Did you share any other information about 
17 the ranch, or the water system? 
18 A. Not that I recall. 
19 Q. Was there ever a time when you showed 
20 Mr. Eldridge the water system? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Was it on this occasion, or some other 
23 occasion, or do you know? 
24 A. I don't recall the occasion. 
25 Q. Do you recall, on or about September 9th -
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1 and I know you don't recall any dates, but about the 
2 first part o f September, whether or not you had a 
3 conversation with Ty regarding the progress of him 
4 obtaining financing? 
5 A. Yes . Yeah, as you prefaced it without the 
6 dates. I recall a conversation with him about his 
7 financing. 
8 Q. D o you recall whether or not you agreed to 
9 help h im look for financing? 
10 A. Yes . 
[11 Qf.DTd~you help him? 
12 A. Actually, no. 
13 Q. Did you make any inquiries about financing? 
14 A. N o . 
15 Wel l , as far as it pertains to helping him, 
16 no. 
17 Q. Did you make any inquiries about financing 
18 the ranch? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. Did you talk to any financial institutions 
21 about how financing would be arranged on the ranch? 
22 A. Not in the context of that conversation. 
23 Later on I did inquire, but it's related to his lease 
24 thing. 
25 Q. On or about the middle of September, do you 
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1 remember having a conversation with Mr. Eldridge, where 
2 both of you discussed that the down payment would have 
3 to be about $75,000, and not $34,000? 
4 A. Ask me again? 
5 Q. On or about the middle of September - and 
6 I'm not holding you to any specific date, I'm just 
7 trying to keep this in some timeline. 
8 A. Okay. 
9 Q. Do you remember having a conversation with 
10 Mr. Eldridge, where both you and Mr. Eldridge 
11 learned — had learned and understood that about 
12 $75,000 would be required as a down payment instead of 
13 the $34,000 set - that you had been talking about 
14 before? 
15 A. Do you mean that they were — his people 
16 that he was talking to to get financing from required 
17 the 75? 
18 Q. Mm-hmm. 
19 A. Yes, I remember something like that. 
20 Q. Do you remember talking with Mr. Eldridge at 
21 that time about him using other property he owned for 
22 collateral? 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. Do you remember telling him that he should 
[25 not borrow money against other property he owned? 
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1 A. No. That's none of my business. 
2 Q. Do you recall, on or about this time, that 
3 Mr. Eldridge may have suggested some form of owner 
4 financing? 
5 A. I recall him suggesting some form of owner 
6 financing. 
7 Q. What was your response? 
8 A. That we didn't want to do it. 
9 Q. Do you recall calling Mr. Famsworth, on or 
10 about September 19th, to talk to him about a lease 
TTi option? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Do you recall talking to him on or about 
14 that date? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. If I were to show you in your phone records 
17 that there is a record of a telephone call from your 
18 phone to his on September 19th, could you tell me what 
-1£— occurred in that conversation? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. Do you remember telling Mr. Farnsworth that 
22 you, in fact, liked the idea of a lease option because 
23 of the interest that you would be earning? 
24 MR. CLARK: I think you meant Mr. Eldridge. 
J25 MR. LUNDGREN: Excuse me. 
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1 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Substitute Mr. Eldridge 
2 in there. I misspoke. 
3 A. (Witness confers with counsel.) 
4 Yes. 
5 Q. Tell me what you remember about this 
6 conversation. 
7 A. Well, the conversation was Mr. Eldridge. Is 
8 the way I remember it, he couldn't get financing 
9 anywhere else. This is the only option he had 
10 available to him was to have us finance him. 
11 So we preferred the straight cash offer all 
12 along. So when I made a comment like that, it was 
13 just -- this is ~ 
14 It was not in the ~ 
15 That comment was made in the context of it 
16 was the lesser of the evils. It wasn't that I 
17 preferred that option over anything else and I was 
18 excited about getting interest, it just made it so it 
19 wasn't as bad. My preference all along would have been 
! 20 for him to just buy it outright. 
21 Q. Understanding that your perception was that 
22 you preferred the cash, did you continue to talk to 
23 Mr. Eldridge about a lease option, or some other form 
24 of owner financing? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 Q. Do you recall talking about whether or not 
2 Mr. Eldridge could take advantage of a 1031 exchange? 
3 A. Yes. Well, that was ~ he - that was his 
4 idea. I remember having the conversation with him. 
5 Q. Did there come a time where you agreed to 
6 discuss the terms with Mr. Eldridge about the lease 
7 option? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 But you're not implying there that we agreed 
10 to do a lease option and then we decided to discuss the 
11 terms after, are you? 
12 Q. Well, I'm not making any implications at 
13 all. I'm just asking you questions, Mr. Farnsworth. 
14 A. Well, there was never like a lease option in 
15 place and then we agreed to do the terms. We agreed to 
16 talk about terms about it, but we didn't agree — terms 
17 were going to be agreed to before the lease option was 
18 agreed on. 
19 Q. Okay. 
20 And what terms did you agree upon? 
21 A. Well, I think we agreed upon the period of 
22 time. 
23 Q. And what period of time was that? 
24 A. The best of my recollection, it was going to 
25 run for three years. 
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1 Q. All right. 
2 Did you agree on any other terms? 
3 A. I'd have to look at the thing. See, we may 
4 have agreed on some. There's some we didn't. 
5 Q. Did you agree on any sort of a down payment, 
6 or purchase price for the option? Any sort of 
7 percentage of the purchase price you wanted? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. Did you agree about any sort of an interest 
10 rate? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Did you agree about any sort of monthly 
13 payment? 
14 A. No. 
15 These were discussed, we didn't agree on 
16 them. 
17 Q. What was discussed in terms of the down 
18 payment or lease option price? 
19 A. Well, Mr. Eldridge ended up sending over 
20 a - his offer, where, if I recall right, he had ten 
21 percent down. I don't remember exactly what the 
22 interest rate was. And then there's a monthly payment 
23 that he offered in there. 
24 Q. Do you remember talking - prior to him 
[25 sending this document to you, can you remember talking 
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1 with him about how much down payment? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And how much was discussed? 
4 A. He wanted to give ~ I think it ends up 
5 being about ten percent. 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 How much did you want? 
8 A. 20. 
9 Q. Did you talk about an interest rate? 
10 A. Yeah, we did. 
11 Q. And howmuch was discussed? 
12 A. It seemed like Mr. Eldridge wanted something 
13 like around two - between two and three percent. 
14 Q. And how much did you want? 
15 A. We wanted - well, we weren't exactly 
16 sure — hadn't really arrived on the fixed amount, but 
17 something a little bit better than what the bank would 
18 give you. 
19 Q. Da you recall telling Mr. Eldridge that you 
20 would charge him less than what banks charged, but more 
21 than what you could get for a CD or a bank savings 
22 rate? 
23 A. I remember mentioning that to him, but I 
24 didn't tell him that that's what we were going to do. 
25 Q. Okay. 
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1 Do you remember how much you actually 
2 offered to him in terms of interest rate? 
3 A. No. 
4 Q. Do you recall suggesting a monthly payment 
5 for this three-year option? 
6 A. Whether he suggested it or I -
7 You phrase your question and it makes it 
8 seem like I'm the one that suggested it. There was -
9 we discussed --1 don't know who was the person that 
10 initiated or whose idea it was. I think it was more 
11 your clients' than mine. 
12 Q. Do you remember talking to Ty, in which 
13 there were two suggestions on the lease? One which 
14 was ten thousand ~ ten percent down, $1,500 per month 
15 interest, or a second option at ten percent down, 
16 $1,750 a month, with $250 a month to go to principal? 
17 A. You need to phrase your questions in the 
18 right context. 
19 These were just terms we were negotiating. 
20 You ask me like as if do I recall this thing like as if 
21 I'd agreed upon it. We hadn't agreed upon any of this. 
22 We had conversations on these things. 
23 Q. Do you remember discussing these two 
24 specific offers? 
25 A. I seem - yeah. I don't know the exact - J 
D o r r a. AZ T > « r t ^ AQ 
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1 don't hold me to the exact numbers, but I remember 
2 discussing something along those lines, yeah. 
3 Q. Do you recall Ty talking to you and 
4 suggesting that a down payment of ten percent, with 
5 $1,675 a month paid, with 25 percent to go to 
6 principal? 
7 A. I seem - I recall — I don't remember the 
8 25 percent going to principal I'm not sure on. 
9 Q. Do you remember telling him you were going 
10 to talk to your brothers and get back to Ty? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Did you talk to your brothers? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And what did you agree upon with your 
15 brothers? 
16 A. They didn't seem like it was a good enough 
17 offer. 
18 Q. Do you recall talking to Mr. Eldridge and 
[19 stating that he wanteds runfiv^horses-on-the-ranch-
20 during the lease period? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. Do you recall asking Ty to draw up a lease 
23 agreement? Lease option? 
24 A. No. 
75 * * * 
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1 (Whereupon, Exhibit No. 6 
2 was marked for identification.) 
3 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Let me show you what has 
4 been marked as Exhibit 6. 
5 Do you recognize that document? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Can you tell me what it is? 
8 A. It's his offer to lease with an option. 
9 Q. And can you tell me when, or about what time 
10 you first saw it? 
II A. We were in the middle of October. : 
12 Q. Do you recall calling Mr. Eldridge the 1st 
13 of October, asking about the lease option and 
14 requesting him to send up to you a form? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. Do you recall the first part of October, 
17 somewhere around the 7th, where you called Ty Eldridge, 
18 where you discussed adding an addendum to this lease 
19 option that would cover the personal property? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. Do you remember talking with Mr. Eldridge 
22 and telling him that you wanted to talk to a friend of 
23 yours about the terms of the lease option? 
24 A. I - we had a conversation about that, but 
25 not exactly the way you've stated it. 
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1 Ever since we decided to look at the 
2 possibility of doing this, I told Mr. Eldridge on more 
3 than one occasion that we'd be consulting with people 
4 on how to - how it ought to look. 
5 Q. And who did you consult with? 
6 A. His name is Doug Westbrook. 
7 Q. Where is Mr. Westbrook? 
8 A. St. George. 
9 Q. Who else did you talk to? 
10 A. I talked to a guy who's a real estate agent 
11 in St. George. I just met him in passing, so I don't 
12 know his name. 
13 Q. Okay. 
14 A. And my brothers consulted with a girl who 
15 works at a title company. Name's Raquel Dunn. 
16 Q. Do you know Raquel? 
17 A. I've met her once, but I don't know her 
18 personally. 
\l9. Qr But dithyotmot taHt tcrher? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. Did you ever show Exhibit 6 to 
22 Mr. Westbrook? 
23 A. I don't recall. I don't think so. • 
24 Q. And did you ever talk to Mr. Westbrook about 
25 these particular terms? 
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1 A. You know, I ~ now that I - I think I did 
2 show him this, yes. 
3 Q. Do you recall when you showed him? 
4 A. Not exactly. I couldn't say exactly. 
5 Q. The month of October? 
6 A. Yeah, it was in the month of October. 
7 Q. First part of October? Last part of 
8 October? 
9 A. No. The last part of October. 
10 Q. Let me show you what's been marked as 
11 Exhibit No. 7. j 
12 (Whereupon, Exhibit No. 7 
13 was marked for identification.) 
14 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Have you seen Exhibit 7 
15 before? 
16 A. Yes. 1 
17 Q. When did you first see Exhibit 7? 
18 A. I think he sent this over with the lease 
19 agreement. Or the ~ his offer there. 
20 Q. Do you recall talking with Mr. Eldridge 
21 about changing any of the terms with this residential 
22 lease option to purchase? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Exhibit 6? 
25 Which term did you change? 
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1 A. Didn't change any of them. I just talked to 
2 him about it. 
3 Q. Which term did you talk to Mr. Eldridge 
4 about changing? 
5 A. Oh, I think there was one in there where 
6 the - I guess there's a default period that seemed 
7 detrimental to him, that we thought should be changed. 
8 It seemed like there was something else. I 
9 can't ~ 
[10 Oh. I think I discussed with him a fact 
[ 11 about - that we wanted it to be such that we could 
12 sell this, like how you sell a loan, or sell the paper. 
13 Q. Okay. 
14 Anything else you discussed about changing? 
15 A. Not that I recall. 
16 Q. Did you talk with Mr. Eldridge about the 
17 start date of this agreement? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Do you recall the discussion about that?^  
20 A. Vaguely. Just when it was supposed to take 
21 effect. If he ~ we ended up doing it, when he wanted 
22 it to start. 
23 Q. Other than what we've talked about, do you 
24 recall discussing any other changes with Mr. Eldridge 
25 after you received this? 
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1 A. Not after we received it. 
2 Q. Okay. 
3 Do you recall, after you had received this, 
4 receiving any telephone calls from Mr. Eldridge 
5 requesting to get together to close? 
6 A. Not to close. 
7 Q. What conversations do you remember with 
8 Mr. Eldridge after this date? 
9 A. I got a call from him where he was inquired 
10 as to our disposition on signing the thing. 
11 Q. And do you know about when that might have 
12 been? 
13 A. Sometime in the end of October. 
14 Q. Okay. 
15 And what was the substance of that 
16 conversation? 
17 A. He was just interested to know what we'd 
18 kind of thought about going ahead and signing onto it. 
19 Q. And your response? 
20 A. Oh, we still were considering it, and 
21 looking it over ourselves. 
22 Q. Okay. 
23 Do you recall, somewhere around the middle 
24 or end of October, where Mr. Eldridge called and asked 
[25 for a key to take his ranch -- to take his parents to 
Paorp ^ - Pacr£* ^A i v c n / 
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1 the ranch? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And did you make arrangements for him to get 
4 the key? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Where did you put the key? 
7 A. I think I hid it outside on the porch of my 
8 house. 
9 Q. Do you recall, at that time, whether or not 
10 Mr. Eldridge also asked you for information on title? 
fir" "XrYesT 
12 Q. Do you recall talking to him about an 
13 abstract? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Did you offer to give him an abstract your 
16 father had had? 
17 A. I told him I might let him look at it, yeah. 
18 Q. Did you ever let him look at it? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. Did he ask for the abstract or other title 
21 informations more than once? 
22 A. I don't remember. 
23 Q. Do you recall talking to Mr. Eldridge about 
24 contacting an escrow company to handle payments under 
25 the lease option, if it was entered into? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Tell me about that conversation. 
3 A. Just asked him if we entered into this, if 
4 he wanted to have us being the ones that he sent the 
5 check directly to, or if he wanted to have an escrow 
6 company handle it, because it wasn't specified in his 
7 document here. 
8 Q. And what was his response? 
9 A. He didn't have a — he - well, we talked 
10 about both. Both things. I don't think he'd made up 
II his mind 100 percent either about what to do with it. 
12 Q. Did he tell you whether or not he would 
13 contact an escrow company? 
14 A. I don't recall. 
15 Q. Do you recall talking to him at this time 
16 about whether or not you were selling some of the 
17 horses that were on the ranch? 
18 A. No, I don't remember talking to him about 
19 that. 
20 Q. Do you recall whether or not he asked to buy 
121 one of the horses on the ranch? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Which horse did he want to buy? 
24 A. We had a gray mare out there that — 
25 Q. Did you suggest a purchase price for the 
ivmiu-i-age 
Page 57 
1 horse? 
2 A. I don't remember if I suggested it or if he 
3 did. 
4 Q. What was the price that was discussed? 
5 A. $500. 
6 Q. Did he ever offer you $500 for the horse? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Did you accept it? 
9 A. No . 
110 Q. Do you recall talking to Mr. Eldridge, on or 
JTI about tne Z4to ot October, aboufTy going back up to 
12 the ranch and doing work on the ranch? 
13 A. No . 
14 Q. Do you know whether or not Mr. and 
15 Mrs. Eldridge ever did any work on the ranch? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. What did they do? 
18 A. They went out there and winterize -
| l 9 weatherized-a&cM-houser-I^origfflat ofchranchrhouse fl 
20 a little bit! I think put up a piece or two -
21 I'm not sure exactly what they did, but, 
22 yeah, they did a little bit of work. 
23 Q. Did you ever tell Mr. Eldridge not to do 
24 work on that? 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 the lease option? 
2 A. I don't recall that. I mean, I may have, 
3 but I don't recall the exact way you've stated it 
4 there. 
5 I mean, I - he knew all along that w e were 
6 consulting with - about it, so . As far as an exact 
7 conversation like that, I don't recall. 
8 Q. Was it at or near this time when you talked 
9 to T y about the fact that he could not tear d o w n the 
10 corrals on the ranch? Assigning certain bills to 
11 Mr. Eldridge he had to pay? That you could - just 
12 let me finish. 
13 That you could sell the note? 
14 A. I 'm not sure on the timeframe. Those things 
15 were discussed over the period of this negotiation, 
16 yeah. 
17 Q. D o y o u recall whether or not you agreed to 
18 close on or about the 28th at this time? 
— A . I can't ~Tior^doifthave"any^rec0ltectiDn 
20 of that, because that conversation -
21 Ask me that again. 
22 Q. O n or about this t ime, do y o u recall, during 
23 this.same conversation, talking about closing o n the 
24 lease option about the 28th? 
25 A. Never talked at all, ever, about c los ing. 
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1 Q. When did you tell him that? 
2 A. After I found out he did it the first time. 
3 Q. Did you ever tell the Bastians that you had 
4 sold or leased the ranch effective November 1st, and 
5 tell the Bastian's to remove their cows? 
6 A. Only part of that. ItoldBastian 
7 originally, when we signed the original purchase 
8 agreement with Eldridge, that it had sold, as far as, 
9 you know, we had signed a contract, and he was going to 
110 have to remove them. 
11 Q. When did you tell that to Mr. Bastian? 
12 A. I don't remember. Somewhere not too long 
13 after we signed the original real estate contract. 
14 Q. So in — somewhere in August or early 
15 September? 
16 A. Probably September. 
17 Q. Did you ever tell the Bastians to remove 
18 their property by November 1st? 
19 A. I told them to remove them. I don't 
20 remember the exact date. 
21 Q. Do you recall, on or about the end of 
22 October, somewhere around the 26th, whether you called j 
23 Mr. Eldridge and left a message stating that you wanted j 
24 Ty to call you back, that you were on your way to St. 
25 George to talk to a friend regarding the final draft of 
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1 Q. Okay. 
2 On or about the 28th, do you recall talking 
3 to Mr. Eldridge about - and telling him that there was 
4 a problem with a realtor? 
5 A. What was the date? 
6 Q. On or about the 28th of October, 2004? 
7 A. On or about? Yes. 
8 Q. What was the problem with the realtor? 
9 A. When we co-listed with the ~ when we went 
10 to re-list with Mr. Wilkinson for the last time, we 
11 decided to co-list it with another agent. And when 
12 they - I'm not sure, because my - the other agents, 
13 my brother dealt with him, and I think he's the one 
14 that drew up the document. 
15 And when they drew it up, we talked about, 
16 to the best of my recollection, that it was just as 
17 usual. Another six-month term. Well, they, somewhere 
18 in their involvement, wrote in 12 months, in the 
19 contract. 
20 Q. Are you talking about Exhibit 2? 
21 A. Yeah. Yes. 
22 Q. Okay. 
23 A. Is this his? 
24 Q. How is it that it came to your attention 
25 that this was a problem on the 28th of October? 
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A. We were reviewing some of the documents, and 
looking over Mr. Eldridge's offer, and my brother read 
through that again and saw that. 
Q. Did you have a conversation with 
Mr. Eldridge, where the Farnsworths would just lease 
him the ranch until the end of the 12-month listing, 
and then add the option if there was a problem with 
Mr. Wade? 
A. We didn't ever say we'd do that. The 
subject was discuss. It wasn't like something we said 
we were going to do. 
Q. Well, that wasn't my question. My question 
was — 
A. Well, your questions are kind of lengthy. 
Maybe if you kept them a little shorter I could keep 
track of it. 
Q. If you have a problem understanding my 
questions, I want you to ask me to rephrase it or reask 
it. I don't want you to be confused, okay? 
Is that okay with you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have a conversation with 
Mr. Eldridge, in which you discussed with Mr. Eldridge 
that he could lease the property for 12 months, and 
then add the option if there was a problem with 
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1 willing to pay half the commission. 
2 This is all at the same time there, when w e 
3 were at the ranch. 
4 Q. Okay. 
5 And what was your response? 
6 A. That that was going to get to the bottom of 
7 the situation first. 
8 Q. Did you ever tell Mr. Eldridge that you and 
9 your brothers would not agree to take less than the 
10 agreed price? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. And did Mr. Eldridge offer to pay the full 
13 real estate fee? 
14 A. I don't recall. 
15 Q. D o you recall whether or not you told 
16 Mr. Eldridge that the realtors did not deserve any fee, 
17 and you were going to contact an attorney? 
18 A. I remember thinking that we were going to — 
t9--dependmg^oirhow^^wentrwe ? deonsui^^^attorney if 
20 we felt we needed to, to see what our options were. 
21 Q. Did you ever consult an attorney? 
22 A. Not about that. 
23 Q. On or about this time, did Mr. Eldridge call 
24 you and express a desire to go back up to the ranch? 
25 A. N o . 
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1 Mr. Wade? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. Tell me about the conversation that you 
4 earlier agreed that happened. 
5 A. We were discussing this situation. And we 
6 thought that that might be an option, if the real 
7 estate agents were being - if we felt that they were 
8 doing this in bad faith. 
9 Q. Okay. 
110 Do you recall that shortly after this, 
11 probably the next day or so, that you had another 
12 conversation with Mr. Eldridge, where you told him that 
13 you were not making progress with the realtors, and 
14 Mr. Eldridge offered to pay half of the real estate 
15 agreement? 
16 A. That's not the conversation the way I recall 
17 it was all in the same day. 
18 Q. Tell me about the conversation as you recall 
19 it. 
20 A. We mentioned to him that we had came across 
21 this situation with the real estate agreement. 
22 That we needed to get it resolved before we 
23 did anything else. 
24 And he said that he didn't want to let a 
125 real estate commission hold up the deal. That he was 
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1 Q. Do you recall talking to Mr. Eldridge on or 
2 about this time that you felt bad about the promises 
3 you had made, and didn't want to make any more? 
4 A. You're quoting me there, and the quote is 
5 not accurate. 
6 Q. Well, tell me what happened. What did you 
7 tell Mr. Eldridge? 
8 A. I told Mr. Eldridge that I felt bad that 
9 this thing had came up at the last minute, and we were 
10 not even able to counteroffer him, is what the context 
11 of it was. It was like dead in the water until we had 
12 this thing sorted out. 
13 Q. Did not Mr. Eldridge tell you he was willing 
14 to pay the rest of the realtor fees so there wouldn't 
15 be any problems? 
16 A. Well, that implies that that was the only 
17 problem, and that wasn't the only problem. 
18 Q. What was the other problem? 
19 A. Just all of the other problems that we 
20 didn't like that we've already discussed that were in 
21 his lease option. 
22 Q. Well, I remember talking about the lease 
23 option, and the one he sent you, and you listed some 
24 problems with that. There were no other problems, were 
25 there? Other than the ones we talked about? 
ivium-rage 
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1 A. I just answered your question. You never 
2 asked me - well, I'd have to go back and review the 
3 questions, but we had reasons we didn't sign these 
4 lease option. 
5 Q. All right. What were the reasons? 
6 A. Not enough down payment. He wanted to 
7 sublet it. He changed the interest. Even on his own 
8 down payment that he wanted to pay, which we didn't 
9 ever agree to. Then he decided that he wanted to have 
10 the farm equipment taken out of that price of money, 
TTl which in essence lowers the down payment even more. 
12 A n d -
13 Q. Well, let's go back to Exhibit No. 6, and 
14 let's see if we have a clear understanding here. 
15 Do you have that in front of you, sir? 
16 A. Mm-hmm. 
17 Q. And how much down payment was he going to 
18 offer you? 
19 -A—Tenpereent^tf tremember. 
20 Q. Well, is it on line three? 
21 A. I don't think so. I think line three says 
22 the ranch. 
123 Q. On page one of the lease agreement -
24 MR. CLARK: I think you're - I think the 
25 third line down, but there's a number three that he's 
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1 looking at. 
2 MR. LUNDGREN: Not paragraph three, sir. 
3 The third line from the top. 
4 THE WITNESS: Oh. Okay. 
5 20 - yeah. That's ~ that would represent, 
6 give or take, ten percent. 
7 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) And how much was that? 
8 A. Ten percent. 
9 Q. $24,000? 
10 A. Mm-hmm. 
11 Q. And was he going to be paying something for 
12 the equipment? Look at Exhibit No. 7. 
13 A. Yeah. He wanted this equipment to be bought 
14 and paid for out of that $24,000. 
15 Q. Well, doesn't that say $10,000 for the 
16 following items? 
17 A. Yeah, but he wanted it to come out of the 
18 24,000. 
19 Q. Where is that expressed? 
20 A. It's not. It was talked about between him 
21 and I. He didn't want to give any more. 
22 He didn't want - like, if he failed on his 
23 thing, he didn't want us to be able to get the 
24 equipment back. He wanted to be that - that to be 
25 purchased separately. And he's got it in his own 
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1 documents where he discussed about how it was 
2 advantageous to have it purchased separately. 
3 Q. Have you seen those documents? 
4 A. I'd have to look back through them and find 
5 them. 
6 Q. Do you have those documents? 
7 A. Hold on a minute. 
8 Q. I'd like to see those, please. 
9 THE WITNESS: Clark, do you have where he's 
110 giving all of his - all of his conversations that we 
bfl ever had? 
12 MR. CLARK: Let's take a break for a moment 
13 while we're sorting out what we're looking for. 
14 MR. LUNDGREN: Let's go off the record for a 
15 minute. 
16 (Whereupon, a break was taken.) 
17 (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Do you have that document 
18 to which you're referring to? 
19 Ar-Yesi 
20 Q. Would you show that document to me, please, 
21 Mr. Famsworth? 
22 A. This is the conversation that I'm talking 
23 about, right? You can read it upside down. 
24 Q. Why don't you just read me the section 
25 t h a t -
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1 MR. CLARK: Let's identify it. 
2 MR. LUNDGREN: I'm going to. 
3 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Let's identify the 
4 document first, Mr. Famsworth. 
5 A. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' First 
6 Discovery Request. 
7 Q. And there's a date on one of those pages. 
8 Would you recite the date of that? Signature date. 
9 To the end of the document. 
10 MR. CLARK: Back here. 
111 It's not dated. Over here it is. 
12 THE WITNESS: It looks like - that's your 
13 writing. Can you read it? 
14 MR. LUNDGREN: It looks like it's 
15 March 23rd, 2005? 
16 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
17 MR. LUNDGREN: That's taken off the 
18 certificate of mailing. 
19 " MR; CLARK: That's the certificate of" 
20 mailing. 
121 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) And you're reciting from 
22 this document, Mr. Famsworth, and what you're reciting 
23 is this information supplied by Mr. Eldridge? 
24 A. No, it's not necessarily information 
25 supplied by him, it's just a part of the negotiation we 
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1 A. I think I took some books, if I remember 
2 right. 
3 I don't remember what my brother took, but 
4 he took some stuff. 
5 Q. Did you have a conversation about - with 
6 Mrs. Eldridge, where you asked her if it was okay if 
7 you took those books because you vanted to start a 
8 bookstore? 
9 A. No. 
|10 Q. Okay. 
11 MR. ELDRIDGE: I think it was a library. 
12 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Did you tell 
13 Mrs. Eldridge that you took those books because you 
14 wanted to start a library? 
15 A. I just wanted the books to be in my home, 
16 because they had been in my home all the time I was 
17 growing up. 
18 Q. Okay. 
m Bid-yotrask-Mr&r Eldridge-ifshe-hadrany 
20 objection whether or not you took them? 
21 A. No, I don't think I asked if she had any 
22 objection. 
23 Q. What did you ask her? 
24 A. I think I might have asked her if she wanted 
|25 part of them, that I may not have wanted. 
I Page 78 
1 Q. At this time did Mr. Eldridge offer to pay 
2 for the horse? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Did he hand you a check for $500? 
5 A. No. 
6 Q. Did you — did he indicate that he had a 
7 $500 check to give to you? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Did you accept it? 
10 A. No. 
II Q. Did you offer to breed Mr. Eldridge's - or 
12 the horse that Mr. Eldridge wanted to buy for nothing? 
13 A. If we would have trans ~ had that 
14 transaction, yes. 
15 Q. Did you tell Ms. Eldridge at this time that 
16 you were going to contact an attorney on Monday 
17 regarding the real estate problem? Real estate agent 
18 problem? 
19 A. I told her that we were going to — if we 
20 felt it was necessary, that we'd contact an attorney, 
21 and do so in a timely fashion. 
22 Q. Who else was at the property besides 
23 yourself and Mr. and Mrs. Eldridge? 
'24 A. My brother was there, and I thinl -
125 Q. Which brother? _[ 
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1 A. David. 
2 I think one of his kids was there. 
3 Mr. and Mrs. Eldridge I think had a friend 
4 there. 
5 And I - well, I don't recall for sure. I 
6 think one of my kids might have been there, but I can't 
7 remember. 
8 Q. Did you, at this time, winterize the 
9 irrigation system? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Mr. Eldridge accompany you on that'/ 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Did you show him how to winterize it? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Did you talk to him about a faulty valve 
16 there, saying that it needed to be replaced? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Did you ask Mr. Eldridge, on this occasion, 
[*9—whedle^oi^no^you-th€«lghtthe-view^fromfeeFan^l 
20 house was worth $400,000? 
21 A. I don't recall that. 
22 Q. Was there any question on your mind, on this 
23 visit, whether or not the Eldridges wanted to acquire 
24 the ranch? 
25 A. They - now ask me again? 
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1 Q. Is there any question in your mind, at this 
2 time, on the 30th, whether or not the Eldridges wanted 
3 to acquire the ranch? 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. You knew that they wanted the ranch? 
6 A. That they wanted to acquire it, yes. 
7 MR. LUNDGREN: Can we take a break for 
8 lunch? 
9 MR. CLARK: All right. 
10 (Whereupon, a break was taken.) 
11 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) We're back on the record. 
12 As I understand your testimony, 
13 Mr. Farnsworth, we had been talking about your visit to 
14 the ranch on October 30th, when the Eldridges were 
15 there, and others. That you had a conversation with 
16 them about contacting an attorney regarding your real 
17 estate problem. Is that correct? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. And the problem was about the fact that 
20 there was a question on the real estate commission? 
21 A. No, the duration of the listing. 
22 Q. The duration of the listing. Let me direct 
23 your attention back to Exhibit No. 2. 
24 In the upper right-hand corner of Exhibit 
25 No. 2, can you read what's written there? 
P o r r o 7 7 _ D o ma Qfl 
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1 A. Mm-hmm. 
2 Q. Would you read that for me, please? 
3 A. Per phone conversation with Allen on 10-29 
4 at 10:30 a.m., we owe him nothing on the sale or lease 
5 of the ranch. 
6 I can't read the rest of it. 
7 Q. Do you know whose initials that are? 
8 A. Those are -- they look like my brother's. 
9 Q. And that would be your brother David? 
10 A. Uh-huh. 
Ill Qr-Didiri dial solve Ure~question about the -
12 Didn't David solve the question about the 
13 length of the real estate commission on the 29th of 
14 October, at 10:30 a.m.? 
15 A. He may have. I didn't know about it yet. 
16 Q. He didn't say anything to you about it on 
17 the 29th? 
18 A. Not that I recall. 
19 Q. Did he say anything-ta-3tf)u^bQ»t-it^ m-4:he 
20 30th? 
21 A. I don't remember the exact date when he told 
22 me that he'd had the conversation. 
23 Q. Here was obviously a matter of a concern. 
24 Why would he have waited to tell you? 
25 A. You'll have to ask him. 
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1 Q. Is it possible that he told you prior to 
2 going up to the ranch on the 30th, or while you were at 
3 the ranch on the 30th? 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. That's not possible? 
6 A. I guess it's possible. 
7 Q. Well, what date do you think he told you 
8 that he had resolved the problem with Mr. Wade? 
9 A. Sometime right around there. On or about, 
10 you know. 
11 Q. Did you talk to David on the 29th? 
12 A. Go ahead. Excuse me, I didn't hear your 
13 last question. 
14 Q. Did you talk to David on the 29th? 
15 A. Not that I recall. 
16 Q. Did you talk to him on the 30th? | 
17 A. I saw him out at the ranch. , 
18 Q. Okay. 
19 I have given your attorney a copy of this 
20 document earlier, which I'd like to mark as an exhibit. 
21 (Whereupon, Exhibit No. 8 
22 was marked for identification.) 
23 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Mr. Farnsworth, I'm going 
24 to represent to you that this is a document which I 
|25 obtained by subpoena from Nextel Corporation, which 
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1 reflects to be telephone calls on your cell phone 
2 number from the period of approximately August 5th 
3 through November 15th, I think the date is. 
4 What is your cell phone number, sir? 
5 A. 404-1898. 
6 Q. And that's area code 801? 
7 A. Mm-hmm. Yes. 
8 Q. And on the cover page of this document 
9 you'll see that it says, in the upper right-hand side, 
10 this is a telecommunication services call detail for 
11 area - phone number area code 801-404-1898, which you 
12 say is your telephone number. Is that correct? 
113 A. Yes. 
14 Q. Now, unfortunately this is very small print, 
15 so I'm going to ask you to indulge with me. 
16 But would you forward through that document, 
17 and the calls are listed in the chronological order, to 
18 the - towards the end you'll see in the upper 
-Ht9—left=faand cuiaei, calls siarrin^wlth number 476: 
120 Each call line has a number. 
21 A. Okay. 
22 Q. Okay? 
23 Did you find that page that starts with 476? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q.I want you to go down and tell me who you 
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1 spoke with at line 479 on October 29th at 4:57 p.m.? 
2 A. I haven't any idea. Let me see, what one do 
3 you want? 479? 
4 Q. 479. 
5 And if you look in the column under, it says 
6 number ~ it says telephone number. Is that your 
7 brother's telephone number? David? 
8 A. I don't know his number by memory. So it 
9 may be. I couldn't verify it. It may be. 
10 Q. And if you look down there, you're going to 
11 see telephone interchanges between your telephone 
12 number and 836-9058 on lines 479, 480, 481, 486, 487, 
13 all on the 29th. 
14 Is it possible that you had this many 
15 conversations, or attempted conversations with your 
16 brother on the 9th? 
117 A. Yes. 
18 Q. Is it possible that on the 29th that he told 
19 you that he had spoken to David - or excuse me, Allen 
20 Wade that morning and resolved the real estate problem? 
21 A. No, because I didn't know that it was solved 
22 when I was out there on the 30th. 
23 We had - well, never mind. That wasn't 
24 your question. 
25 Q. Did you know, on October 30th, that another 
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1 offer had been presented on the ranch? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. When did you find out about that offer? 
4 A. The evening of the 28th. 
5 Q. When did you tell Mr. Eldridge, when you 
6 had - that you had received another offer? 
7 A. I don't recall. It's somewhere in our 
8 responses to you though. 
9 Q. Did you tell Mr. Eldridge on the 30th that 
Ji(L__yoahad xeceived_aa^Qffer...on the 28th?_ 
11 A. I don't recall telling him. 
12 Q. Did you tell Mr. Eldridge, on the 30th, that 
13 others were mad at you? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. While you were winterizing the ranch, and 
16 Mr. Eldridge was with you, did he pay close attention 
17 to the winterizing process? 
118 A. Did he? 
119 Q 7 Y e s 7 " 
20 A. I don't know. You may better ask him. 
21 Q. Did - | 
22 A. I was winterizing things. I wasn't looking j 
123 at him. i 
24 Q. He was with you? 
25 A. He was with me. J 
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1 Q. Asking questions? 
2 A. A few. 
3 Q. You were explaining to him what you were 
4 doing? 
5 A. Yeah. 
6 Q. At any time prior to October 30th, did you 
7 ever tell Mr. or Mrs. Eldridge, that as far as you and 
8 your brothers were concerned, that there was no deal 
9 between you and the Eldridges, or something comparable? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. How was the — how did you learn about the 
12 offer on the 28th? 
13 A. Mr. Wilkinson called me on the phone. 
14 Q. How many offers did he tell you he had? 
15 A. He had two. 
16 Q. Prior to your conversation with him on the 
17 28th, how long before that had it been before you 
18 talked to Mr. Wilkerson? 
19 A. I don't recall. 
20 Q. Had it been just one or two days? 
21 A. Yeah. It had been just like - sometime the 
22 first part of the week. 
23 Q. And what was that conversation concerning? 
24 A. He had had somebody that was interest -
25 another person that was interested in leasing the place 
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1 with an option. 
2 Q. Did he tell you any details about that 
3 offer? 
4 A. I don't recall. He gave me the guy's number 
5 for me to call the person. 
6 Q. And you have that number? 
7 A. Not with me. 
8 Q. Can you get it? 
9 A. Yes. 
ho Q._ And_what: was that person's name? 
11 A. Shane Gardner. 
12 Q. And when you spoke with Mr. Gardner, what 
13 did you tell him about the lease? 
14 A. About his offer? 
15 Q. Yes. 
16 A. I asked him what his offer was. 
17 Q. What was his offer? 
18 A. An offer of a lease with an option to 
19 purchased ~ ~ 
20 I don't remember it exact terms, but I think 
21 he offered 50,000 down. And if I remember right, he 
22 wanted to extend it over four years. 
23 Yeah. 
24 Q. Did he talk about an interest rate? 
125 A. No. Not that I remember. 
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1 Q. What was the purchase price he was offering? 
2 A. I think it was 350. 
3 Q. And what did you tell Mr. Gardner? 
4 A. I told him we'd think about it and get back 
5 with him. 
6 Q. And did you? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. And what did you get back to him? What did 
9 you say? 
10 A. I told him that we — if I remember right, I 
11 think we wanted 70,000 down, and for the thing to 
12 extend over a period of three years. 
13 And then I questioned him a lot about the 
14 avail — if he actually had the money, or if it was 
15 going to be one of these things where he says he has 
16 the money and can't produce it. So I was concerned 
17 about if he could actually come up with his down 
18 payment. 
19 Q. Did you tell him what interest rate you 
[20 wanted? 
121 A. I don't recall if I did or not. 
J22 Q. Did you tell him whether or not $350,000 was 
23 acceptable? I 
24 A. Not ~ well, that would imply that I 
25 accepted the whole thing. I 
IYAUIII-J. agK, 
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1 No, I didn't tell him the 350 was 
2 acceptable. I told him we'd look at his offer. 
3 Q. You said you wanted $70,000 down, and you 
4 wanted three years. Did you want more than $350,000? 
5 A. That would have been a ~ could have been a 
6 starting point for a negotiation with him. 
7 Q. Did Mr. Gardner ever present to you a 
8 written offer with those terms? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. How was the conversations with 
11 Mr. Gardner - wnat nappened with those? 
12 A. I called him back when we found out this 
13 problem with the real estate agent. That it was listed 
14 for longer than we had anticipated. 
15 And he just said get back with me when you 
16 know what you want to do. 
17 Q. Did you ever talk to him after that? 
18 A. Mm-hmm. 
I1Q f\ Art/4 n>U*»t <4t/4 TTAII f a l l Vity»tO 
- J i y - - X^ r- _T_1G Wnat -iHtl-y€H^tC_i-f_ttElf 
20 A. Told him that we'd accepted one of the other 
21 offers. 
22 Q. What other offer had you accepted? 
23 A. The one from Byron Gibson. 
24 Q. How long - when - you told him some time 
25 after you accepted the offer from Byron Gibson. When 
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1 did you accept his offer? 
2 A. I don't — can't remember right off the top 
3 of my head. I'd have to look at the contract. If 
4 you've got it there, that's whatever date we signed it. 
5 (Whereupon, Exhibit No. 9 
6 was marked for identification.) 
7 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) Let me show you what has 
8 been marked as Exhibit No. 9. 
9 Can you identify that document? 
10 MR. CLARK: This appears to me to be several 
11 documents. 
12 MR. LUNDGREN: Exhibit 9,1 will represent 
13 to you, is several documents that relate ~ 
14 A. Well, this one on the top is called ~ 
15 reads, a Buyer Due Diligence Checklist. Two pages 
16 later there is a Real Estate Purchase Contract. 
17 Q. Is that the Real Estate Purchase Contract 
18 with Mr. Gibson that you were just speaking about? 
19 A. I think so. 
20 Q. Can you find for me what date that was 
21 accepted? 
22 A. November the 12th. 
23 Q. And so you had a conversation with 
24 Mr. Gardner sometime after November 12th, and told him 
|25 that you'd accepted this deal? 
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A. I don't recall if it was before or after, I 
just remember telling — we'd made up our mind that 
this is the way we were going to go. I let him know. 
Q. Okay. 
Did you tell Mr. Gardner, before or after 
October 30th, about the real estate agent problem? 
A. If I recall the date right, it was on 
October the 30th. 
Q. Well, if it wasn't on October 30th, and I'll 
represent to you that I don't see that on your call 
report here, when would - would it have been the 31st7 
or would it have been the 29th? 
A. I've told you throughout this whole 
proceeding. I don't recall the exact date of a phone 
call. 
Q. I understand. I'm just trying ~ 
A. I just told you I made the phone calls on or 
about sometime around then. 
C\ A l l rirrVit • 
\l. /Mi ngni. 
Did you tell the Farnsworths that you had 
received an offer from Gardner? 
A. Tell the who? 
Q> Excuse me. Did you tell the Eldridges that 
you'd received a call from Gardner ~ 
A. No. 
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Q. ~ making an offer on the lease? 
A. .No. 
Q. Were your brothers aware of that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you tell Mr. Eldridge that you had 
another offer on the property? 
A. I don't remember the exact date. 
Q. Well, you said you didn't tell him on the 
30th. And I'll represent to you that October 30th is a 
Saturday. 
A. If you want to take the time for me to look 
at your client ~ if your client remembers the date, 
and I don't dispute it. It's in the documents 
somewhere. 
Q. If I was going to represent to you that it 
was November 8th, you would not disagree with that? 
A. I wouldn't like assert that that's when it 
was, because I don't remember exactly when it was, but 
it ~ I wouldn't have any reason to - it couldn't have 
been that day. 
Q. And talking about that conversation with 
Mr. Eldridge, what did you tell him? 
A. I told him that we'd received an offer to 
purchase the place from ~ I don't think I told him 
who, but I just - I was referring to the Gibson offer. 
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1 Q. And did you talk with Mr. Eldridge about 
2 what his position should be at that point? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. What did you tell him? 
5 A. He wanted to try to match the offer. 
6 Interest. 
7 Q. Okay. 
8 A. But he had indicated to me throughout all of 
9 the negotiations that he was just on the razors edge 
10 financially to be able to afford it at the price he'd 
Ti 1 offered, and now we're talking $60,666 more. 
12 So I counseled him to don't put yourself in 
13 financial trouble. If you want - because he told me 
14 that in order to get the money he was going to have to 
15 go to a loan shark. And so I told him, You'd be smart, 
16 since, you know, he'd indicated to me throughout the 
17 course of this thing how difficult it was going to be 
18 for him financially. So I told him, Don't put yourself 
19 inthat position.-Just make an offer that you think 
20 you can afford, and sit in the back-up position. 
21 Because these offers, they have a tend — it's not 
22 uncommon at all for them to not pan out. Especially 
23 right at the start. 
24 Q. Did Mr. Eldridge tell you at that time you'd 
25 do anything to get the ranch? 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. Did you tell him you'd talk to your brothers 
3 and see what they could do to help out the Eldridges? 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. Did you tell Mr. Eldridge whether or not any 
6 realtors were involved? 
7 A. I can't remember if I told him that or not. 
8 Q. Did you offer to Mr. Eldridge, that if he 
9 came up with somewhere around $390,000 in cash, that 
10 you would sell the ranch to him without the personal 
11 property, but he had to do that within two days? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. How did Mr. Eldridge respond? 
14 A. He said he'd try. 
15 Q. Let me direct your attention to Exhibit 9. 
16 And let's talk about the terms of the Real Estate 
17 Purchase Contract. ! 
18 How much down payment were they going to i 
19 pay? 
20 A. I'll have to look through. I think it was 
21 50,000. Yeah. 
22 Q. How much commission were you going to pay to 
23 the real estate people? 
24 A. Six percent. 
|25 Q. On the $400,000? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Let me check my math here, but I think six 
3 percent of $400,000 is what, $24,000? Is that 
4 correct? 
5 A. Fine with me. I haven't figured it out. 
6 Q. And if that's correct, then you would 
7 receive, out of that down payment, about $26,000. Is 
8 that correct? 
9 A. If that's what the math is, I don't have any 
10 problem with it. 
_ Q; ^ 
12 A. I don't know. They had somebody set up to 
13 finance them. 
14 Well, they had some group of ~ I shouldn't 
115 say I don't know. I don't remember exactly, and I 
16 never double checked it or saw it in writing. But they 
17 had financing lined up somehow. 
18 Q. Let me direct your attention to the bottom 
-19- of that Real Estate Purchase Contract on the first page 
20 there. 
21 And there's some handwriting down there. 
22 Just above paragraph 2.2 at the very bottom? 
23 A. Mm-hmm. 
24 Q. Does that indicate that they were going to 
25 pay you five percent interest? 
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1 A. Yeah, if this was the - I mean, that's what 
2 this contract says, if I read the language right. 
3 If I can read the writing. 
4 Q. Did you discuss that with your brothers? 
5 A. I suppose. You know, we went through this 
6 contract. 
7 Q. Did you and your brothers agree to these 
8 terms? 
9 A. Yes. And we signed it, yeah. 
10 Q. I want you to turn back to the end of this 
11 particular section of documents. 
12 A. Well, do you know what? We had several 
13 addendums that went with this. 
14 Q. Let's go through the addendums in a minute? 
15 A. All right. 
16 Q. But I want to see if that's your signature 
117 accepting - making acknowledgment that you'd seen 
18 this, and going to make a counteroffer. 
19 A. What page are you on? 
20 Q. Well -
21 A. Or -
22 Q. This is page one, two — 
23 A. You're on the last of the contract? 
24 Q. - three, four, five. Page six of that 
25 contract. 
I T A U I U ' A a g V 
Page 97 
1 A. Yeah. And what was the question? 
2 Q. Is that your signature? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And then there's addendum to this contract? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Who drafted this addendum? 
7 MR. CLARK: W h i c h o n e ? 
8 MR. LUNDGREN: A d d e n d u m N o . 1? 
9 THE WITNESS: To the best of my 
10 recollection, it was drafted by Mr. Wilkerson. 
TTl Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) A n d did~Ke~^ 
12 A. And I probably con - I consulted with him, 
13 you know, before he wrote it up. 
14 Q. You consulted with him. Did you direct him 
15 to make this counteroffer? Or addendum? 
16 A. No. We j u s t -
17 Q. Well, let me make it — 
18 A. Well, it's an adden - there's -
p Q. Who imtiated-Addendum-Nor-t? 
20 A. Let me see. 
21 If I remember right, I think the buyers 
22 initiated Addendum No. 1. 
23 This was their - part of their offer to -
24 that gave us two options we could take, is Addendum 
|25 No. 1. ^ 
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1 Q. Okay. 
2 Who initiated Addendum No. 2? 
3 A. Well, let's see. I'm not sure on Addendum 
4 No. 2, if it was one of the ones that they were giving 
5 to us like as an offer, or if 2 it got -
6 Because we initiated some of them, 
7 obviously, but I am not sure if this was one of them. 
8 I think this is still them make making an offer for us 
9 to accept. 
10 Q. Who initiated Addendum No. 3? 
11 A. I think Mr. Wilkerson and myself consulted 
12 on this. 
13 Q. Is that your signature in Addendum No. 3? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Do you know what it says at the bottom of 
16 that page? 
17 A. No. That's not my writing. I don't know 
18 what's on there. 
19 That, I think, is probably put on there 
20 after I signqd it. It just looks like a — 
21 I don't understand — I can't read it. I 
22 don't know what it is. 
23 Q. Does Addendum No. 3 indicate that you accept 
24 the terms of their offer, excepting for allowing for a 
125 court date? 
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1 A. I believe so. 
2 Q. And there's a second Addendum No. 3 on the 
3 page after that. ; 
4 Can you tell me what that is? 
5 A. Just what it says there. Let me see. Just 
6 another addendum to deal with the hearing, I think, as 
7 t h e -
8 Obviously the buyers were concerned of what 
9 the outcome of the hearing was going to be. 
10 Q. Did you accept that second Addendum No. 3? 
TI A. Yes. 
112 Q. Now, there's a third Addendum No. 3 that's 
13 typewritten. 
14 What can you tell me about it? 
15 A. Nothing other than what I've already told 
16 you. I mean, it says what it is. 
17 Q. Is the language on these third Addendum 
18 No. 3 the same as the one that you accepted? Same 
49—words, but-type written? 
20 A. I think so. 
21 Well, let me check. Yeah. 
22 There might be a date or something 
23 different, but I think in general it's the same one. 
124 Q. Now, there's a signature at the bottom of 
25 that one you accepted. That is your signature, is that 
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1 correct? 
2 A. A r e you talking about the handwritten 
3 Addendum N o . 3? 
4 Q. The handwritten addendum? 
5 A. Yes . 
6 Q. And what is the date? 
7 A. Le t ' s see. 11-4. November the 4th. 
8 Q. So you accepted this offer on November 
9 the 4th, is that correct? 
10 A. Well , that might be an error in spelling o r 
11 something, because I don ' t think we accepted it until 
12 December the 4th. 
13 Q. W e l l - -
14 A. Or -
15 Q . I see some things at the top of this that 
16 seem to indicate -
17 A. Or , well , do you know what? Maybe — yeah, 
18 we probably did accept this in November. I don ' t 
119 remember exactly. I know we sent a lot of addendums 
20 back and forth trying to deal with your guys ' hear ing, 
21 and so. 
22 Q. M y question is whether or not you accepted 
23 this addendum and contract on November 4th. 
24 A. Yes . 
25 Q. Yes , you did. Okay. 
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1 Accepting it with Addendum No. 3 included in there. 
2 Q. Which Addendum No . 3? You have signed two 
3 Addendum No . 3s . You signed one on 11 and I can' t read 
4 that date. And you signed one on 11-4. Which one of 
5 these Addendum No. 3s are you referring to? 
6 A. I don ' t remember. 
7 Q. Please give me your best estimate of what 
8 you ' re referring to . 
9 A. In my best estimate it would be the one 
10 that 's in the second order here. 
(11 Q. The 11-4? 
12 A. Yeah. I would — yeah. That one that says 
13 no contingencies. 
14 Q. Okay. 
15 Now, bear with me, please. 
16 On November 4th, after you have signed this 
17 document, according to your understanding, could you 
18 have cancelled the deal with Gibson? 
j _ .__ - ^ ^ j j j j j g t Q ^ y unders tandmgTyoucan 
20 cancel these things any time up until closing. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A. And could y o u -
23 Q. Go ahead and explain. 
24 A. I just - that 's my understanding of real 
25 estate law. I don't know that it's correct or not, 
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1 but. 
2 Q. That ' s all I was asking you for was your 
3 understanding. 
4 So when you made the offer to Mr . Eldridge, 
5 on about November 8th, you felt like you could get out 
6 of this deal with Gibson, if Eldridge would come up 
7 with the $390,000 in cash? 
8 A. W e didn' t have a deal with Gibson. I hadn' t 
9 signed the actual contract yet. 
10 Q. That 's my point. So you could have gotten 
II out of - whatever you signed here didn't mean anything 
12 until you signed the final contract on the 12th. Is 
13 that correct? 
14 A. Well, you ' re putting words in my mouth. 
15 Q. Well, explain it to me. 
16 A. If you want me to explain the spirit of this 
17 was, in all of the time between when we got the offer 
18 and when we signed it was spent getting to an offer 
19 that we thought was acceptable. 
20 Q. Okay. 
21 A. When we reached that, in the spirit of that, 
22 that it was an acceptable offer to us , that 's when it 
!23 was presented to Mr. Eldridge. Before it was signed. 
124 Q. Okay. 
25 And so as o f -
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1 A. But don ' t ask me if I signed something that 
2 didn ' t mean anything to me. 
3 Q. I 'm just trying to understand what 's 
4 happening. 
5 So in the spirit of the agreement, as of 
6 11-4, okay? You still could have sold the property to 
7 somebody else? 
8 Somebody would have come in and offered you 
9 half a million dollars, you could have gone ahead and 
10 signed with somebody else for half a million dollars? 
11 A. The way I understand - my understanding of 
12 it is you ' re just negotiating, and you haven't signed, 
13 you ' re welcome to accept from anybody. 
14 Q. So the answer to that question is yes? 
15 A. My answer is what it was. 
16 Q. Did you ever talk with your brothers about 
17 whether or not it would be kind of nice, or terms of 
118 that nature, that a distant relative could have 
19 acquired the ranch? 
20 A. No. 
21 Q. Do you know whether o r not Bob West had 
22 any - acquired any interest in this ranch as part of 
23 this deal with Mr . Gibson? 
24 A. I don ' t know. 
25 Q. Did Mr. Wilkerson disclose to you that he 
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1 may have an interest in the ranch? 
2 A. No . Bob West or Mr. Wilkerson? 
3 Q. My first question was regarding Bob West. 
4 My second question was regarding Mr. Wilkerson. Gerald 
5 Wilkerson? 
6 A. Did Gerald have interest? Or if Gerald knew 
7 Bob had interest? 
8 Q. My question is do you know whether or not 
9 Gerald Wilkerson had any interest in the purchase of 
10 the ranch, other than acting as a real estate interest? 
II A. No, I don't know. 
12 Q. Do you know whether he knew whether Bob West 
13 had any interest in it? 
14 A. I don ' t know. 
15 Q. Why did you allow the Eldridges to stay the 
16 weekend on the ranch in - October 30th weekend? 
17 A. Because they asked to. 
18 Q. That 's it? 
19 A. (Witness nods.) 
20 MR. CLARK: Answer out loud. 
21 THE WITNESS: What? 
22 MR. CLARK: You need to answer out loud. 
!23 You nodded your head. 
124 THE WITNESS: Oh. Yes. 
25 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) You indicated that Doug 
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1 Westbrook had given you advice about your real estate 
2 transactions, and that Raquel ~ I don't remember her 
3 last name - had talked to your brothers about the real 
4 estate transactions. 
5 Anybody else you spoke to regarding real 
6 estate — the real estate transaction regarding the 
7 ranch? 
8 A. That real estate agent that I named that I 
9 met down in St. George. Well, I didn't name him, but. 
10 Q. You didn't know his name? 
[1 r TtrYeaETTust met nun in passmg. 
12 Did you ask - did you ask me if the 
13 purchase sale of the ranch to the Eldridges, or just a 
14 sale of the ranch? 
15 Q. Regarding the sale of the ranch. 
16 A. Just in general? 
17 Q. In general. 
18 A. That's all I - well, I think - I'm sure I 
19 consulted, you know -^wiferMr. Wilkersonrbeeause-he-was-
20 the real estate agent, you know. 
21 Q. Okay. 
22 A. But aside from that, I can't recall. 
23 Q. What was Mr. Wade's arrangement in selling 
24 the property? He was co-listing agent. What was he 
25 going to be doing? 
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1 A. It's my understanding that Mr. Wilkerson 
2 doesn't have access to put a piece of paper on what's 
3 called the multiple listing, and Mr. Wade did. And so 
4 we thought that that could generate some more interest, 
5 or get the ranch out there a little more, if Mr. Wade 
6 co-listed with him. 
7 We'd been listed with Mr. Wilkerson for a 
8 while, I think, and we hadn't got any serious action on 
9 it, so we thought it couldn't hurt to try to broaden 
10 our possibilities a little bit. 
11 Q. Have you provided a seller disclosure to 
12 Mr. Gibson, or his group? 
13 A. I believe so. 
14 Q. I don't have a copy of that disclosure in 
15 these documents. Can you - will you ask your attorney 
16 to forward me a copy of that disclosure? 
17 A. The real estate agent probably should have 
18 it. He didn't come with all of the stuff you 
19 subpoenaed from him? 
20 Q. I don't have a copy of it. 
21 A. We can try to find you one, if there's still 
22 one that exists. 
23 Q. Did either Bob West or Gerald Wilkerson 
24 agree to give back part of their commission to you on 
|25 the sale of the ranch? 1 
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A. We discussed that subject. No - whether ~ 
You're asking me as if we'd reached some 
final agreement on this, and no. We discussed the 
subject. And then we arrived at that Addendum 9, and 
whatever it is, and that's what we went with. 
Q. How much had you discussed about receiving 
back from the real estate agents? 
A. Well, what was when we were trying to reach 
an agreement here on how to indemnify the buyer. 
That's when the subject came up. That in the unlikely 
case that we lose tins case, we'd give iiun back ins 
money. 
But we were going to pay the commission up 
front. And we weren't going to have that commission to 
pay back the buyer. So we discussed that with the real 
estate agents, what their disposition was on returning 
their commissions then. 
Q. You indicated in your counterclaim that your 
-attorney-filed to our amended petition^ thaf^ou-were 
seeking some damages because of the liens that had 
been — lis pendens that had been filed. 
What are your damages? 
A. Well, we don't have the purchase amount that 1 
we would have had. 
Q. I'm just going to stop you and explain that. 
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What purchase amount would you have had? 
A. We would have had the 390,000 in its 
entirety from them by now, plus the interest. 
Q. And — but if you win, you're not going to 
have any damages because you're going to get the 
$390,000. Correct? 
A. Well, we're not making any interest on part 
of it right now. 
Q. Is the money that's being paid by the 
purchasers being held in an interest-bearing account? 
A. Yeah, but we didn't get all of the whole 
amount of it. 
Q. So you believe you've lost some interest? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know how much? 
A. No. I haven't computed it yet. 
Q. Will you compute that and let your attorney 
now how much that is and let me know? 
A. We can. 
Q. Thank you. 
What other damages do you believe you've 
suffered? 
A. All our expense of coming out here, and our 
attorney's fees. 
And I could - if you want me to give you a 1 
TkT?nr\ 
MUltl 
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1 list, I can get a long list for you of all of the kind 
2 of things w e could have done with the financial 
3 independence that this had provided us — would have 
4 provided u s with , that we don ' t have now. 
5 Q. I want you to prepare a list that explains, 
6 in detail, all of the damages you believe you have 
7 suffered by vir tue of the lis pendens . 
8 Will you d o that? 
9 MR. CLARK: Can we do it this way? Could 
10 you send me an interrogatory, and then well respond to 
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1 right now. 
2 MR. CLARK: I just think that's really 
3 unethical. And apparently you were unaware of that. 
4 MR. LUNDGREN: I w a s u n a w a r e o f t h a t , a n d I 
5 don't think that my client realized it was still on. I 
6 think she was absorbing the proceedings and simply 
7 forgot to turn it off. 
8 And I will further stipulate, if there's any 
9 confidential attorney-client information on that, it 
10 will not be used. 
11 MR. CLARK: T h a n k y o u . 
12 MR. LUNDGREN: E x h i b i t N o . 10. 
13 (Whereupon, Exhibit No. 10 
14 was marked for identification.) 
15 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) L e t m e s h o w y o u w h a t ' s 
16 been marked as Exhibit No. 10, Mr. Farnsworth. 
17 And although the printing is kind of vague 
18 on that, can you identify what that is? 
19 A. Real Estate Purchase Contract. 
20 Q. Who is making the offer on that? 
21 A. Anthony Zufelt. 
|22 Q. What date was this offer made, do you know? 
123 A. I can't read it on this copy here. I think 
24 it's the 29th, but I can't read it for sure. j 
25 Q. Okay. I 
-rage "' 
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1 When did you first see this document? 
2 A. The 30th. 
3 Q. Were you notified of - that the offer had 
4 been made prior to the 30th? 
5 A. Well , l ike I said, h e called me the evening 
6 of the 28th. Said there was two offers. So - 1 can ' t 
7 remember if he said exactly w h o , or what, but -
8 And then on the 30th, h e gave m e these -
9 the regionals, both this one and the Byron Gibson. 
10 Q. And the amount of this offer is for how 
rrr~mudi? 
12 A. $401,000. 
13 Q. I 'm curious why you did not accept the one 
14 for $401,000, and you accepted one for 390. 
15 A. Because w e ' d already been down the road with 
16 somebody saying they could get the money and not being 
17 able to come up with it. So the other guy said he had 
18 his financing lined up , and it wasn ' t going to be 
19 through abank,~and t h a t h e had it secured. And this 
20 guy was going to have to go try to get it from the 
21 bank . 
22 Q. Let me show you what is going to be marked 
23 Exhibit 11 . 
:24 (Whereupon, Exhibit N o . 11 
! 25 was marked for identification.) 
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1 MR. LUNDGREN: T h i s is the o n l y c o p y I h a v e , 
2 Clark, so we'll have to go with that. 
3 MR. CLARK: O k a y . 
4 Q. (BY MR. LUNDGREN) C a n y o u identify th i s 
5 Exhibit No. 11? 
6 A. Yeah. Addendum No. 1. 
7 Q. Is that your signature at the bottom of 
8 that? 
9 A. Y e s . 
10 Q. And the date? 
11 A. It's not my writing in the date. 
12 Q. What's the date next to your signature? 
13 A. The 8th of November. 
14 Q. And would you read the terms in the 
15 addendum? The added terms? 
116 A. The added terms in the - okay. I remember 
17 this exhibit. Or this addendum now. 
18 Read the — okay. Seller has accepted 
19 another offer, but willing to make the offer of Zufelt 
20 Farms with a back-up offer, if accepted by Zufelt. 
21 Price to be 400,000. Number two, cash, 
22 close be on the - on 2-15-05. Buyer offer to be 
23 effective only if accepted offer fails after 2-2-05. 
24 No contingencies, straight cash offer. 
25 Q. And did you sign this on or about 
~jtf 
12 Yes. 
13 MR. CLARK: Format wise would b e best. 
14 THE WITNESS: What did we ~ 
15 MR. CLARK: H e ' s going to send m e an 
16 interrogatory l ike the one y o u ' v e already answered. 
17 That gives u s a format to respond to. 
18 MR. LUNDGREN: Let ' s go off the record. 
19— (Whereupon, a break was taken.) -
20 MR. CLARK: W e ' r e ready to go back on the 
21 record. I want to raise another objection. T h e video 
22 recorder. I see y o u ' r e leaving it on during breaks . I 
23 think that ' s immoral , unethical, and illegal. 
24 MR. LUNDGREN: Was it o n during the break? 
125 MRS. ELDRIDGE: Yeah. I mean, i t ' s still o n 
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1 November 11th? 
2 A. I don't remember -
3 Q. Or November 8th? I'm sorry? 
4 A. I don't remember the exact date, but what 
5 this was was Mr. Zufelt, if I remember it right, wanted 
6 to establish himself in second position in case the 
7 first offer fell through. And so this is how - what 
8 was done to do that. 
9 Q. And so you responded to him that you already 
10 had a deal? You already had ~ 
TTI A. No, 1 didn't ever respond to Mr. ZufelE 
12 Q. Well, you signed this addendum, which states 
13 that the seller has accepted another offer. Is that 
14 correct? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Was the original Gibson offer for $400,000? 
17 A. I believe so. 
18 Q. If he offered you $400,000 originally, why 
I I O /4ir1 if/Aii virln/j tin t*\\rtt\a ^QfV? . —— • - • — 
1 i y — UlU yOU~Wiiltt Up^dJfcmg^znj: 
20 A. Because, like I told you before, Mr. Zufelt 
21 was going to have to go to the bank, is my 
22 understanding. Or told to me that he was going to have 
23 to go through the financing process at the bank.. 
24 Q. Mr. Gibson offered you $400,000. You wound 
25 up making a deal with Mr. Gibson for $390,000. 
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1 A. Uh-huh. 
2 Q. Why? 
3 A. Because that — we went for the 390 in order 
4 to not - he offered 400,000, and I think it was going 
5 to be made in - I can't remember exactly, but there 
6 was going to be multiple payments. More than one 
7 payment. So we took $10,000 off to be able to close 
8 the whole deal out on January. 
9 Q. Well, your Addendum No. 9 -
10 MR. CLARK: On Exhibit 9? Is that where 
11 we're at? 
12 MR. LUNDGREN: On Exhibit 9. Paragraph one. 
13 It says-
14 Well, it may have been I didn't have the 
15 right date. On which a date did you change the 
16 purchase price from 400 to $390,000? 
17 A. I don't know if we changed it on the 
18 addendum or not. 
19 I guess I could go back through and look at 
20 them. I just remember that that was the deal. 
21 Q. That would have been Addendum No. 3, dated 
22 11-4. 
23 Okay. 
24 The original offer was, on the Real Estate 
25 Purchase Contract, 11-9-2004, from Mr. Gibson, gave two 
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choices. A 50,000 at closing, 50,000 in six-months, 
100,000 each year until paid in full at five percent, 
or cash after January 31st, 2005. 
So you had a cash offer for $400,000, which 
would have been paid after January 31, 2005. That 
doesn't explain why it winds up being 390,000. 
A. Oh, because I ~ let me see. 
Because the - in order to get the 400,000 
total, he didn't want to give anything until he gave 
the 400,000, like at the closing or something like 
that, at January 31st. We wanted to get him secured 
with the 50,000 down. So we said, you give us 50,000 
non-refundable to show your good faith, and then we'll 
go ahead and take the rest, which would be what? 350, 
I guess, at the later date. 
It was in - see, in order to do the 400, he 
didn't want to put anything down. See. So is that 
could have put us in another deal like we were in with 
hi9—Eldridgrherergonig~over^^ | 
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back and forth. We were like, Put your money where 
your mouth is. You know? If you want to put this, 
put 50,000 down non-refundable, and we'll knock $10,000 
off for you. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But you put your money up there, then, to 
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make sure you're serious. 
Q. Thank you. 
Anything else? 
MR. LUNDGREN: Okay. We're done. 
MR. CLARK: Okay. 
MR. LUNDGREN: Do you have anything? 
MR. CLARK: I don't. 
(Whereupon, the deposition 
was concluded at 2:57 p.m.) 
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1 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
3 ) SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
4 
5 THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the testimony of 
the foregoing witness, in the foregoing cause named, was 
6 taken before me, DEBRA A. DIBBLE, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of 
7 Utah, residing at Woodland, Utah. 
8 
That the said witness was by me, before 
9 examination, duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth in said cause. 
10 
m Thar ttieiesxiraony o^sai*^ritness-way 
reported by me in Stenotype, and thereafter caused by 
112 me to be transcribed into typewriting, and that a full, 
true and correct transcription of said testimony so 
13 taken and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing 
transcript, and said witness was examined and said as 
14 in the foregoing annexed transcript. 
15 
I further certify that I am not of kin or 
16 otherwise associated with any of the parties to said 
cause of action, and that I am not interested in the 
17 event thereof. 
18 That in accordance with Rule 30(e), no 
request having been made for the witness to read and 
19 .^  sign, the original transcript was sealed and delivered 
to the taking attorney for safekeeping. 
20 
21 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set 
my hand and affixed my Notarial Seal this of 
22 ,2004. . 
23 
24 Debra A. Dibble, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
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